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Abstract: 
For many of the large-scale problems facing humanity, individuals lack the power to 
address them on their own. We might call upon group agents such as states or 
corporations to solve them for us. Problems such as climate change, however, are of such 
a scope and magnitude that no single group agent can deal with them effectively. To 
achieve a cooperative solution, groups must negotiate with one another on how to 
address these problems. Contributing to our understanding of how humanity can deal 
with such large-scale problems, the present thesis offers a theory of negotiating group 
agents. 
After an introduction, chapters two, three, and four offer a philosophical reconstruction 
of the sociological Negotiated Order approach. At the core of these chapters is a 
pragmatist theory of motivational change in social contexts, which I contrast with 
standard rational choice theory. The Negotiated Order approach argues that many social 
phenomena, such as organisations, function based on motivational change occurring in 
the context of informal negotiations. 
Chapter five discusses group agency and argues that functionalist accounts of group 
agency are a promising approach for extending the Negotiated Order approach. The sixth 
and final chapter returns to the original motivation for developing a theory of negotiating 
group agents. It shows that in the case of climate change negotiations, the Negotiated 
Order account offers a different and promising perspective than standard rational choice 
models. 
In addition, the thesis includes an appendix which discusses Dewey’s theory of choice and 
proposes a way of formalising its pragmatist take on preference change. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Whether it be climate change, transnational economic crises, or the threat of nuclear war, 
humanity is facing large-scale problems. In light of these pressing problems, we might call 
upon agents to work out a resolution. But individuals lack the power to effectively 
address these problems and humanity itself is not an agent1. Group agents, however, 
serve as good candidates for addressing them. 
By forming group agents, human individuals pool their power. States, corporations, or 
transnational NGOs may be among the problem-solvers needed. In recent years, various 
philosophers (List & Pettit 2011, Huebner 2014, Tollefsen 2015, Epstein 2017) have put 
forward theories of group agency that allow us to see which groups might be eligible 
candidates for acting on climate change, economic crises, or threats of war. 
The aforementioned problems, however, are of such scope and magnitude that no single 
group agent can deal with them effectively. For example, while we might place our hopes 
in the USA’s contribution to combating climate change, even this world power is not up 
to the task on its own (see Gardiner 2011: 96-97 for an explanation as to why not). 
Multiple group agents must act together to avoid catastrophe although their individual 
interests will diverge. Thus to achieve a cooperative solution, they must negotiate with 
one another on how best to address the problems. 
We therefore need to understand how group agents negotiate with one another. What 
kind of negotiators are states when they face one another in climate change 
negotiations? Which assumptions should we make when we model the negotiations 
between group agents? To answer these questions, I propose a theory of negotiating 
group agents.  
                                                          
1 Or at least it is not based on the more plausible theories of group agency: cf. Lawford-Smith 2015. 
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Standard rational choice theory offers one account of negotiations. By standard rational 
choice theory, I am referring to accounts in decision and game theory which assume that 
intrinsic preferences are fixed 2  and that agents, individual or group, act on their 
preferences and beliefs in an attempt to maximise their preference satisfaction. Christian 
List and Philip Pettit put forward an account of group agents built upon standard rational 
choice theory in their influential book, Group Agency (2011).3 
While the assumptions of standard rational choice theory allow the construction of 
simple and powerful mathematical models, they also limit the usefulness of the theory 
as an account of negotiations. From the vantage point of standard rational choice theory, 
some potential avenues for advancement in dealing with large-scale problems remain 
undetectable, or so I suggest. One might hope to find options other than the one outlined 
in the occasionally dismal models of rational choice theory. 
For example, in climate change negotiations, states might seem caught up in a prisoner’s 
dilemma or a tragedy of the commons (Gardiner 2011). States prefer mutual cooperation 
  ̶ each state curbing its emissions   ̶  over mutual defection resulting in severe climate 
change. But the states also prefer the option of defecting while others cooperate. In other 
words, each state prefers it that the others cut their emissions to avert climate change, 
leaving its own economy to progress unhindered. If countries also deem it preferable not 
to be the “sucker”, (that is, not to be the one who cooperates while others withdraw,) 
defection dominates. No matter what the other agents do, each one maximises their 
satisfaction of preferences by defecting. 
Being rational preference maximisers, the states defect and the climate deteriorates. But 
not only would the climate suffer   ̶  the overall pay-off would be even lower than with 
                                                          
2 For the notion of intrinsic preferences, see Binmore 2009: 5-6 
3 Although List developed more sophisticated models of rational choice with Franz Dietrich (2013), 
we find little of this reflected in List’s work on group agency. 
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mutual cooperation. We want to avoid such an outcome, but how can we do this, given 
the assumption of standard rational choice theory? I propose that standard rational 
choice theory occludes certain ways forward, and that abandoning its dubious 
assumptions allows us to see these options. A different view on negotiations is the first 
step towards avoiding what seems to be inevitable failure from the perspective of the 
standard approach. 
The present thesis offers a different theory of negotiating group agents. Drawing on the 
sociological Negotiated Order4 approach, I provide an account of group agents exhibiting 
a so-called Negotiated Order internally and in their interactions with one another. Within 
sociology, the Negotiated Order approach, spearheaded by Anselm Strauss, presents 
some competition to standard rational choice approaches. It claims to offer a different 
account of agency that incorporates motivational change in an original manner. I dedicate 
a large part of my thesis to reconstructing this account of agency and showing how it 
diverges from standard rational choice theory. 
My thesis presents the account of negotiating group agents that emerges if we base our 
account on the Negotiated Order approach rather than standard rational choice theory. 
By endorsing the Negotiated Order approach, a picture of group agents results that allows 
us to see new options for negotiating large-scale problems. To establish this broadening 
of perspective, I look especially at models of climate change negotiations between states. 
I illustrate how alternative ways out of unfruitful negotiation deadlocks can be discovered 
when states undergo a type of preference change as proposed by the Negotiated Order 
approach. Abandoning the assumption that intrinsic preferences exist prior to the 
                                                          
4 To indicate the technical nature of this term, I will capitalise it here and in the following. The 
exact analysis will occur in chapter four. 
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situation of action, new potential for cooperation becomes apparent in our account of 
climate change negotiations. 
My thesis does not establish the correctness of the Negotiated Order approach, which 
would be an empirical endeavour in sociology and psychology, nor does it defend the 
reality of group agents, as much of the current literature in the philosophical debate 
attempts to do. Rather, I reconstruct a sociological approach and demonstrate that when 
endorsed, the approach provides us with a different picture of the interaction between 
multiple group agents than thus far assumed in philosophical debates (for example by 
Gardiner 2011). 
Before I provide an outline describing how my thesis develops the Negotiated Order 
approach as a theory of negotiating group agents, it is necessary to go into more detail 
about the sociological approach. Since the Negotiated Order approach has received little 
philosophical attention so far, I introduce it and its history. This background information 
makes it easier to see why I proceed the way I do. 
 
The History and Context of the Negotiated Order Approach 
The roots of the Negotiated Order approach reach back to the institutionalisation of 
sociology in the USA and, in particular, the Chicago School of the early 20th century. On 
the sociological side, William Thomas and Robert E. Park numbered among the most 
important members, but the school always exhibited a philosophical side. Not only had 
Park been under Dewey’s influence (cf. Joas 1993: 33), but George Herbert Mead 
remained in close contact with the future sociological researchers. 
The Chicago School did not propagate one principled sociological theory, but rather 
formed a loosely united community. As Paul Rock writes, “[f]from the very first, an oral 
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tradition dwarfed the formal and articulate processes of disseminating ideas” (Rock 1979: 
5). But without doubt, classical pragmatist philosophy influenced the school and its 
account of individual agents from the start (Joas & Knöbl 2009: 184-185). For this reason, 
I occasionally call the sociological approaches following the Chicago School “pragmatist 
sociology”. 
One particular element of Dewey’s theory of action lived on in pragmatist sociology: the 
Problematic Situation.5 According to Dewey, Problematic Situations prompt agents to 
change their take on the world (cf. Joas & Knöbl 2009: 189). How exactly we should 
describe such Problematic Situations and what it means for agents to change their take 
on the world is the main topic of the next chapter. 
During its heyday, the Chicago School produced prominent sociological research, 
especially in the field of urban sociology, but starting in the 1940s its influence waned. 
The heritage of pragmatist sociology and of the Chicago School continued in symbolic 
interactionism, which has been recognised as a distinct school of sociology ever since. 
Symbolic interactionism took its cues from the earlier Chicago School and the work of 
George Herbert Mead.6 Herbert Blumer, who had been Mead’s assistant, became the 
father and most important proponent of symbolic interactionism. In Blumer’s work, 
Chicago’s oral tradition lived on. 
The symbolic interactionists look closely at how individuals interact, how they interpret 
the situation and each other during interactions, and how these interpretations shift. 
With the emphasis on meaning and interpretation came a narrowing of the perspective 
of symbolic interactionism. While Blumer continued the pragmatist tradition in sociology, 
some questions raised by the Chicago School received less attention from the symbolic 
                                                          
5 To indicate the technical nature of this term, I will capitalise it here and in the following. 
6  For a debate within sociology on the pragmatist roots of symbolic interactionism, see the 
exchange between Lewis (1976, 1977) and Blumer (1977). 
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interactionists. The original Chicago School had been famous for its urban sociology, 
which focussed on the structure of cities and addressed issues at various scales. The 
symbolic interactionists, on the other hand, focussed on interaction in the microsphere, 
that is among a small number of individuals. They engaged in a form of folk psychological 
analysis of interacting agents interpreting various objects, including each other. The 
symbolic interactionists rarely considered social phenomena on a larger scale. 
As a consequence, critics accuse symbolic interactionism as lacking a proper theory of 
sociological macro-phenomena. According to this criticism, the symbolic interactionists 
fail to account for large-scale phenomena. While many sociologists use insights into 
micro-interaction offered by symbolic interactionism, they hold that symbolic 
interactionism remains incomplete at best, since it neglects macro-phenomena. Climate 
negotiations, involving virtually all nations of the world, are one such macro-
phenomenon. Although attempts have been made to respond to this accusation, the 
problems with macro-phenomena have lingered with symbolic interactionism right 
through to the present (cf. Joas & Knöbl 2009: 216-219).  
Anselm Strauss put forward his Negotiated Order approach in the context of symbolic 
interactionism and its limitations. Strauss had received his education at Chicago 
University and contributed to the formation of symbolic interactionism with his early 
book (1997 [1959]) on identity entitled Mirrors and Masks. His Negotiated Order 
approach turned the pragmatist tradition in the form of symbolic interaction towards 
organisation theory. Like many authors in the tradition of the Chicago School, Strauss 
developed his approach by engaging in empirical research. 
Together with a team, Strauss investigated medical institutions and, in 1963, published a 
foundational text for the Negotiated Order approach: “The Hospital and Its Negotiated 
Order”. This book chapter, which I draw on repeatedly, presents the main tenets of the 
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Negotiated Order approach. Further important sources are Strauss’ books Negotiations 
(1988 [1978]), which elaborates and defends the Negotiated Order approach, and 
Continual Permutations of Actions (2014), which discusses the theory of action underlying 
Strauss’ work. 
Being an offspring of symbolic interactionism, the negotiated approach inherited the 
problems regarding macro-phenomena. While these issues are not the main topic of my 
thesis, the focus on group agents has an interesting consequence: It ‘scales up’ pragmatist 
sociology. By discussing how the Negotiated Order approach sheds light on climate 
negotiations between states, I show how it can address a macro-phenomenon. Bearing 
in mind this background knowledge of pragmatist sociology, I can clarify how my own 
project proceeds. 
 
Outline of a Theory of Negotiating Group Agents 
To reap the benefits of the Negotiated Order approach for a theory of negotiating group 
agents, I reconstruct it in a way palatable for philosophers. The pragmatist heritage of the 
approach serves as the starting point for this endeavour. 
The second chapter of my thesis introduces Dewey’s theory of the Problematic Situation 
mentioned above. I reconstruct this theory as an account of preference change, which 
forms the first pillar of my reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach. Since my 
reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach serves as a competitor to standard 
rational choice models, I focus on how the theory of Problematic Situations goes beyond 
the assumptions of the latter. 
Standard rational choice models assume stable intrinsic preferences (see Stigler & Becker 
1977), that is to say that intrinsic preferences remain independent of the situation of 
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action. If I intrinsically prefer chocolate ice cream over strawberry ice cream, my 
preference will not change. At best, new information can lead the extrinsic preference to 
change, for example when I learn that the ice cream shop also offers chocolate ice cream 
and therefore buy that rather than strawberry ice cream.  
In the case of negotiations, this means that agents have their intrinsic preferences prior 
to the negotiations and that these intrinsic preferences remain fixed during the process. 
This assumption underlies the concern that group agents such as states cannot serve as 
the problem-solvers needed for climate change and similar large-scale problems: if their 
intrinsic preferences lock the agents into a prisoner’s dilemma, they seem to have no way 
out. 
Pragmatist sociology, including the Negotiated Order approach, breaks with the 
assumption of stable intrinsic preferences. Instead, Problematic Situations prompt 
preference change, including the change of intrinsic preferences. In response to 
encountering a Problematic Situation, agents become more likely to undergo a change of 
their preferences. By the end of the second chapter we should have a grasp on what 
exactly occurs in such Problematic Situations. But to understand the full dynamic ensuing 
from Problematic Situations, we must also understand the importance pragmatist 
sociology assigns to interpretation and meaning. 
For this purpose, the third chapter reconstructs the symbolic interactionist heritage of 
the Negotiated Order approach. The task proves difficult since “interactionism has never 
been concisely formulated” (Rock 1979: 7). Blumer offered what comes closest to a 
summary of the foundational principles (Blumer 1969: 2): 
1. Human beings act towards objects, including other human beings, based on the 
meanings these objects have for them. 
2. The meaning of objects arises out of social interaction between human beings. 
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3. The agents engage in interpretative processes towards the objects they encounter. 
Since these principles remain vague, I am compelled to reconstruct them at great length. 
At the risk of committing a heresy, I use tools from rational choice theory for my 
reconstruction efforts. Rational choice accounts of conventional meaning and signalling 
capture much of what Blumer and other symbolic interactionists were after.  
David Lewis’ Convention (1969) offered one of the first rational choice models of meaning. 
Conventions, including linguistic conventions about meaning, arise out of particular 
cooperation problems. Brian Skyrms (1996, 2004, 2010) and others have further 
developed such approaches to meaning, drawing on evolutionary theory. These models 
of signalling can account for how meaning arises in interactions and how individuals 
interpret and act on it. 
While I argue that rational choice models can cover much of what Blumer discussed, I 
focus on the original contribution symbolic interactionism makes over and above such 
models. What rational choice theorists describe as signalling not only affects choices, but 
also the intrinsic preferences underlying the choices. As I show in the third chapter, the 
theory of Problematic Situations allows signalling to influence preference change and to 
thereby lead to a deeper form of cooperation. This finding forms the second pillar of my 
reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach. 
The fourth chapter then presents my analysis of Negotiated Orders. Drawing on the 
theory of action reconstructed in the previous chapters, I provide the necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for exhibiting a Negotiated Order. Negotiated Orders are a 
special form of social order, shaped by negotiation in response to Problematic Situations. 
According to the Negotiated Order approach, bureaucratic rules cannot explain all 
features of a social order on their own. We need to take negotiations and informal 
agreements into account. 
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Because the negotiations respond to Problematic Situations, there is an increased chance 
of preference change while they take place. The kind of signalling about preference 
change discussed in chapter three plays a role during these negotiations. Engaging in 
trade-offs is not the only way to cross a motivational chasm in negotiations; a change of 
motivations serves as a bridge as well. 
Chapter five combines the theory of group agency with the Negotiated Order approach. 
Strauss and other practitioners of the Negotiated Order approach have asserted the 
existence of group agents. Relying on their word, I do not myself offer a defence of group 
agency. The Negotiated Order approach, however, does not provide a theory of group 
agency. Being a sociological school rather than one of philosophy of mind, it says little 
about the theory of mind for groups. I fill this gap by arguing that Negotiated Order 
sociologists should accept a coarse-grained functionalism about minds. My argument 
proceeds by rejecting the most influential competitor: the interpretivist theory of group 
agency defended by List and Pettit (2011), and Tollefsen (2015). 
In addition, I argue that the Negotiated Order approach puts limitations on what can be 
the functional realisers of propositional attitudes in groups. The on-the-spot agreements 
created by negotiations have to be part of the realiser, not just bureaucratic rules, formal 
procedures, and official declarations. This proposed limitation stands in contrast to the 
picture suggested by List and Pettit’s work. 
The sixth chapter returns to the original motivation for developing a theory of negotiating 
group agents. I deliver on my promises and show that in the case of climate change 
negotiations, my account of group agents offers a different perspective than standard 
rational choice models. For this purpose, I consider models of climate change at length. 
As I discuss in chapter six, group agents do not face a simple prisoner’s dilemma during 
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climate negotiations, yet the situation they face might resemble one (see Gardiner 2004, 
2011). 
While I stay clear of defending any ethical or political positions on climate change, my 
account points out potential paths for influencing climate change negotiations to achieve 
cooperation. Assuming that group agents face a situation resembling a prisoner’s 
dilemma during climate change negotiations, one way to leave this situation behind is if 
the group agents undergo a preference change in response to Problematic Situations. 
Since debates on climate ethics have been largely based on standard rational choice 
models, my diverging account should interest researchers in this field. 
In addition to the six main chapters, the present thesis includes an appendix, which 
provides a more extensive interpretation of Dewey’s relation to decision theory. This 
appendix reconstructs Dewey’s theory of practical reasoning as a contribution to decision 
theory and helps to formalise motivational change. I will refer to the formal tools outlined 
in the appendix at multiple points in the thesis to provide a deeper understanding, but 
they are not a pre-requisite for understanding the general line of argument. 
 
On Reconstructing the Negotiated Order Approach 
Reconstructing the Negotiated Order approach for philosophical purposes is an 
endeavour that is far from trivial. I therefore want to point out a few complications 
regarding my attempt before jumping into it. 
Strauss and other researchers did not establish the Negotiated Order approach by writing 
a manifesto providing clear principles guiding all future applications.7 Rather, Strauss and 
                                                          
7 The closest that Strauss ever came to setting down explicit principles might be his list of 19 
assumptions in Continual Permutations of Action (Strauss 2014: 23-45). But these assumptions 
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his team plunged head first into empirical research, drawing from various sources and 
following sometimes conflicting intuitions. Even in his later book Negotiations, Strauss 
prefers to discuss research findings rather than abstract principles. Accordingly, my thesis 
considers the sources from which Strauss draws in his empirical work, particularly 
Dewey’s pragmatist theory of action and Blumer’s symbolic interactionism. 
Arising out of a long tradition of pragmatist sociology, the Negotiated Order approach 
has become a multifaceted approach with a precarious unity. One can reconstruct this 
approach from various angles and achieve quite disparate results. The textual basis 
remains a far from univocal. My own reconstruction unifies the Negotiated Order 
approach by contrasting it with standard rational choice theory, that is, decision and 
game theory, assuming stable intrinsic preferences. This take on the Negotiated Order 
approach lends itself for discussing models of negotiating group agents since recent 
philosophical discussions of group agency have made use of standard rational choice 
theory but not its lesser-known rival. 
Strauss himself characterises his differences with game theory as follows:  
“One of its [game theory’s] virtues is that it does focus attention directly on negotiations 
and on such related modes of activity as coercing, persuading, and manipulating; but it 
just as surely preconceives the nature of the social orders that game theorists study and 
interpret, as well as the possibilities for action within the interpreted orders.” (Strauss, 
1988: 72) 
Both standard game theory and the Negotiated Order approach shed light on 
negotiations and related modes of activity, but Strauss believes that some of the 
assumptions underlying game theory limit the description of such activities excessively. 
                                                          
focus on action, while leaving out other aspects of the Negotiated Order approach, and not all of 
them are shared universally within the approach. 
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In the following chapters, I discuss how the Negotiated Order approach relaxes these 
assumptions, particularly the assumption that intrinsic preferences remain stable. 
To make the contrast easier, my reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach moves 
it as close as possible to rational choice theory. I use the notion of preference for my 
reconstruction and argue that much of the symbolic interactionist heritage can be 
captured using rational choice models of signalling. Many pragmatist sociologists might 
consider this move a heresy, but I provide textual evidence for my reconstruction and, in 
the end, show that the Negotiated Order approach has more to offer than standard 
decision and game theory. In effect, by moving the Negotiated Order approach closer 
than usual to rational choice theory, I only grant more to my imagined opponent. 
While my reconstruction has a clear basis in the work of Strauss and other pragmatist 
sociologists, it remains selective. I want to note one omission: identity. Strauss’ earlier 
book, Mirrors and Masks, written before he went on to found the Negotiated Order 
approach, discussed how individuals assume identities such as student or professor and 
how these identities shape interactions and vice versa. 
Although I occasionally draw on Mirrors and Masks to support my interpretation of 
Strauss, I do not discuss the role of identity in the Negotiated Order approach. While 
taking identity into account might reveal further differences between the Negotiated 
Order approach and standard rational choice theory, for my purposes I can exclude its 
role. The contribution of the Negotiated Order approach becomes apparent without 
wading into the difficult territory of identity. 
Every concise reconstruction of the negotiated approach will be selective. Other 
reconstructions might focus on identity and not include the notion of the Problematic 
Situation, although it has a clear influence on Strauss and other pragmatist sociologists. 
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My selection justifies itself by including the right elements to allow an account of 
negotiating group agents, which goes beyond standard rational choice models.  
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Chapter Two: The Problematic Situation 
The first leg of my reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach is a theory of 
motivational change. The founder of the Negotiated Order approach, Anselm Strauss, 
stated that many actions either have no clear goal or, if there is such a goal, “nevertheless 
over time something happens to this imagined goal” (Strauss 2014: 35). This chapter 
provides a discussion of the special something that happens. Strauss claims that means-
ends schemes are often incapable of covering the whole dynamic of action, because 
“[b]oth ends and means may be reformulated in transit because unexpected results occur. 
Commitment, even to a major way of life or destiny, is subject to revision in process” 
(Strauss 1997: 38, see also Strauss 2014: 33).8 
I reconstruct the Negotiated Order theory of motivational change as a theory of 
preference change. My reconstruction remains completely descriptive, that is, I avoid any 
normative evaluations of the motivational change processes described by Dewey and the 
pragmatist sociologists and instead only render their empirical claims acceptable for 
philosophical debate. This descriptive approach raises the question of the empirical 
adequacy of my approach. I defer here completely to the authority of the pragmatist 
sociologists. They have engaged in qualitative research (e.g. Strauss et al. 1963, see also 
Strauss 2014) and found the processes that I reconstruct to be empirically plausible. 
Strauss, however, was not the first to talk of a revision in process initiated by unexpected 
events. The idea belongs to the pragmatist heritage of the Negotiated Order approach. 
Problematic Situations9 play an important role in Dewey’s pragmatism: they matter for 
                                                          
8 I use the term “commitment” in a specific way later on, which is explained in the appendix and 
is to be distinguished from Strauss’ use. 
9 As mentioned before, I capitalise the term to indicate its technical use, which is discussed later 
on. 
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his theory of action, his epistemology, and his political theory. Given this, it might be 
surprising that only in a few passages does Dewey provide an explicit account of 
Problematic Situations. 
Generally, we can distinguish between epistemically Problematic Situations and 
motivationally Problematic Situations. In epistemically Problematic Situations, agents 
have an increased likelihood of changing their epistemic states such as beliefs, while in 
motivationally Problematic Situations, agents are more likely to undergo a change of their 
motivational states such as preferences. While pragmatists insist that these two types of 
Problematic Situations often coincide so that an epistemically Problematic Situation is 
also a motivationally Problematic Situation, at least conceptually we can distinguish 
between them. 
My chapter proceeds as follows in presenting the theory of Problematic Situations. First 
I introduce them by drawing on Dewey’s discussion in his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 
which treats epistemically Problematic Situations. Although I am interested in 
motivationally Problematic Situations, it helps to start with epistemically Problematic 
Situations since Dewey has provided more material on these. 
After presenting Problematic Situations in this general way, I specify the three necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions of motivationally Problematic Situations. Each condition 
characterises one stage in the encounter of a Problematic Situation. Each stage receives 
treatment in a separate section. 
The first stage is the indeterminate situation, which is characterised by disruption and 
confusion and leads agents to identify a problem. The identification of the problem is the 
central feature of the second stage. Such identification then leads the agent to become 
open to change. Agents opening up to motivational change in response to a Problematic 
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Situation enter an exploratory phase during which they try out various courses of action 
and might change their preferences according to the experiences they undergo. 
Having introduced these three stages, and in the course of doing so with the Problematic 
Situation, I contrast this theory of motivational change with rational choice theory. While 
the endorsement of intrinsic preference change distinguishes the account of 
motivationally Problematic Situations from standard rational choice theory, some non-
standard decision theory models allow for such change as well. Cohen and Axelrod’s 
model of adaptive utility bears a striking resemblance to the pragmatist account of 
Problematic Situations. A closer look, however, reveals important differences. In 
particular, the pragmatist account emphasises the exploratory nature of preference 
change.  
The chapter ends by comparing of my account with a model by Cohen and Axelrod and 
an initial application of the proposed preference change theory to a social situation. As it 
turns out, the theory of Problematic Situations has important implications for game 
theory, which I develop in later chapters. 
 
The Epistemically Problematic Situation 
To provide a basic introduction to Problematic Situations, I present Dewey’s account of 
epistemically Problematic Situations. An epistemically Problematic Situation leads the 
agent to open up to a change of her epistemic states, such as beliefs. An epistemically 
Problematic Situation, however, is not only characterised by this kind of change but also 
by the way the change arises. 
According to Dewey, a Problematic Situation arises out of an indeterminate situation. But 
what is a situation in the first place? And what might characterise a situation as either 
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indeterminate or problematic? Drawing on the work of Barwise and Perry (1981: 669), 
we can say that a situation is characterised by a spatio-temporal location and a type, 
where the type represents the agent standing in relation to various other objects. If I kick 
a ball, the situation is of the ball-kicking type, since I stand to the object of a ball in the 
relation of kicking it.10 
An indeterminate situation is “uncertain, unsettled, disturbed” (LW 12: 109),11 because 
something disrupts the agent’s activity. Dewey describes such a situation as one 
pervaded by “a unique doubtfulness” (LW 12: 109). Rather than in a kicking relation, the 
agent stands in relation to the objects in that she is confused about these objects by 
virtue of a disruption of her activity. Accordingly, the indeterminate situation is 
characterised, first by a disruption of the agent’s activity, and second by the agent’s 
ensuing confusion about the objects with which she engages. 
In their discussion of symbolic interactionism, Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl use the 
example of a computer that stops working to illustrate such situations (Joas & Knöbl 2009: 
197). In the following, I use an extended version of this example: I am writing my thesis. 
Unexpectedly, my text processing program misbehaves. It just won’t format the citations 
the way I want them formatted. So far, the computer has served me as nothing more 
than a glorified typewriter, but now it disrupts my activity. 
In the first moment, I am merely confused since I expected the program to format the 
citations the way I intended and do not understand why it does not. My writing activity 
                                                          
10 In many of my examples I will assume that the relation is of actively engaging in a certain way 
with the objects e.g. kicking the ball. But this is not a necessary condition. 
11  Here and in the following, abbreviations to quote John Dewey’s The Collected Works, the 
numbers indicating the volume: 
MW: Dewey, J. (1976). The Middle Works, 1899–1924. J. A. Boydston (ed.), Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press. 
LW: Dewey, J. (1981). The Later Works, 1925–1953. J. A. Boydston (ed.), Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press. 
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has been disrupted and I encounter an indeterminate situation. The citations simply 
won’t take the form I intended for them. The confusion of the indeterminate situation 
leads the agent to look for and identify a problem, thereby turning it into a Problematic 
Situation (cf. LW 12: 111). 
My thesis writing situation presents a clear enough and specific problem: I cannot meet 
my goal of formatting the citations in such-and-such a way with the program. Having 
identified the problem, the situation stops being merely confusing and turns problematic: 
something must be done about it. In the epistemic case, the agent subjects the situation 
and its components to inquiry.12 I try to learn more about how I can format my citations 
with the text processing program and read about the various functions of my program. 
In addressing the epistemically Problematic Situation, the agent opens up to changing her 
epistemic states, in particular her beliefs. My beliefs about computers and text processing 
programs are up for grabs. I actively look for clues13 about how citation formatting works 
and might go so far as to acquire a computer handbook, having opened up to changing 
my beliefs and to exploring various courses of action. For example, I try another writing 
program and different formatting solutions to figure out what is going on. 
In the end, I might have to give up on my belief that I can format my citations this way, 
while acquiring new beliefs about the general topic. According to Dewey’s description, I 
have tried out different courses of action following various hypotheses, first wildly 
clicking various tabs and items on my computer screen, then reading up on formatting 
                                                          
12 Dewey’s description of the Problematic Situation here is very close to Peirce’s conception of 
doubt and inquiry: “The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term 
this struggle inquiry, though it must be admitted that this is sometimes not a very apt designation” 
(Peirce 1992: 114). 
13 In this context Dewey writes of the suggestions that the situations provide. For the role of 
suggestions, see Dewey LW 11: 114 and MW 6: 239. 
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citations and various text processing programs until I could make sense of the situation 
by holding appropriate beliefs.14 
Based on this introduction to epistemically Problematic Situations, I propose the 
following necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for Dewey’s technical notion of a 
“Problematic Situation”: 
A situation is a Problematic Situation for an agent if 
(i) it arises out of a situation of unexpected disturbance of the agent’s 
activity, 
(ii) the agent identifies a problem, and 
(iii) in response, the agent opens up to a change of mental states. 
Later on, I discuss all three conditions at length for the special case of motivationally 
Problematic Situations. Here I provide a basic sketch using my example of epistemically 
Problematic Situations. However, the first two conditions do not differ between the 
epistemic and the motivational case. The difference lies merely in which mental states 
become open to change. 
These three conditions for a Problematic Situation describe the three stages that 
characterise a Problematic Situation. The first condition describes the stage of the 
indeterminate situation, which comes before the Problematic Situation and gives rise to 
it. In the computer example, the indeterminate situation is limited to the first moment in 
which I am just confused that the program fails to format the citations in the way I had 
intended and expected. My thesis writing activity grinds to a halt. 
The second condition describes the identification of the problem, which initiates the 
Problematic Situation. In the computer example, I identify the problem that my expected 
                                                          
14 Compare this with Dewey’s description of the process in his essay “How We Think” MW 6: 240-
241. 
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course of formatting the citations proves infeasible, because the program acts contrary 
to my expectations. Prompted by this identification of the problem, I start an enquiry into 
text processing programs, which leads to the next phase outlined in the third condition. 
We only have a proper Problematic Situation if in response to the identification of the 
problem the agent is opened up to a change of mental states. Such opening up 
characterises the stage following the Problematic Situation, which I call the exploratory 
phase. In my example, I open up to changing my beliefs about text processing programs 
and formatting citations. This opening up does not have to be under agential control, that 
is, the agent does not need to volitionally change her mental states. All that is needed is 
that the agent has an increased probability of a change in propositional attitudes, in this 
case the change of beliefs. To indicate that agential control isn’t necessary, I often use 
the passive formulation. 
By that point I have, of course, already changed my beliefs somewhat: I had to give up on 
my belief that I could simply format my citations in such-and-such a way without running 
into difficulties. But these belief alterations form only the preamble to the changes of 
mental states mentioned in condition (iii), because they occur before the agent is opened 
up by the situation. Only the further belief changes result from the inquiry prompted by 
identifying the problem. They arise because I read up on text processing and try out 
various things. 
A Problematic Situation in the sense presented here and found in pragmatist sociology 
needs to have all three features: the unexpected disturbance, the identification of a 
problem, and the opening up which characterises the exploratory phase during which 
agents are more likely to change their mental states. I use “Problematic Situation” as a 
technical term derived from Dewey’s usage. The technical term overlaps partially with 
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colloquial use of “Problematic Situation”, but my definition does not cover all standard 
uses. 
Not every situation which we deem problematic arises out of an unexpected disturbance. 
A situation can be morally problematic without an unexpected disturbance preceding it. 
In a straightforward sense, an immoral action makes a situation morally problematic. The 
conditions for Problematic Situations, such as the demand for a disturbance, have 
nothing to do with this situation being problematic in a colloquial sense. However, Dewey 
clearly had something else in mind and the pragmatist sociologists picked up on his theory. 
The three conditions hold for Problematic Situations in general, and one can differentiate 
between epistemically and motivationally Problematic Situations based on which mental 
states agents reconsider in the exploratory phase. For epistemically Problematic 
Situations, the exploratory phase concerns epistemic states such as beliefs. For 
motivationally Problematic Situations, the exploratory phase concerns motivational 
states such as preferences. A situation might be a Problematic Situation of both types, 
since agents often reconsider epistemic as well as motivational states at the same time. 
However, in my reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach I focus on 
motivationally Problematic Situations, because the motivational case diverges from 
standard rational choice theory. 
 
The Motivationally Problematic Situation 
Dewey’s theory of the Problematic Situation influenced how pragmatist sociologists think 
about motivational change. Strauss stays close to Dewey when he offers the following 
description: 
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“But the future is uncertain, is to some extent judged, labeled and known after it happens. 
This means that human action necessarily must be rather tentative and exploratory. 
Unless a path of action has been well traversed, its terminal point is largely indeterminate. 
Both ends and means may be reformulated in transit because unexpected results occur. 
Commitment, even to a major way of life or destiny, is subject to revision in process-at 
least until the final commitment of self-sacrifice.” (Strauss 1997: 38) 
The emphasis on the unexpected and the reformulation of ends and means in transit 
derives from Dewey’s theory of the Problematic Situation. As suggested in Strauss’ quote, 
motivationally Problematic Situations share the main features of epistemically 
Problematic Situations. The same three stages characterise the theory of the Problematic 
Situation. 
First the agent finds herself confused in an indeterminate situation because an 
unexpected event disrupts her activity. Strauss’ formulation of “unexpected results” 
refers to this state. 
Second, the agent identifies a problem thereby initiating the Problematic Situation. This 
identification might be fairly vague at the beginning. In the computer example given 
above, I might at first identify the problem only as the fact that the text processing 
program fails to format the citations the way I intend. In the course of my engagement, 
my description of the problem becomes more fine-grained. 
Third, identifying a problem opens the agent up to changing her mental states during an 
exploratory phase. In a motivationally Problematic Situation, the agent opens up to 
changing her motivational states. Agents may reformulate ends and means in transit, as 
Strauss observes. Often, we do not stop our activities altogether and then act with ready-
made new ends after having come up with a new course of action. Rather we explore 
different courses of action by trying them out. 
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While the quote shows that Anselm Strauss, the father of the Negotiated Order approach, 
endorsed the theory of motivationally Problematic Situations, many gaps remain. What 
kind of disruption prompts a Problematic Situation? What does it mean to identify a 
problem, and what is the nature of the exploratory phase? In this section, I present the 
motivationally Problematic Situation in general before I turn to the three stages: 
disruption, identification of problem, exploratory phase. 
I reconstruct the theory of motivationally Problematic Situations as a theory of 
preference change. This is a departure from Dewey and the pragmatist sociologists since 
they do not use the term “preferences”, mostly for historical reasons and perhaps to 
distinguish themselves from rational choice approaches. Nonetheless, two reasons speak 
for this move: 
First, it simplifies the comparison with standard rational choice models, which rely on the 
concept of preferences. My reconstruction aims to show that the Negotiated Order 
approach has more to offer than the standard rational choice models. To accept the 
conceptual tools of standard rational choice theory is to grant the opposed view the 
choice of weapons.  
Second, the actual research by Negotiated Order approach sociologists allows for an 
interpretation in terms of preferences. Although in their more abstract theoretical work, 
Dewey, Blumer, Strauss, and others shun the term “preference”, the actual descriptions 
of interactions invite an interpretation in terms of preferences. Take this section from 
Strauss describing the situation before a negotiation in a medical institution: 
“The stage was set for a full round negotiation: The physician wanted responsibility and 
operational leadership to pass to another ‘responsible’ person; the psychologist wanted 
an 'intellectual' colleague; the nurse wanted someone to teach her psychodynamics, and 
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the social worker wanted an ally to help mitigate the physician’s ‘arbitrary power.’” 
(Strauss 1988: 118) 
It is natural to interpret this passage as saying that, for example, the psychologist 
preferred a negotiation outcome that provided him with an intellectual colleague over 
one that does not. The concept of preferences readily captures what Strauss describes in 
folk psychological terms. Given such passages, it appears acceptable to reconstruct the 
Negotiated Order approach using the concept of preference. 
I distinguish intrinsic preferences from extrinsic preferences. The motivational force of an 
extrinsic preference depends on other preferences.15 For example, if I prefer to drink 
from the cup of water on my table because of my preference for satisfying my thirst over 
remaining thirsty, then my preference to drink from this cup is derivative of the 
preference for satisfying my thirst. 
In mixed cases, my preference for some state of affairs over another is partially derived 
and partially intrinsic. I might prefer to drink a cup of tea because I prefer to quench my 
thirst, but I might also want to do it because I like to drink tea. For the sake of simplicity, 
I am sticking with the polar cases of either fully intrinsic or fully extrinsic preferences, but 
extending my discussion should pose no difficulty. Having defended and clarified my use 
of preferences, I present an example of a Problematic Situation. 
Matilda visits an alpine village every summer. During her current visit, she finds a path up 
a hill she had failed to notice before. She wants to walk this new path.16 In fact, she has 
an intrinsic preference to take this path over any other path. She sets off down the path, 
                                                          
15 I distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic preferences by a difference in motivational force, but the 
literature often points to a difference in justification (e.g. Binmore 2009: 5-6). An intrinsic 
preference would then be one for which no further justification, or at least no further justification 
in terms of preferences, can be given. I assume that the motivational and the justificatory aspect 
of preferences go together. 
16 A similar scenario can be found in Anderson 2014. 
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but then suddenly finds herself confronted with an unexpected obstacle. A tree has fallen 
across the path and it is too big for her to climb over it. Thick thorn bushes on both sides 
of the path render even a small deviation from it difficult. The tree blocks the path and 
Matilda’s activity. She has to stop. 
Just as in the previously discussed computer scenario, Matilda experiences confusion in 
an indeterminate situation because an obstacle disrupts her activity. The complete 
confusion lasts for only a moment since Matilda quickly identifies the problem: a tree is 
lying across the path. The disruption and following identification of the problem opens 
Matilda up to a change of her motivational states. In this example, one motivational state 
presents itself as especially relevant: Matilda has an intrinsic preference to walk this new 
path. She preferred to take the newly discovered path over the others. This intrinsic 
preference now has an increased probability of changing. Matilda has opened up to 
preference change. 
The occurrence of a Problematic Situation does not guarantee that intrinsic preferences 
change. Matilda might keep her preference for walking this particular path even if she 
finds it blocked. She might fetch a chainsaw or she might just wait until the fire brigade 
removes the tree without ever giving up her preference for walking this path over other 
paths. The Problematic Situation only renders an intrinsic preference change more likely 
than if no Problematic Situation had occurred (ceteris paribus). The theory of Problematic 
Situations is strictly probabilistic. 
Matilda might have maintained another, purely extrinsic preference to walk the path. She 
might have taken this route because it seemed a good way to satisfy her preference to 
reach the top of the hill. The intrinsic preference would have been to reach the top of the 
hill, rather than to take a particular path. In this case, the Problematic Situation might 
move Matilda to lose her extrinsic preference to walk this path and look for another way 
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to follow her intrinsic preference. She might just choose another path that leads to the 
top of the hill. In this scenario, there would be no intrinsic preference change. 
However, while the availability of an extrinsic preference increases the likelihood that 
only such an extrinsic preference changes, the probability that the intrinsic goal of 
reaching the top of the hill will be abandoned increases due to the Problematic Situation 
as well. Problematic Situations do not only affect means. They can affect all ends, as 
Strauss’ quote with which I started the present section suggests. 
According to Dewey and the pragmatist sociologists, all goals are within the reach of 
Problematic Situations, which gives action an open-ended character (Strauss 1997: 38). 
Whether Matilda had the intrinsic preference to walk up the hill or to take this particular 
path, encountering a Problematic Situation increases the chances of a revision of extrinsic 
and intrinsic preferences. 
Matilda’s case fulfils the three conditions of Problematic Situations: 
(i) There is a situation of unexpected disturbance when Matilda encounters 
the tree. 
(ii) Matilda identifies a problem: A tree blocks the path she wanted to walk. 
(iii) Matilda opens up to a change of extrinsic and intrinsic preferences. 
I elaborate each of these three conditions in the following three sections. 
Note here that only the third condition makes the difference between epistemically and 
motivationally Problematic Situations. In the epistemic case, the agent opens up to a 
change in epistemic states, in the motivational case she opens up to a motivational 
change. Again, the opening up does not have to be under agential control. Matilda does 
not have to intentionally reconsider her set of preferences. 
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Many Problematic Situations turn out to be epistemically and motivationally problematic, 
and pragmatists emphasise this confluence of epistemic and motivational changes. 
Particularly for cases in which only extrinsic preferences change, the difference vanishes. 
If Matilda wanted to walk the path only because she preferred to reach the hilltop and 
this seemed the easiest path, acquiring the knowledge that a tree is blocking the path 
suffices for Matilda to lose the extrinsic preference. 
The claim that extrinsic preferences change comes as no surprise. The notion of an 
extrinsic preference implies that they depend on beliefs about how the agent can realise 
the underlying intrinsic preferences. A change of intrinsic preferences is more interesting 
and I therefore focus on such cases in the rest of my thesis. 
The theory of Problematic Situations postulates that extrinsic and intrinsic preferences 
can change. However, the fact that an agent encounters a Problematic Situation does not 
guarantee a motivational change. The encounter merely raises the probability of the 
preference change during the exploratory phase prompted by the identification of the 
problem. The motivational change takes place during an exploratory phase in which the 
agent tries out various courses of action. But before I discuss this third phase, I will turn 
to the disruption and identification of a problem that precede it. 
 
Unexpected Disruption 
An unexpected disruption stops activity and causes confusion. The disruption and the 
confusion characterise the indeterminate situation preceding the Problematic Situation. 
I have suggested as much already, but two major questions remained open: What gets 
disrupted, and what counts as an unexpected disruption? 
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When Matilda goes for a walk on a path and finds this path unexpectedly blocked so that 
she must stop, the event counts as a disruption. An obstacle unexpectedly disrupts an 
activity. Matilda literally stops walking when she comes upon the tree. She engages in an 
activity before discovering the tree, and although she had intended and expected 
otherwise, she ceases her engagement in the activity upon her discovery. 
The example of Matilda concerns the bodily behaviour of walking. Dewey and the 
pragmatist sociologists focus on examples of bodily activity. However, despite the focus 
on outward behaviour, a disruption can also affect a purely mental activity. A telephone 
call disrupts me while I multiply two large integers in my head. The call leads to disruption 
and confusion characterising an indeterminate situation even though the activity was 
purely mental. 
Nothing in the pragmatist literature rules out such a case of merely mental activity. The 
focus on cases of bodily behaviour is a result of the fact that pragmatists, including 
pragmatist sociologists, are interested in how reflective mental activities arise in the first 
place (see, for example, MW 14: 54). But emphasising that reflective mental activity often 
arises out of disrupted pre-reflective activity does not entail that the reflective mental 
activity cannot get disrupted as well. 
We can now specify what gets disrupted: an activity of the agent. The activity can be 
bodily or mental and the expectations can be tacit. What counts as an unexpected 
disruption of such an activity? While it does not matter whether the activity involves 
outward behaviour or mere thinking, the unexpected nature of the disruption does 
matter. 
Strauss introduces the terminology of “trajectory projection” (Strauss 2014: 55) for 
capturing the expectations associated with activities. Agents internally project the course 
of activity. Occasionally they form explicit and exhaustive means-end schemes, but often 
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they maintain only rough expectations about how things might go, which remain outside 
conscious awareness. Matilda tacitly expects that she can simply follow the path up to 
the hill. It turns out to be more difficult. An indeterminate situation arises from a 
disruption that goes against the expectations with which the agent acted.  
For Matilda, disruption results from the unexpected difficulty in following one’s desires. 
Just facing a difficulty satisfying a preference does not suffice for a disruption. While I am 
keenly aware that my preference to visit Japan this summer over staying at home will 
remain unfulfilled because of my limited budget, this difficulty does not disrupt my 
activity. I never began planning to go to Japan this summer. Even if my financial 
constraints were unknown to me, as long I did not start planning or acting in some way 
based on the assumption that I will go to Japan, no activity is unexpectedly disrupted. 
In contrast, if I had started planning my trip to Japan and tried to book my flight, then my 
activity would have been disrupted by the fact that my credit card did not cover the 
expenses. I might then have entered a Problematic Situation. The disruption does not 
guarantee that I encounter a Problematic Situation, but it characterises an indeterminate 
situation leading up to a Problematic Situation. 
Facing a difficulty in satisfying a preference is not sufficient for a disruption, nor is it 
necessary. The disruption could result from acquiring new information violating 
expectations of the agent without rendering preference satisfaction more challenging. 
Assume Matilda wants to take the path expecting it to lead her up the hill. However, some 
ways up the path she comes across a fork and neither of the two paths takes her up the 
hill. Matilda’s desire was to walk the path, and encountering a fork does not create a 
difficulty in fulfilling this desire. Going either way suffices to fulfil the preference for going 
on this new path over other paths. Nonetheless, having to select a direction disrupts the 
activity. Matilda stops walking. She might identify a problem and turn the situation into 
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one that is problematic, or she might just shrug her shoulders and move in one direction, 
but as long as encountering the fork unexpectedly interrupts the walking, it is a disruption. 
In all the previous examples, the disruption of the activity has been external. The agent 
engages in an activity, such as walking, and external objects, a tree or a fork in the path, 
disrupt it. Even in the example of my journey to Japan, my credit card is what puts a 
limitation on the activity. However, internal disruptions also occur. 
Assume that you solve some difficult mathematical problems in your head and suddenly 
you forget the last value. Without the value, you stop calculating. You could go back and 
calculate or give up, but in either case your mental activity is disrupted by purely internal 
causes, not because a telephone call diverted your attention. If you identify a problem 
that increases the likelihood of preference change, then you have encountered a 
Problematic Situation. 
Disruptions come in a variety of forms. For an indeterminate situation, the disruption 
must violate some expectation, interrupt some already ongoing activity and thereby 
cause confusion. As mentioned, the activity can be physical or mental and the 
expectations can be tacit. What matters is that the activity stops at least momentarily 
because of an event that goes against the agent’s expectations. If the situation fulfils 
these conditions, then the agent encounters an indeterminate situation. It turns 
problematic when the agent identifies a problem that opens her up to preference change. 
 
Identifying a Problem 
The indeterminate situation ends and the Problematic Situation starts when Matilda 
identifies a problem and this identification opens her up to change (cf. LW 12: 111). What 
exactly is Matilda doing when she identifies a problem in the situation of the blocked 
path? Does Matilda make a judgement that could be mistaken and if so, what makes the 
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judgement true or false? My account needs to clarify whether Matilda engages in a 
cognitive judgement and if so, what the truth-making facts for the judgement are. 
Dewey writes in his discussion of Problematic Situations that “the situation is taken, 
adjudged, to be problematic” (LW 12: 111). This quote and in particular the term 
“adjudged” supports a cognitive analysis of identifying a problem. To identify a problem 
is to make a judgement about the situation, and so the identification could be wrong. 
However, Dewey also wants this first judgement of identifying a problem to remain thin. 
Identifying the initial problem stands at the beginning of a longer inquiry “[t]o find out 
what the problem and problems are which a Problematic Situation presents to be 
inquired into, is to be well along in inquiry” (LW 12: 112). Only the initial identification is 
a necessary condition for a Problematic Situation. The further specification of the 
problem happens during the inquiry prompted by the Problematic Situation. In other 
words, the agent turns the situation into one that is problematic by making a judgement, 
but we need a judgement with rather thin truth-makers, that is truth-makers which do 
not require the agent to settle on too much. 
To develop the thin notion of identifying a problem, I introduce a thicker one for contrast: 
the notion of identifying a well-defined problem. I show that such a notion demands too 
much and then return to the thinner notion. To identify a well-defined problem, we must 
specify the goal, the initial state, admissible operations, further constraints, and the 
outcome state. As Nozick helpfully clarified, the required goal serves as “an evaluative 
criterion for judging outcomes and states” (Nozick 1993: 164) of the problem. They are 
the standard by which to evaluate any putative solution to the problem. It is the 
specification of the goal which creates trouble. 
Take Martin, who stands at the foot of a hill and has the goal of reaching the top as soon 
as possible. Martin picks a quick path up the hill and encounters an obstacle just as 
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Matilda did. Assume that Martin immediately identifies a well-defined problem. A tree 
blocks this path completely and there is no way around it. Martin specifies walking the 
available paths as admissible operations.17 Among the further constraints are Martin’s 
bodily capacities and the conditions of the paths. Given his lack of fitness, Martin cannot 
run up the hill all the way. The outcome state should be Martin standing on top of the 
hill. Most importantly, the goal is to reach the top as soon as possible. Unless Martin 
commits to a specification of the admissible operations, the constraints, the outcome 
state, and the goal, he has not identified a well-defined problem. 
By identifying a well-defined problem, however, Martin closed down the option of 
changing his intrinsic preference for reaching the hilltop. Endorsing a goal is necessary for 
having a well-defined problem. To specify a well-defined problem for oneself entails a 
commitment to a goal and therefore to certain preferences. In the example, Martin sticks 
to his intrinsic preference for reaching the top of the hill, and only changes the extrinsic 
preferences concerning the route to take. 
Identifying a well-defined problem already narrows down the potential motivational 
change. A problem is well-defined only relative to a fixed goal. Accordingly, endorsing a 
well-defined problem rules out giving up on the goal that specifies the well-defined 
problem and adopting new goals that outweigh it. To completely open up to changing his 
goal of reaching the top of the hill would entail that Martin gives up his well-defined 
problem. On Dewey’s account, in contrast, the identification of the problem is supposed 
to open the agent up to preference change rather than to close that possibility down. To 
open up to changing his goal, Martin would have to give up his well-defined problem, not 
endorse it. 
                                                          
17 I take here the notion of an admissible operation to be the same as that of an option worth 
considering. 
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Identifying a problem in Dewey’s broader sense is a crucial step to opening the agent up 
for a motivational change, including a change of intrinsic preferences. Identifying a well-
defined problem always puts some goal beyond the reach of the situation. Finding the 
path blocked prompts Matilda to reconsider her intrinsic preference for walking this path. 
Does she really prefer to take this way over any other way? She opens up to changing the 
one intrinsic preference we stipulated her to have. No goal pertaining to the situation is 
beyond the reach of the Problematic Situation. 
The notion of a well-defined problem subordinates the changes to a fixed goal, but 
Problematic Situations can affect all goals after the identification of the problem. In other 
words, the necessary conditions for identifying a problem cannot require that one 
considers a goal as being fixed. At least in principle, a Problematic Situation could turn all 
preferences upside down. 
This is not to say that in all Problematic Situations, all goals open up to reconsideration. 
When I encounter a Problematic Situation trying to format the citations in my thesis, I 
open up to changing my preference, but I will not reconsider my goal of writing a thesis. 
This Problematic Situation does not unsettle me enough to have such an effect. 
In sum, it is not a necessary condition of Problematic Situations that no goal is considered 
fixed, but the necessary conditions must allow for situations which reach all goals. By 
identifying a well-defined problem, Martin already narrows down the motivational 
change in a way that puts goals beyond the reach of the situation. The notion of 
“identifying a problem” in condition (ii) for Problematic Situations has to remain thinner. 
Nozick, to his credit, is well aware that we encounter problems in which our goals “may 
not be predetermined; a person may select his goals or alter the ones he has been given” 
(Nozick 1993: 165 Footnote). 
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Earlier I asked what the truth-making facts for identifying a problem could be, and the 
discussion of the well-identified problem provides us with the following answer: a 
judgement that identifies a problem can be true even without a fixed goal relative to 
which something is a problem. Matilda does not have to correctly specify a fixed goal to 
make the judgement of identifying a problem true. 
Instead we should see the identification as the agent making the judgement that she just 
faced an indeterminate situation. Only confusion caused by an unexpected disruption of 
activity characterises the indeterminate situation, not judgement. The identification of a 
problem is the judgement of having encountered an unexpected disruption of one’s 
activity. The truth-making fact of the judgement is not that the situation poses a well-
defined problem, but rather that the agent’s activity cannot proceed as expected, is 
interrupted in an unforeseen way, and therefore confusion ensues. 
Matilda identifies the problem that she cannot proceed with her activity as she preferred 
and expected. She wanted to walk a path and since a tree lies across the path, and she 
can neither easily climb over it nor walk around it, the activity is disrupted. While I 
claimed above that to identify a problem, the agent does not have to be committed to a 
goal, Matilda’s motivation to walk the path comes into play here after all. This preference, 
however, becomes opened up for reconsideration. There is no fixed goal, because the 
difficulties in following the preference and judging the existence of such a problem have 
unsettled the agent’s goal. 
One might suggest that Dewey’s theory assumes a fixed goal relative to which the 
situation is taken to be problematic, even if this time the goal looms in the background. 
The goal would be more general, perhaps the goal to have preferences which allow 
uninterrupted activity, or the goal to grow as a person through experience (cf. Hook 1959). 
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Following this proposal, Matilda identifies a problem insofar as she judges that preferring 
this path over others fails to allow uninterrupted activity. 
The pragmatist sociologist can respond to this suggestion in two ways. One option is to 
accept that there is such a goal relative to which the situation is problematic, but it is the 
goal of a second-order preference. The preference for uninterrupted activity might be 
the higher-order preference to develop certain first-order preferences. The other option 
is to deny that the agent needs such a second-order preference to identify the problem, 
and instead argue that the agent engages in a less instrumental form of reasoning. We 
should endorse the second option and deny the need for a second-order preference, 
which is not to rule them out for all cases. 
The pragmatist literature does not provide the basis for attributing such a second-order 
preference. Dewey emphasises the primacy of activity (MW 14: 84-87), but he does not 
mean to say that uninterrupted activity is the highest goal from which we derive others. 
Rather, Dewey claims that activity is a default state for agents to which we usually return 
after disruption. After a disruption, human agents return to activity because this has been 
hard-wired into them. They do not need a second-order preference to motivate them, 
since activity serves as a fallback option. Nothing I found in the pragmatist literature 
sufficiently supports postulating a second-order preference instead. 
Since I am reconstructing the pragmatist Negotiated Order approach, Dewey’s word has 
a pro tanto authority. Other things being equal, I should stick to his presentation. 
However, if it turned out that only by postulating a second-order preference can one 
make sense of the Negotiated Order approach, then a rational reconstruction should 
postulate it after all. I must show how we can do without a second-order preference. 
Concretely, why should we call it a problem if it is not a problem relative to a goal the 
agent is still committed to? This question concerns the justification of our terminology. 
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I suggest that to identify a problem, the agent does not need an instrumental inference 
relying on a second-order preference. That the agent registers that her activity has not 
gone its projected course but rather has been disrupted justifies calling the judgement “a 
problem identification”. The agent already had a motivation that set the standard by 
which to evaluate whether there is a problem. 
Matilda walks up the path only to find her way blocked. She identifies a problem since 
she wanted to walk this path to the top of the hill and a tree stopped her from doing so. 
Her activity has been disrupted and this prompts a change to her preferences, including 
the preference that originally put her on this path. But she does not have to engage in an 
instrumental inference of the form: 
a) I have the goal to engage in undisrupted activity. 
b) My activity is disrupted because of my preferences. 
c) Therefore, the situation is problematic regarding my preferences. 
Rather, Matilda identifies the situation as problematic because the activity does not work 
out as expected. The disruption suffices for the problem without a higher-order 
preference against disruptions. 
Consider the parallel case of finding preference fulfilment good. You do not need a 
preference for having your preferences fulfilled to find it good that your preference has 
been fulfilled. You just need the preference, which has been fulfilled. Matilda can find it 
good to walk the path in virtue of having an intrinsic preference to walk this path rather 
than another. Likewise, you do not need a preference for having your preferences fulfilled 
to find it bad that your preference has not been fulfilled. You just need an unfulfilled 
preference. 
Finally, for you to find a problem in how your preference led you into a situation in which 
things are not working out, you do not need a preference that your preferences should 
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work out. You just need the preferences which led you to this situation. Importantly, the 
agent does not have to remain committed to the preferences which led to the situation. 
Having followed one’s preferences, to find one’s activity unexpectedly disrupted suffices 
to open the agent up to preference change on the pragmatist model. 
Earlier I asked why we should call it a problem if it is not a problem relative to a goal that 
the agent is still committed to. We can call it a problem because the agent engaged in 
some activity that was disrupted against the agent’s expectations. Something went 
wrong, therefore the agent faces a Problematic Situation even though there remains no 
goal to which the agent is fully committed and relative to which the situation is 
problematic. 
These considerations do not rule out that some agents in fact have such second-order 
preferences that come in during or after Problematic Situations. However, the analysis of 
Problematic Situations, in particular condition (ii), does not require such preferences. The 
agents can identify a well-defined problem and a problem relative to a second-order 
preference, but neither identification is necessary for a Problematic Situation. 
A situation is a motivationally Problematic Situation only if an identification of a problem 
in the required sense leads the agent to open up to a motivational change; that is, only if 
it increases the likelihood of preference change.18 How exactly the preferences change 
depends on the developments in the exploratory phase following the problem 
identification. Hence, the next section discusses the exploratory phase. 
 
                                                          
18 This is the empirical claim, which I reconstruct from the pragmatist basis of the Negotiated Order 
approach. I do not defend its empirical adequacy but rather rely on the theory’s endorsement by 
pragmatist sociologists of motivational change to support it. 
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Exploratory Phase 
The unexpected disruption of activity and the identification of a problem are necessary 
conditions for a Problematic Situation. Strictly speaking, opening up to preference change 
is a necessary condition, but not the following exploratory phase. In principle, an 
intervention could stop the agent after opening up and before exploring. A Problematic 
Situation opens Matilda up for preference change, but if a bolt of lightning hit her, she 
would never go through an exploratory phase. 
Nonetheless, the exploratory phase deserves our attention. Although it is not a necessary 
condition for a Problematic Situation, it distinguishes the pragmatist theory of preference 
change. As we will see later, it is lacking in other models of preference change and the 
next chapter develops the important role of the exploratory phase. 
In the exploratory phase, the agent tries out different courses of action without yet 
having fully committed to the motivation underlying this course of action. Agents can 
simulate the exploration in their imagination, but they also engage in exploratory 
behaviour. The exploratory phase is a period of time in which the agent acts with a low 
commitment on various potential motivations. Having opened up to preference change, 
the agent acts with tentative motivations and the feedback she receives influences 
whether she actually settles on this motivation. 
Having tentative motivations, the agent follows the course of action she would engage in 
if she endorsed certain preferences, but without yet having settled on them completely. 
I propose that to have a tentative preference is to have a preference with a limited 
commitment. 19  Discussing Problematic Situations, Dewey writes that “the decision 
reached [is to be regarded] as hypothetical and tentative until the anticipated or 
                                                          
19 I formalise this idea and further specify the notion of commitment in the appendix. 
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supposed consequences which led to its adoption have been squared with the actual 
consequences” (MW 12: 173). 
In the exploratory phase, the agents maintain preferences in a qualified state, that is, 
with limited commitment. Not all preferences might be held in this state, but at least 
those the agent associates with the identified problem will be.20 These preferences are 
tentative. The agent has a high chance of giving them up again if the consequences 
suggest it, a topic which I address at length in the next chapter. 
Matilda does not have a firmly established preference when she chooses a new path after 
encountering the Problematic Situation. She tentatively tries adopting new preferences, 
giving up preferences, and changing their strength without yet fully committing to these 
changes. Eventually, however, the agent settles on a new motivational profile. The 
commitment to the preferences rises and the exploratory phase ends for the agent. She 
effectively loses some preferences and endorses new ones. 
One might ask what leads the agent to settle on one motivational profile rather than 
another at the end of the exploratory phase. In the epistemic case, the agent draws 
inferences to establish a new profile of beliefs. Does the agent in the motivationally 
Problematic Situation become more likely to engage in some form of practical inference? 
For an alteration of extrinsic preferences, the answer is yes. Assume that Matilda wants 
to get to the top of the hill, finds the way blocked, and enters a Problematic Situation. In 
response, she gives up her extrinsic preference to go up this path to the hill rather than 
using another path. She keeps her intrinsic desire to get to the hilltop, however. This 
intrinsic preference to get to the top of the hill together with the belief that the next best 
                                                          
20 The exact scope of which preferences are qualified is a major open question of the Negotiated 
Order approach. For my purposes, I leave it at the criterion of an association with the problem 
(see also the appendix).  
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path to walk is on the south side of the hill, lead her to the practical inference that she 
should go to the south side. But in this case the inference rests on stable intrinsic 
preferences and the instances in which these preferences change interest us more. 
Can an inference also establish a new intrinsic preference? At the end of the exploratory 
phase, does the agent infer the new motivational profile including all changes to intrinsic 
preferences? The question raises a thorny issue, which will return: Which forms of 
practical inference are valid, and whether agents can ever validly infer intrinsic 
preferences, are disputed matters.21 Following the pragmatist sociologists, I maintain 
that Problematic Situations can lead to new intrinsic preferences. If I proposed that the 
agent established her new motivational profile by way of valid practical inferences, then 
I would be committed to the claim that agents validly infer intrinsic preferences. 
Perhaps to the dissatisfaction of some philosophers, I sidestep the issue. The license for 
my evasion follows from my aim: reconstructing the Negotiated Order approach and 
applying it to negotiating group agents. This aim is descriptive. The Negotiated Order 
approach as developed by Strauss belongs to sociology, not a theory about which forms 
of practical inference are valid.22 
While I promise a theory of preference change, my theory remains descriptive and 
operates at a relatively general level. The process through which agents change their 
motivational profile might be a form of inference and this form of inference might be 
valid or not. In fact, the agent might undergo a mix of inferential and non-inferential 
changes, and the inferences might be a mix of valid and invalid forms of inferences. I 
                                                          
21For one theory that postulates something close to an inference to intrinsic desire, see Millgram 
1997; see also the edited collection Millgram 2001 for related issues in the debate on practical 
reasoning. 
22Dewey might have thought that he discussed a form of valid practical inference, but I am mainly 
interested in the sociological contributions. 
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merely consider how to describe the motivational changes independently of these 
concerns. 
When an agent changes her beliefs in response to an epistemically Problematic Situation, 
the agent might also engage in a fallacious theoretical inference. The agent draws new 
inferences, and rationality requires her to draw only valid inferences, but a descriptive 
theory can and should allow that agents make mistakes. Even if an agent engages in 
fallacious reasoning, we would still want to describe the situation that led her to 
reconsider her beliefs. Descriptive models of epistemically and motivationally 
Problematic Situations can leave the question of validity to others. 
Nonetheless, I reconstruct an informative model: It makes the prediction that in certain 
circumstances agents are more likely to change their preferences, including their intrinsic 
preferences which rational choice theorists (e.g. Stigler & Becker 1977) consider as 
unchanging.  In the next chapter, I offer even further predictions. These will clarify how 
the tentative preferences of the exploratory phase settle in and become preferences with 
a full commitment. 
I have developed all three conditions for Problematic Situations: the unexpected 
disruption leading to the identification of a problem, which opens the agent up to test 
new motivations in a qualified manner during the exploratory phase. Before I move 
beyond individual cases in my reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach, I 
compare the theory of Problematic Situations with another model of preference change. 
 
Comparison with Cohen and Axelrod’s Adaptive Utility 
By introducing intrinsic preference change I deviate from the rational choice models 
usually employed in the social sciences, and especially economics. Stigler and Becker 
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(1977) argued that economic models can do without the change of intrinsic preferences 
and many followed their suggestion, including the rational choice models of climate 
change negotiations between states. 
Some non-standard rational choice models, however, allow for preference change and 
one might wonder whether the Negotiated Order approach offers something different 
from them. From the available models23 I select a particularly relevant one: The model of 
adaptive utility developed by Cohen and Axelrod in their 1984 paper “Coping with 
Complexity: The Adaptive Value of Changing Utility” resembles my Deweyan account 
while offering a helpful contrast. It will establish that one can construct mathematical 
models similar to the pragmatist theory of Problematic Situation and at the same time 
helps to see what makes the latter unique. 
Cohen and Axelrod intend to establish that preference change can be adaptive. They 
want to offer a model “where such a process [of changing preferences] can improve 
performance” (Cohen & Axelrod 1984: 30). Along a relevant dimension of assessment, 
the outcome has to improve because the intrinsic preferences change in response to the 
situation. The agent acts better, in a sense to be further specified, because she changes 
her intrinsic motivations. Cohen and Axelrod defend their view with an example: 
A factory manager has to divide a fixed number of labour hours between the production 
and the maintenance of the machines. Being a factory manager, she wants to maximise 
output. She aims to achieve this goal using an expected output function. This is the output 
function she believes to be valid; wrongly as we will see. The expected output function 
                                                          
23 Theories and accounts of preference change include but are not limited to Dietrich & List 2011, 
2013, Hansson 1995, Grüne-Yanoff & Hansson 2009, Hansson & Grüne-Yanoff 2012, Dekel et al. 
2007. 
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specifies the expected output (ŷ) using the hours of labour devoted to production (x) and 
a parameter b, with the expected value b̂. 
Because there are multiple rounds of production, the values need time indexes. The 
expected output, the expected value of b, and the productive labour vary over each round. 
The manager estimates the expected output ŷt using the estimate b̂t-1 from the previous 
round of production and the actual number of labour hours devoted to production in the 
current round (xt). Putting all this together, Cohen and Axelrod provide the following 
expected output function: 
ŷ𝑡 = −𝑥𝑡
2 + 𝑏̂ 𝑡−1𝑥𝑡 
This function describes what the manager believes to be the relation between the hours 
of production labour and the parameter b. She uses this equation to guide her actions. 
Cohen and Axelrod also stipulate an equation for how the manager estimates b: 
𝑏̂ 𝑡 =
𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡
+ 𝑥𝑡 
For each round, the manager calculates her estimate of b using the output of this round 
(yt) and the labour invested into production during this round (xt). The manager then uses 
this updated estimate in the next round of production. 
However, in Cohen and Axelrod’s example, the manager’s estimated output function 
does not match the actual output function. The manager overlooked another parameter, 
namely the output lost to pilferage. They include this parameter as c in the output 
function, and since it tracks the pilferage, it takes a value below zero (c < 0).24 The correct 
output function is:25 
                                                          
24 They also assume for sake of simplicity that this factor remains stable. 
25Cohen and Axelrod also considered other production functions and came to similar results, see 
Cohen & Axelrod 1984: 38. 
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𝑦𝑡 = −𝑥𝑡
2 + 𝑏̂𝑥𝑡 + 𝑐 
So far Cohen and Axelrod specified how a factory worked and how the manager expected 
it to work without including preference change. The next two steps introduce preference 
change. 
First, Cohen and Axelrod stipulate that the factory manager receives intrinsic utility for 
labour devoted to production. We calculate this intrinsic utility by multiplying the hours 
of labour x with a value w, which we can interpret as the intrinsic utility of one hour of 
production labour. 
Since the manager also receives utility for the output (y), we end up with the following 
utility function: 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑥𝑡 = −𝑥𝑡
2 + (𝑏̂ + 𝑤𝑡)𝑥𝑡 + 𝑐 
The function is nothing more than the sum of the production output with the intrinsic 
utility of the productive labour. Because the manager does not know the amount of 
output before letting the factory do its work, we also have a function for the expected 
utility: 
Ût = ŷ𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑥𝑡 
The expected utility is the expected output plus the intrinsic utility of the productive 
labour. 
Second, Cohen and Axelrod stipulate that surprise governs the value w. In other words, 
surprises change the amount of intrinsic utility that the manager derives from one hour 
of labour devoted to production. Cohen and Axelrod propose measuring the surprise the 
manager experiences by subtracting the expected utility for one round of production 
from the actual utility of that round: 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝑈𝑡 − Û𝑡 
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The surprise governs the intrinsic utility associated with productive labour. All we now 
need for a model of preference change is an equation specifying how w changes over 
time. Cohen and Axelrod suggest the following equation: 
𝑤𝑡+1 =
𝑥𝑡−𝑥𝑡−1
|𝑥𝑡|
∗ 𝐷𝑡
𝑥𝑡
+ 𝑤𝑡 
This equation makes surprise the main driver of preference change and puts a drag on 
the change so as to rule out runaway preferences (see Cohen and Axelrod 1984: 35). 
To answer the question as to whether this equation describes actual preference change 
in humans, we would need empirical evidence. However, Cohen and Axelrod only want 
to show that under certain conditions, preference change improves the performance of 
the agent. Whether human agents in fact show such preference change remains a 
secondary consideration. 
The following graphic (taken with minor adaptations from Cohen and Axelrod’s paper) 
provides a comparison of how the models differ with and without preference change: 
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Start 
w1 = 0; x1 = initial guess of 
best policy 
Receive experience 
𝑈𝑡 = − 𝑥𝑡
2 + (𝑏̂ + 𝑤𝑡)𝑥𝑡 + 𝑐 
Adjust beliefs 
𝑏̂ 𝑡 =
𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡
+ 𝑥𝑡 
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if t = 1, then wt+1 = 0, 
otherwise  
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Choose new policy 
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Cohen and Axelrod calculate that for a wide range of values, the agent with preference 
change makes choices superior to those of the agent without. But first we have to clarify 
the benchmark used to determine that the agent’s choices are indeed superior. Because 
the preferences change, we cannot compare the quality of the choices using the amount 
of utility. If we did that, an agent with a large w would appear superior to the agent who 
always sticks to w = 0, even if the factory produced very little or nothing at all. The factory 
manager would hardly excel if she just followed her idiosyncratic preferences and let the 
business slide. 
In effect, Cohen and Axelrod only compare the output of factories.26 Since w always takes 
a positive value in the equation, if the preference changing agent creates higher output, 
she also receives higher utility. The manager who not only cares about output but also 
about hours of labour devoted to production, achieves more output than the manager 
who cares only about output. 
This surprising outcome results for many values, because the managers cannot exactly 
predict output. The parameter, c, escapes the manager and allows the adaptive 
preference model to have an edge. That managers lack perfect insight into all variables 
influencing the production process is probably the least worrying assumption Cohen and 
Axelrod make for their model. We can question the psychological plausibility of the 
equation describing the change of w, but the limited knowledge of production processes 
should raise little controversy. This plausible assumption makes the difference between 
the performances with and without preference change. 
While the result of the model provides a rationale for preference change, my interest 
concerns the striking resemblance it bears to Dewey’s theory of Problematic Situations. 
                                                          
26 Cohen and Axelrod (1984: 36) introduce more complex considerations, but the output is what 
the difference boils down to. 
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In both theories, unexpected outcomes lead to a change of preferences. Preference 
change happens in response to a situation arising from limited knowledge. We can adapt 
the example of Matilda to the assumptions of Cohen and Axelrod’s model with only minor 
modifications. 
Assume that Matilda has an intrinsic preference to walk a certain path. She receives the 
utility at if her preference is fulfilled. In addition, she has an intrinsic preference to reach 
the top of the hill, leading her to receive utility bt if her preference is satisfied. The intrinsic 
preference to walk the path exceeds the preference to reach the top of the hill (at > bt), 
but Matilda believes that the path should lead to the top of the hill, so that the expected 
utility of the walk is at+bt. 
She finds to her surprise, however, that the path goes around the hill rather than to the 
top. The discovery of the different route leads Matilda to stop and identify a problem. 
The path does not lead where she thought it would. This new information surprises 
Matilda. We can even calculate the surprise as the difference between the expected and 
the actual utility as suggested by Cohen and Axelrod: it is exactly bt since that was the 
intrinsic preference of reaching the hilltop. 
The surprise and the identification of a problem might lead to a change of her intrinsic 
utilities, so that at becomes at+1 and bt becomes bt+1. If the utility change is big enough, so 
that bt+1 > at+1, then Matilda would take another path up the hill. The preference for a 
path up the hill now guides her action. Encountering the Problematic Situation leads to a 
change of intrinsic preferences. 
I have specified the example so that it fits with Cohen and Axelrod’s model as well as the 
pragmatist account of Problematic Situations. Just as in Cohen and Axelrod’s example, I 
have given a preference which changes in response to surprise. At the same time, the 
example fits Dewey’s theory since Matilda encounters a Problematic Situation and 
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undergoes a change of intrinsic preferences in response. Both theories postulate intrinsic 
preferences adapting to the unexpected. There remains, however, significant and 
illuminating differences between the approaches. 
 
Differences 
While Cohen and Axelrod describe a mathematical toy model to show that agents with 
preference change can outperform agents with stable intrinsic preference, Dewey and 
the pragmatist sociologists provide a complex but informal theory of how agents undergo 
actual motivational changes.  As a result of these varying interests and approaches, and 
in spite of all convergence, numerous differences emerge. Some of these differences 
hardly matter in the present context. For example, Cohen and Axelrod talk about utility, 
while I have couched Dewey’s theory of Problematic Situations in terms of preferences. 
Little rests on this for present purposes. I want to discuss two more consequential 
differences that shed light on the theory of Problematic Situations. 
First, the theory of Problematic Situations and Cohen and Axelrod’s model differ insofar 
as the pragmatist theory lets a disruption and the identification of a problem prompt the 
opening up to preference change, while Cohen and Axelrod let surprise change 
preferences. 
While the two mechanisms of disruption/identifying a problem and surprise resemble 
each other and can give rise to the same results, as seen in the adapted Matilda example, 
key differences remain. According to Dewey, only a disruption of activity in which the 
agent identifies a problem increases the probability of preference change.  If a surprising 
disruption occurs but the agent identifies no problem, then she does not change her 
preferences, even though she has been surprised. 
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For example, Matilda might find a £50 note on her walk. She stops for a moment to pick 
it up. The discovery disrupts her activity and surprises her, but she does not see any 
problem. She puts the money in her pocket and walks on without opening up to 
preference change. Finding the money, however, leads her to experience more utility 
than expected from taking her walk. The money is a welcome surprise and Cohen and 
Axelrod’s model suggests that such a surprise should shift the preferences. Accordingly, 
the predictions of the two approaches diverge. 
While surprises and Problematic Situations often take place as one package, we should 
not confuse them. An unexpected disruption is part of the analysis of Problematic 
Situations, and if we were to count every unexpected event as a surprise, then a surprise 
belongs to the necessary conditions for a Problematic Situation. Since Cohen and Axelrod 
operationalise surprise as the difference between expected and actual value of a variable, 
they seem to endorse a concept of surprise as violation of expectations. 
But surprise is insufficient for a Problematic Situation, and therefore Dewey offers a more 
restrictive account of preference change. All situations of unexpected disruption are 
situations of surprise, but not all of them lead to Problematic Situations. Since economists 
have disputed the very existence of intrinsic preference change, restricting the scope of 
the category is a sensible move. In any case, I am reconstructing the Negotiated Order 
approach following Dewey. Psychological experiments could test the empirical adequacy 
of the pragmatist account versus Cohen and Axelrod’s model, but this is not my project. 
I take the pragmatist sociological approach as given and reconstruct it as charitably as 
possible. 
Second, Cohen and Axelrod portray preference change as instantaneous, while Dewey 
and the pragmatist sociologists emphasise the exploratory nature of such processes. 
According to the theory of Problematic Situations, agents explore different courses of 
 58 
 
action before a new motivational profile is firmly established. Matilda looks both ways 
and takes steps in multiple directions before settling on a new motivational profile. 
Cohen and Axelrod’s model involves no probability and instead assumes the immediate 
development of new preferences. They also lack anything analogous to the exploratory 
phase. The factory manager never holds any tentative preferences exploring various 
courses of actions, but changes her preferences immediately. We can show the difference 
between the models by adapting the flowchart used above to now describe the 
pragmatist model (without equations): 
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Cohen and Axelrod’s model does not include the box “try out new courses of action”. 
Instead of opening up to preference change, agents immediately change their 
preferences. I introduced tentative preferences characterised by a limited commitment 
to capture the exploratory nature of action emphasised by Dewey and Strauss. By 
Start 
initial action routine 
Receive experience 
A problematic experience 
Choose new routine of action 
Based on new preferences, a new routine of action is chosen 
Act again 
Open up to preference change 
Try out new courses of action 
Explorative phase 
Change preferences 
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contrast, Cohen and Axelrod’s manager either has a preference or not, without any 
variation in commitment. 
These significant differences result from the problems of modelling preference change. 
Including probabilities and an exploratory phase in their model would have complicated 
it without contributing to their aim. As mentioned, Cohen and Axelrod intend to establish 
that preference change can be adaptive and to do that they can assume a simplified 
picture of such change. 
I am interested, however, in how agents negotiate with one another, and for this purpose 
the exploratory phase proves important. The exploratory phase allows agents to explore 
each other’s motivational landscape while having a low commitment to their own 
preferences. The next chapter discusses the impact of the exploratory phase on the 
interaction between agents. Before that, I take a first step towards introducing 
preference change into models of interdependent action of multiple agents. 
 
From Individuals to Game Theory 
The theory of preference change in response to Problematic Situations has implications 
for game theory. The models of interdependence resulting from taking the theory of 
Problematic Situations into account differ from standard game theoretic models. To 
convey this difference, I will consider the well-known prisoner’s dilemma. 
In a standard prisoner’s dilemma, the result of the game affects two agents who cannot 
enter binding agreements. Each of them prefers the outcome of mutual cooperation over 
the result of mutual defection. However, each of them most prefers an outcome in which 
the other cooperates but they themselves defect. The worst outcome results from the 
other defecting, while they themselves cooperate. Given this pay-off structure, defection 
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becomes the dominant strategy. Defection is the move which maximises preference 
satisfaction regardless of what the other player does. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B 
Cooperate Defect 
Player A Cooperate 2, 2 0, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
 
Assuming agents act according to these fixed preferences, mutual defection inevitably 
results. By introducing the capacity to change preference in response to Problematic 
Situations, however, the result stops being inevitable. The theory of Problematic 
Situations allows the transformation of the prisoner’s dilemma, as the following example 
illustrates: 
David and Simon had hoped to organise a conference together, but the prospects appear 
dismal. Currently they are each on separate flights to their annual joint meeting with their 
funding body, so they cannot communicate. To get the conference funding from their 
funding body, at least one of them must read a batch of papers before the meeting. Only 
reading the papers will give them the necessary information to present the topic of the 
conference well. If neither of them reads the papers, they will not receive the funding 
and the conference cannot take place. If both read the papers, they present the topic 
even better and secure slightly more funding. 
However, Simon and David could also work on their thesis or on their next publication. 
Since they are indifferent as to the choice between working on their thesis or on their 
next publication and both options imply defection from reading the papers, for now we 
can group the two options into one: defection. Later, however, it matters that there are 
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two ways of defecting. Having sketched their options, we need to specify how they rank 
them. 
David and Simon prefer mutual reading over mutual defection. But both prefer to defect 
while the other does the reading over both doing the reading. Finally, they prefer mutual 
defection over doing the reading alone. As a result, their pay-offs are that of a prisoner’s 
dilemma: 
 
PD David 
Read Defect 
Simon Read 2 (Simon), 2 (David) 0, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
 
We should expect both Simon and David to get off their flights without having read the 
papers. The conference appears doomed. 
However, something unexpected occurs. Simon starts to work on his thesis after take-off, 
but he then discovers that he left an important file back home on his USB flash drive. 
Confused, he looks for the flash drive in various pockets to no avail. He doesn’t have the 
file he needs for continuing to work on his thesis. The inaccessibility of the file disrupts 
his activity and Simon identifies a problem: He cannot go on writing on his thesis without 
the file. 
Given his prior preferences, it is clear what Simon should do now: start writing his next 
publication.27 He was indifferent as to the choice between working on his thesis and 
                                                          
27 The example assumes, of course, that the USB flash drive is not needed for the publication. 
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writing the next publication, and stuck in a prisoner’s dilemma with regard to reading the 
papers. Given that working on his thesis is now out of question, his prior preferences 
suggest turning to the publication. 
But Simon finds himself in a Problematic Situation and opens up to preference change.28 
Maybe working on his next publication could turn out to be not so important for him and 
he might instead invest his time in reading the papers. In an exploratory phase, Simon 
starts looking into the papers. He explores this different course of action and finds that it 
suits him after all. His motivations changed and the encounter with the Problematic 
Situation results in different pay-offs: 
 David 
Read Defect 
Simon Read 4 (Simon), 2 (David) 2, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
 
As one can see, reading rather than defection now dominates Simon’s options. 
Accordingly, he reads the papers, Simon and David receive their funding, and the 
conference takes place. The preference change transforms the game and a different 
outcome emerges. 
This result is almost trivial. Hardly anyone doubts that if agents preferred different 
options, the outcome would differ. However, the contribution of the Negotiated Order 
approach is to provide guidelines for when preferences change. Confusion and the 
                                                          
28 As I noted before, the Negotiated Order approach does not offer a detailed specification as to 
which preferences open up to change. I presume here that the relevant preferences for the 
situation become tentative. 
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identification of a problem, which have both received attention in the present chapter, 
precede the motivational changes. 
Furthermore, this application of the theory of Problematic Situations provides only a hint 
of what is yet to come. In the outlined scenario, Simon undergoes a preference change 
while on a plane – one that is in isolation from other relevant players. While Simon’s 
motivational change affects the interaction with David, and so paves the way for 
organising a conference together, Simon and David do not interact during the exploratory 
phase before the new motivational profile settles in. In the next chapter, I argue that 
interaction during the exploratory phase makes a difference for preference change.  
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Chapter Three: Symbolic Interactionist Roots 
Dewey’s account of Problematic Situations is not the only influence on Strauss’ 
Negotiated Order approach. The approach grew out of symbolic interactionism and 
accordingly shares the latter’s basic assumptions. In the present chapter I contribute to 
the reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach by discussing these assumptions 
and extending the account of preference change to social contexts. While symbolic 
interactionism comes in various flavours, we can focus on the Chicago version 
spearheaded by Herbert Blumer, since it had the most influence upon Strauss, who 
learned sociology in Chicago. 
I begin my reconstruction in this chapter by presenting three principles Blumer put 
forward in his “The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism”, included in the 
1969 collection Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. These principles 
emphasise agency, meaning, and interpretation. Agents act based on the meaning that 
objects, including other human beings, have for them, and engage in complex and flexible 
processes of interpretation which reshape the meaning of these objects. I act towards 
the raised hand of a student in my seminar based on the meaning it has for me, in this 
case the meaning of asking permission to speak. The interpretation process can be quite 
complex, for example, if I know that a student has already contributed a lot and therefore 
refrain from picking her. Such processes can then reshape the meaning of raising a hand: 
the good student’s hand develops a different meaning than those of others. 
Blumer takes his three principles to distinguish symbolic interactionism from other 
approaches. But I ask whether rational choice accounts might meet all three principles. 
The theories of conventions and signalling developed by such authors as David Lewis 
(1969) and Brian Skyrms (2010) capture Blumer’s discussion of agency, meaning, and 
interpretation while endorsing standard rational choice theory. Blumer’s meaning 
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becomes the signalled information and introducing common knowledge allows David 
Lewis to give the information a conventional and flexible nature and emphasises 
interpretation. Even the importance of the interpretation process has its place in David 
Lewis’ account of conventions. Apparently, core principles of symbolic interactionism 
dissolve into standard rational choice theory. 
Symbolic interactionists, however, can give signalling a role which the assumptions of 
standard rational choice foreclose. Since symbolic interactionists follow Dewey, they can 
draw on the theory of Problematic Situations, which I reconstructed in the previous 
chapter. This theory describes a mechanism of motivational change, including the change 
of intrinsic preferences, while standard rational choice approaches, such as the models 
by Lewis and Skyrms, do not allow for such change. 
In the penultimate section of the chapter, I argue that signalling, i.e. the meaning and 
interpretation of meaning, affects the process of preference change. Because agents 
enter an exploratory phase in which they try out different potential motivations, they are 
open to intervention by other agents. The signal of one agent to another can affect the 
way the other’s motivations change. This allows agents to align not just their actions by 
way of signalling, but also their intrinsic preferences. The standard rational choice 
approach with its assumption of fixed intrinsic preferences has nothing analogous to offer. 
The chapter ends by addressing complications resulting from extending signalling 
accounts to model preference change. 
 
The Principles of Symbolic Interactionism 
The project of reconstructing symbolic interactionism poses many difficulties. Symbolic 
interactionism never achieved complete theoretic unity. In his The Making of Symbolic 
Interactionism, Paul Rock notes that “[s]ince its very beginnings interactionism has never 
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been concisely formulated” (Rock 1971: 7). Because symbolic interactionists preferred 
empirical research over abstract theory, they have been wary of spelling out their 
principles. Instead, they founded their school upon an oral tradition originating in the 
Chicago School. As a result, symbolic interactionism has fuzzy boundaries, overlaps with 
other traditions of sociology, and contains conflicting positions.29  To quote Rock again: 
“Because its tenets have not been clearly laid down, because its contours and boundaries 
are imprecisely drawn, there cannot be any exact demarcation of the place of 
interactionism within the larger territory of sociology.” (Rock 1971: 16) 
No authoritative manifesto codifies the tenets of symbolic interactionism. One text, 
however, comes close. In his 1969 “The Methodological Position of Symbolic 
Interactionism”, Herbert Blumer presents the three core principles of symbolic 
interactionism. Although these principles do not capture all the contributions of symbolic 
interactionism, they resemble the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an 
account of interaction to fall within the school. Blumer introduces the principles in the 
following passage, calling them “premises”: 
“Symbolic interactionism rests in the last analysis on three simple premises. The first 
premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the 
things have for them. […] The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived 
from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows. The third 
premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative 
process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters.” (Blumer 1969: 2) 
Meaning and its role in human action lie at the heart of the three principles. Humans act 
based on meaning, which arises out of interaction and which humans interpret. I act 
                                                          
29 This did not get better in the decades following Rock’s work: see Fine 1993. Snow 2001 even 
argued for broadening the tradition beyond Blumer’s three principles. 
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towards the student who raises her hand in my class based on the meaning students and 
raised hands have for me.  
Blumer’s three principles are:  
1. Human beings act towards objects based on the meanings these objections have 
for them. 
2. The meaning of objects arises out of social interaction between human beings. 
3. The agents engage in interpretative processes towards the meaning of the objects 
they encounter, which reshapes the meaning. 
In the following three subsections, I go through each of these three principles and discuss 
the restrictions they provide for an account of interaction to fall within the boundaries of 
symbolic interactionism. In the next section, I will attempt to reconstruct symbolic 
interactionism using rational choice theory. 
 
First Principle 
The first principle states that human agents act towards objects based on the meaning 
these objects have for them. Objects should be broadly construed to include humans, 
events, and situations. Blumer, however, remains unclear as to the meaning of “meaning”. 
That he did not have primarily linguistic meaning in mind is beyond dispute, but without 
a further interpretation of “meaning”, the principle remains opaque. 
Two interpretations suggest themselves: first, the meaning of the object could be the full 
mental representation of the object, including all associations with the object. The 
meaning of a book might then be that I know that is a book, that I remember buying it, 
and that I associate a certain pleasure with the experience of reading it. 
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Second, the meaning of the object could be the information conveyed by the object. In 
the case of a book, it could convey information on its pages. Given as a present, a book 
on writing style conveys the information that the other person thinks I could improve my 
writing. I discuss the notion of information further in the next section. 
As we can see, one can distinguish a mentalist and an information theoretical analysis of 
Blumer’s concept of meaning. I endorse the information theoretical analysis because it 
fits better with Blumer’s discussion of Mead’s theory of gestures. 
According to Blumer’s reading, a “gesture is any part or aspect of an ongoing action that 
signifies the larger act of which it is a part” (Blumer 1969: 9). Blumer illustrates this with 
the example of “a robber’s command to his victim to put up his hands [which] is (a) an 
indication of what the victim is to do; (b) an indication of what the robber plans to do, 
that is, relieve the victim of his money; and (c) an indication of the joint act being formed, 
in this case a holdup” (ibid.). 
All three indications singled out by Blumer describe the informational content of the 
robber’s command. The utterance explicitly contains the information that the victim is 
supposed to put up his hands, but there is also other implicit information, such as that 
the robber plans to acquire the victim’s money. Blumer’s discussion of the second 
principle supports interpreting “meaning” as the information an object conveys. We can 
reformulate the first principle: human beings act towards objects based on the 
information these objects convey to them. 
One might consider this principle rather trivial, but remembering the historical context 
challenges this impression: radical behaviourism still held sway in psychology when 
Blumer first put forward his principle. Radical behaviourists denied the relevance of 
information processing by the agent insofar as they denied that there were any mental 
entities with which the agent engaged internally. 
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The first principle distinguishes symbolic interactionism from radical behaviourism, but 
also from other approaches. Blumer attacks psychologists who “turn to such factors as 
stimuli, attitudes, conscious or unconscious motives, various kinds of psychological inputs, 
perception and cognition, and various features of personal organization to account for 
given forms or instances of human conduct” (Blumer 1969: 3). Of course, Blumer does 
not deny the importance of perception and cognition for action. He is aware that without 
perception, objects could hardly convey information and without cognition, little 
information processing could occur. Blumer objects to neglecting the meaning of objects 
over these other factors, without denying that one can study both. 
Objects convey information and the agents absorb this information, process it, and act 
accordingly. Raising your hand in my seminar conveys the information that you intend to 
ask a question. Perception plays a role here, but does not suffice on its own. I know that 
you want to say something not only because I perceive your hand above your head, but 
because I have the necessary background knowledge. Cognition alone does not suffice 
either; it has to process the information received from the hand within the social context. 
As Blumer is well aware, symbolic interactionism is not alone in giving meaning such a 
guiding role; a cognitive psychologist will also accept that agents receive information and 
that they act based on this information. The second principle differentiates symbolic 
interactionism further. 
 
Second Principle 
According to the second principle, meaning arises out of social interaction, rather than 
the object itself or the psychology of one individual. Blumer elaborates: 
“The meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the ways in which other persons act 
toward the person with regard to the thing. Their actions operate to define the thing for 
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the person. Thus, symbolic interactionism sees meaning as social products, as creations 
that are formed in and through the defining activities of people as they interact.” (Blumer 
1969: 4-5) 
The meaning of raising your hand in a seminar arose out of social interactions. At one 
point the convention was established through interactions, and students were taught 
how to use the gesture.30 
One might worry, however, that not all information arises out of social interaction. 
Robinson Crusoe on his island notices that one flower blooms shortly before the rain 
period. The blooming of the flower now conveys to him the information of the coming 
rain period. The meaning of the flower has changed.31 How then should we make sense 
of Blumer’s claim that meaning arises out of interaction? 
Since Blumer does not address this issue directly, I propose the following reconstruction: 
we should not understand the claim that meaning arises out of social interaction as a 
universally quantified statement claiming one source for all meaning, but rather as a 
generic statement for the cases of meaning, which are core for Blumer, in particular, 
shared meaning in social situations. Blumer is not interested in providing a perfectly 
general analysis of meaning. He is not an information theorist trying to analyse the nature 
of information in all domains. He instead emphasises the importance of information 
conveyed in social interaction for his sociological research. Social interaction is a key 
contributor to establishing shared meaning, but not a necessary condition. 
As a sociological school, symbolic interactionism has a special interest in shared meaning. 
Shared meaning is information, which the object conveys to multiple persons who have 
                                                          
30 Like information, conventions receive more attention in the next section. 
31 The same problem arises for the mentalist interpretation of what Blumer means by “meaning”. 
Robinson Crusoe has a mental representation of the flower as announcing the coming rain. 
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common knowledge of this fact. For example, when a student raises her hand in a 
seminar, the information that she wants to speak is shared by everyone in the room who 
sees the hand, and we all have common knowledge of this situation and the hand’s 
meaning. Symbolic interactionism addresses the question of how meanings “become 
taken-for-granted and routinized” (Snow 2001: 372), that is, how the information of 
signals becomes robustly established in social practices. 
Many symbolic interactionist studies turn around the ways multiple individuals create 
shared meanings. These studies discuss how information transfer becomes shared and 
stable for multiple agents. The shared meaning typically arises out of interaction since 
interaction establishes the common knowledge needed for the information to be shared. 
Many Negotiated Order studies discuss the negotiation of shared meaning (e.g. Maines 
1982, Bryant & Stensaker 2011) as one type of interaction establishing shared 
information.  
The second principle demands that the typical information, which is the focus of 
sociologists, arises out of social interaction. This principle still does not suffice to 
distinguish symbolic interactionism from various other approaches. Blumer aims to get 
more specific. 
 
Third Principle 
Blumer’s third principle emphasises interpretation. Not only do human agents act 
according to the meaning of objects, where the meaning arises out of interaction, but 
they also engage in complex interpretation processes. Taking the notion of interpretation 
in a broad sense, it would be trivial to say that an agent interprets the information in her 
environment. Every agent, even a cockroach scrambling into a dark corner, processes 
information. Interpretation, in Blumer’s sense, entails more than information processing. 
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Blumer’s third principle serves to emphasise the role of the agent regarding meaning: 
“The actor selects, checks, suspends, regroups, and transforms the meanings in the light 
of the situation in which he is placed and the direction of his action” (Blumer 1969: 5).32 
The agent engages flexibly with the information and the interpretative process affects 
the meaning of the objects. 
While a cockroach exhibits some flexibility by fleeing into the dark, it does so to a lesser 
degree than Blumer demands.33 Human agents show great flexibility in their actions. 
When the students raise their hands in my class, I do not just pick the first one I see, but 
instead consider the circumstances. Who spoke last? Who looks most confident? My 
reaction depends on various further considerations. I am flexible in how I interpret and 
respond to the conveyed information. 
Flexible agency is not all; in addition, Blumer demands conscious awareness. As he writes, 
during interpretation, the agent “has to point out to himself the things that have meaning” 
(Blumer 1969: 5). Blumer believes that “[t]he capacity of the human being to make 
indications to himself gives a distinctive character to human action” (Blumer 1969: 15).34 
While sub-conscious information processing occurs within human agents, the kind of 
interpretation Blumer emphasises requires conscious engagement with the information. 
Blumer and the symbolic interactionists in general focus on the meaning of objects, 
insofar as their research subjects’ conscious awareness makes a causal contribution to 
the interpretation. This puts a further constraint on what Blumer means by “meaning”. 
He does not just mean “conveyed information”, but “consciously accessed and processed 
                                                          
32 See also Snow 2001: 373-374 on the principle of human agency in symbolic interactionism. 
33 I’m not committed to Blumer being right on this difference between animal and human agents. 
However, symbolic interactionism traditionally draws such a contrast. For a critical discussion of 
this aspect, see Alger & Alger 1997.  
34 While Blumer thinks that only humans and no other animals engage in interpretation of the kind 
discussed here, this does not form the core of symbolic interactionism and therefore is not part of 
my reconstruction. 
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conveyed information”. The cockroach presumably processes information only in the first 
sense, without conscious access. 
The third principle demands that the conveyed information goes through conscious and 
flexible interpretation processes. Blumer makes a further claim, which belongs in the 
scope of the third principle: interpretation plays a role in the transformation of meaning 
in interaction. According to Blumer, “interpretation should not be regarded as a mere 
automatic application of established meanings but as a formative process in which 
meanings are used and revised as instruments for the guidance and formation of action” 
(Blumer 1969: 5). The interpretation processes reshape the information conveyed by the 
object in the future. 
A student raises her hand signalling to me that she wants to speak. However, she 
contributes frequently to the seminar. I give her a slight nod of the head and a smile, 
acknowledging her effort and knowledge, while taking another student who has spoken 
less. My response is not automatic but flexible and reflective. This interaction also 
changes the information the same action has in the future. The next time the student 
raises her hand only to show that, in principle, I can pick her to speak if no other student 
comes forward. Both of us share knowing glances. She conveys different information with 
the gesture in virtue of the previous interaction. Our flexible interpretation practices, that 
we do not always interpret a raised hand as a wish to speak and respond automatically, 
lead to a change of informational content. 
Such examples illustrate Blumer’s take on conscious interpretations and their power to 
reshape the meaning of objects through interaction. They are everyday examples 
described from a folk-psychological perspective. 
In summary, Blumer’s three principles demand 
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1. that consciously accessible information guides actions, 
2. that in the typical sociologically relevant cases the information arises out of 
social interaction, and 
3. that flexible and conscious interpretative processes shape how the 
information feeds into action. The interpretations and the associated 
interactions change the informational content. 
We can consider a theory which meets these principles to fall within the boundaries of 
symbolic interactionism. In the next section, I undertake the attempt to offer a rational 
choice reconstruction of symbolic interactionism. 
 
The Rational Choice Account: Signalling and Common Knowledge 
At the time Blumer formulated his three principles, game theory failed to satisfy his 
demands for a theory of interaction. Game theory models typically assumed all-knowing 
agents, who responded mechanically to given incentives. Interpretation processes played 
no role worth mentioning in guiding action. The agents might have seemed to be limited 
automata, incapable of processing information in the flexible manner envisioned by 
Blumer. However, in 1969, the same year Blumer’s “The Methodological Position of 
Symbolic Interactionism” appeared in his collection Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective 
and Method, David Lewis published his seminal book Convention, which introduced 
conventions and signalling games to rational choice theory. 
In recent years, games of signalling and information processing more generally have 
become well-established areas of research. In a series of books, Brian Skyrms (1996, 2004, 
2010) has presented key insights from these developments. With these contributions, 
standard rational choice theory offers an account of interaction meeting Blumer’s 
principles. 
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First Principle 
According to Blumer’s first necessary condition, meaning guides human actions. Objects 
in a situation have meaning, insofar as they convey information in situations. Brian 
Skyrms defines informational content as “how the signal affects probabilities” (Skyrms 
2010: 34). That the student raises her hand in class raises the probability that she wants 
to say something from the teacher’s point of view. Skyrms’ information allows an analysis 
of Blumer’s meaning within the framework of game theory. 
Not all Skyrms-type information counts as Blumer’s meaning, however. Skyrms (2010: 29-
30) engages in evolutionary game theory and discusses cases in which bacteria transfer 
information to coordinate. They release certain molecules and the reception of a certain 
quantum of molecules increases the probability of enough bacteria being in a certain 
state. While of interest to Skyrms’ evolutionary project, such examples of information 
transfer between bacteria are far removed from what Blumer had in mind. As discussed 
in the previous section, information must be consciously accessible to the receiving agent 
to count as meaning in Blumer’s sense. The meaning of an object is not determined by all 
ways it affects probabilities but only by those ways which are consciously accessible to 
the receiver.  
The occurrence of smoke increases the probability of a fire taking place and therefore 
conveys information in Skyrms’ sense. The smoke has the meaning of fire only if the agent 
perceiving it consciously accesses the information of likely fire. My proposal is that 
Blumer’s notion of meaning picks out a subset of Skyrms’ information, namely the 
consciously accessed information.35 While Blumer limits himself to consciously accessible 
                                                          
35 Blumer’s focus on our consciousness also suggests that we are dealing here with subjective 
probabilities. The student’s raised hand raises my subjective probability of her wanting to speak. 
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information, game theory can very well accommodate this restriction. There is no 
principled conflict between the two approaches here. 
 
Second Principle 
In his Convention, Lewis intended to analyse the sense in which linguistic meaning is 
conventional. As Quine and others had pointed out (cf. Lewis 1969: 1-4), linguistic 
meaning cannot be conventional in the sense that people met to discuss and agree what 
each word should mean. People did not convene to establish a convention. Linguistic 
meaning must get off the ground without presupposing linguistic exchanges. In response 
to this attack on the conventionality of meaning, Lewis turned to game theory. He 
conceived the problem of establishing conventional meaning as a coordination problem. 
A coordination problem is a game with multiple coordination equilibria, that is, a 
combination of strategies “in which no one would have been better off had any one agent 
alone acted otherwise” (Lewis 1969: 14). For example, the two of us have to meet at a 
certain time in one of our offices. It does not matter to either of us in which office we 
meet, but it matters that we end up in the same room, since neither of us has the time 
to run to the other office if we failed to meet at the same one. The pay-off matrix looks 
as follows: 
CP Office 1 Office 2 
Office 1 1, 1 0, 0 
Office 2 0, 0 1, 1 
 
No strategy dominates this game, because no move promises to be the best irrespective 
of the action by the other player. Instead, the game confronts us with two coordination 
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equilibria, the cases where we meet in the same office. We just need to coordinate. In 
the usual cases of meeting in an office, we could verbally agree on one place; but since 
Lewis is interested in how linguistic meaning arises in the first place, I leave this option 
aside for the moment. 
A Lewisian convention provides a way to achieve coordination without linguistic 
communication. With a convention to meet in my office rather than yours, the problem 
dissolves. The convention provides the solution to the coordination problem, but 
understanding the incentives of the coordination problem enables us to see how we 
establish a convention without explicit agreement, that is, without presupposing 
linguistic meaning. Our interests already align. We want to have a convention so we do 
not miss each other in the wrong office. 
Lewis saw that in a repeated coordination problem, finding oneself following a 
behavioural pattern in which an equilibrium is realised provides a reason to stick to the 
pattern. If we have started to always meet in your office, then we both have reasons to 
go there for the meeting. I expect you to be in your office and you expect me to go there. 
Based on this insight Lewis offered an analysis of conventions. Simplifying slightly, a 
regularity in the behaviour of agents in a recurrent game is a convention, if and only if it 
is common knowledge amongst the players that in the instances of the recurrent game, 
1. almost everyone conforms to the regularity, 
2. almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to the regularity, 
3. almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding the 
possible combinations of actions, 
4. almost everyone prefers to conform to the regularity, on condition that almost 
everyone else conforms to it, 
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5. almost everyone would prefer to conform to another regulation, on condition 
that almost everyone was to conform to it (cf. Lewis 1969: 78). 
The two of us follow the behavioural regularity of meeting in your office and we expect 
each other to do so. Our preferences are approximately the same and in favour of keeping 
to the regularity as long as the other does. 
The incentive structure of a coordination problem, behavioural patterns, and common 
knowledge of the structure and the patterns bear the brunt of Lewis’ analysis of 
conventions. Lewis introduced the influential analysis of common knowledge as a 
principally infinite hierarchy of “i knows that j knows that … knows that A” (cf. 
Vanderschraaf & Sillari 2013). I know that you know that we generally meet in your office 
and you know that I know that, and so on.36 Given this common knowledge, we both have 
a reason to show up at your office rather than mine. 
The term “common knowledge” is a bit of a misnomer as Lewis admitted, since a 
structure of hierarchical iterated beliefs suffices for giving a reason to follow the 
conventional pattern (cf. Lewis 1978: 44, Footnote 13). If I believe that you will be in your 
office and you believe that I believe and so on, this gives me a reason to go there, 
although we only believe rather than know. However, since the term “common 
knowledge” has become the standard, I will stick with it. We should only keep in mind 
that the requirement for common knowledge remains thinner than the term suggests. 
Often common knowledge arises out of a public announcement, and therefore linguistic 
meaning plays a role. However, as Lewis (1969: 56-58) discusses, common knowledge of 
the conditions can also arise by other means, such as past experience of conforming to 
                                                          
36 Since Lewis wrote, further analyses of common knowledge have been proposed. I omit here the 
debates about whether Lewis’ hierarchical analysis is the right one and whether there has to be a 
highest level of knowledge or belief. As long as game theorists can use one analysis of common 
knowledge my argument stands. 
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the regularity. I notice that we always meet at your office in the past and you notice it 
too. We infer that we are both aware of this regularity and that we both prefer it over 
another one as long as the other keeps to it. Since common knowledge only requires 
beliefs, we can easily establish common knowledge in this case. 
With the analysis of convention in place, we can turn to convention-based signalling. 
Lewis proposes that signalling games are coordination games. Consider a traffic light at a 
road junction where our cars meet. If we manage things such that we all stop on red and 
drive on green, we survive. But we also survive if we all stop on green and drive on red. 
We face a coordination problem. A convention saves our lives. 
Traffic lights convey their information to stop or drive only because of the behavioural 
patterns of drivers. While fire causes smoke under a variety of conditions independently 
of any agent, traffic lights cause others to drive or stop depending on our previous 
interaction. The convention gives the traffic lights meaning, in Blumer’s sense. Only by 
virtue of the convention does the red light convey the information that I should stop, and 
the convention depends on previous interaction.37 The previous interaction establishes 
the behavioural pattern and the common knowledge of it. 
In contrast to the fire scenario, this conventional meaning arises out of interaction just as 
Blumer would have it. Our behavioural regularity forms a condition for the convention, 
which allows the traffic light to convey the information we access. If everyone drove at 
red and stopped at green, the convention and accordingly the informational content 
would change. Lewis’ analysis of convention captures this dependence on interaction and 
the rational choice approach accordingly conforms to Blumer’s second principle of 
symbolic interactionism. Key cases of shared meaning arise out of interaction. 
                                                          
37 There might be some natural reasons, why we should use red. Perhaps it is easier to see. 
However, such details at best render the coordination game slightly impure. 
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Common knowledge helps to explain how information arises out of interaction. Only 
because I know that you know that red lights serve as signals to stop, do I drive on green 
without slowing down. It is the special sauce which allows rational choice models to 
increase the informational content of signals. This common knowledge-based rational 
choice proposal bears a striking resemblance to pragmatist sociology in the tradition of 
Mead. Take the following passage from Hans Joas summarising Mead’s position: 
“[H]umans anticipate the way partners in action would potentially behave in response, 
and create an inner representation of that response. This ability enables humans to gear 
their behaviour to what potentially would be that of partners. As the partner, assuming 
it to be a human being, also had the same ability, a completely new pattern in the history 
of evolution emerges for coordinating behaviour: coordination by means of a shared 
orientation towards patterns of mutual behavioural expectations.” (Joas 1996: 187, see 
also Blumer 1969: 9-10)  
Ignoring the dubious claim about the evolutionary uniqueness of humans, this quote 
could re-describe David Lewis’ finding. The drivers coordinate their interaction on the 
road based on mutual expectations. A new coordination arises because two agents have 
a hierarchy of beliefs or knowledge. In this light, using common knowledge appears in 
line with later pragmatist sociology and allows us to account for various phenomena that 
symbolic interactionists have traditionally focussed on.38 
Symbolic interactionists might worry that the rational choice reconstruction only covers 
the special case of coordination problems, while Blumer does not only want meaning to 
                                                          
38 Joas’ summary of Mead has a slightly more behaviourist tendency than the suggestion by the 
rational choice approach. The quote qualifies the expectations as behavioural, while Lewis 
introduced common knowledge in mentalist terms. However, my reconstruction of the Negotiated 
Order approach is more cognitivist than the original pragmatist sources of Dewey and Mead. This 
cognitivist reconstruction facilitates the use in sociology. Mead might write about behaviour, but 
Blumer focusses on meaning and conscious interpretation. 
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guide action in the case of traffic lights and the like, where the preferences of the agents 
align. Meaning also guides the actions of agents in conflict. If the rational choice models 
were limited to coordination games of aligning interest, then they would fall short of the 
demands made by symbolic interactionists. 
Coordination problems play an important role in the rational choice discussion of 
signalling, especially when it comes to explaining linguistic conventions. They deserve this 
attention, because their multiple equilibria allow for an element of arbitrariness in 
conveying information. Stopping on green and driving on red serves us just as well as the 
other way round. But coordination problems are not the only game where common 
knowledge and signalling make a difference. 
Take the classic example of burning bridges in game theory. A general leads her troops 
across a bridge into a battle and has the bridge burned behind them. The bridge would 
have allowed easy transportation and there is no equivalent substitute. If the troops win 
the battle, they would prefer a bridge behind them for transportation. If they lose the 
battle, it is better to have a good retreat opportunity. Under such conditions, burning the 
bridge might seem irrational. The general might know, however, that she is playing a 
game of chicken, also known as the Hawk-Dove game, against the enemy troops. 
This game of chicken has the following four outcome states. If both sets of troops fight 
with full force without retreating, both will be utterly destroyed and no one will win. 
However, if one troop fights with full force and the other retreats early, the first one will 
be victorious and suffer mild damage, while the second will lose and suffer mild damage. 
The pay-offs can be represented in the following matrix: 
Chicken Fight Retreat 
Fight -1, -1 2, 0 
Retreat 0, 2 1, 1 
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Burning the bridge removes part of the infrastructure for the retreat and increases the 
cost for one player. We could represent it in the matrix as follows: 
Chicken Fight Retreat 
Fight -1, -1 2, 0 
Retreat -.5, 2 1, 1 
 
For the row-player, that is the player whose options are represented in separate rows, 
retreat becomes a worse option. Looking at the new matrix we might be puzzled as to 
why anyone would burn the bridge as it only worsens one’s options. However, the matrix 
is not everything, because it does not show an associated shift of expectations. We must 
consider how burning the bridge functions as a signal.39 
The impact of destroying the bridge being common knowledge, setting it on fire conveys 
important information: the general burning the bridge intends to fight to the end.  If she 
considers retreating, burning the bridge is not a good move. That she sets it on fire 
indicates that she will commit all the force of her troops even if it results in her own 
demise. The signal conveys information, not about the pay-offs, but about the probability 
that a player will choose a certain act. 
The common knowledge of the intention to commit all forces changes what is rational for 
the other general. Given the pay-offs as specified before in the matrix, retreat becomes 
the only rational option. Letting the other win and allowing oneself to survive is better 
than mutual destruction. 
Common knowledge changes the information conveyed. Only because the troops march 
towards the battle, and only because the structure of the situation is common knowledge, 
does burning the bridge signal a resolve to fight to the end. As we can see, meaning arises 
                                                          
39 In effect, we have here a case of costly signalling, a type of signalling I discuss later.  
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out of interactions and common knowledge in situations other than just coordination 
problems. 
As I argued, this rational choice approach meets the first two principles Blumer proposed 
for symbolic interactionism: Agents act according to the meaning of objects and this 
meaning arises out of interaction, at least for core cases. What about the third principle 
emphasising interpretation? 
 
Third Principle 
As mentioned before, Blumer has something special in mind when he emphasises 
interpretation. The generals engage in a limited form of interpretation in the example of 
burning the bridge and so do we when we stop in front of red traffic lights. Nonetheless, 
without giving further details these examples do not live up to the third principle. 
According to Blumer “interpretation should not be regarded as a mere automatic 
application of established meanings but as a formative process in which meanings are 
used and revised as instruments for the guidance and formation of action” (Blumer 1969: 
5). Responses to traffic lights appear to be automatic. While I have shown that game 
theory can deal with the interpretation in the cases of the traffic light and the burning 
bridge, these instances might be considered rather simple. Blumer also intends to cover 
more complex cases by giving more prominence to interpretation processes. More 
detailed rational choice models also allow the interpretations to play a bigger role.  
Consider the case of a driver who sees a red traffic light at a cross-roads ahead at night 
and it is commonly known that there is very little traffic at that time. The driver can see 
that no one is driving on the intersecting road. She slows down to make sure she will not 
overlook anything, but despite the red light she drives through the intersection. The 
interpretation of the traffic light does not simply lead to an automatic compliance with 
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the rule. The driver takes the red traffic light as a warning but does not adhere to its 
injunction because she also considers other information. 
We can describe this process of interpretation using rational choice tools. Assume that 
we have instituted a convention to stop on red and drive on green. But just as Blumer 
emphasised, the interpretation matters. Let us return to the driver who sees a red traffic 
light up ahead at night and there is no traffic at all. A rational choice account can model 
her as facing the following decision tree:40 
 
Encounters with a red traffic light split up into two types: encountering the red light 
during daytime traffic and encountering it alone at night. In each type of situation, the 
agent faces the decision whether to follow the convention or not. If the agent follows the 
convention, she stops and receives a pay-off of zero. She does not get to her destination 
faster, but she also avoids accidents. This holds at night and during the day, but the pay-
                                                          
40 It is not quite a game in extensive form since I don’t include the other players properly. 
Red 
Light 
Day Traffic Night Alone 
0 -10 0 1 
No Stop Stop Stop No Stop 
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off for diverging from the convention differs depending on the time of day and the 
associated traffic. 
If the driver does not follow the convention during the day, she receives a negative pay-
off because she is likely to have a crash. During the night, however, ignoring the 
convention has a small pay-off since it speeds up the journey and there is hardly any 
traffic.41 We see that here interpretation is not just an automatic response to the light 
but takes the environment into account. Rational choice models can capture this 
perfectly well. 
Although this model illustrates that rational choice accounts of signalling leave ample 
room for flexible principles, we should only consider it a start. For example, I have not 
introduced probabilities into the decision tree, as a realistic model should. Nothing stops 
us from adding more complexity to the model and the more we add, the more the agent 
appears to be a sophisticated interpreter. Standard rational choice theory can account 
for the complex interpretation processes. 
It also allows for such processes to affect conventions and thereby the meaning of objects. 
Assume that we start out with a convention to stop at red traffic lights. However, it 
becomes common practice to ignore red traffic lights during the night if no other drivers 
can be seen. The agents interpret the light more flexibly than originally intended. At some 
point, this becomes common knowledge and everyone accepts this regularity. Even the 
police officers won’t give you a ticket if they see you crossing a red traffic light at night. 
Under these circumstances, we have a different convention than before. Accordingly, the 
meaning of the signal changed because of the way interpretations guide actions. The 
conveyed information turned from an unqualified “stop” to a conditional one. 
                                                          
41 I ignore the possibility of law enforcement. 
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The example illustrates how interpretation can affect meaning. Even if the agent ignores 
the red traffic light at night, we can still understand the meaning of the traffic light in 
terms of the information it conveys. Because the incentives in the lonely night-time 
driving situation differ from those which the convention was supposed to handle, the 
game changes, which causes the behavioural pattern to change, which in its turn affects 
the convention. The rational choice models meet Blumer’s demand that flexible and 
intelligent interpretation processes shape meaning. 
 
Preliminary Conclusion 
I have considered all three principles Blumer put forward to distinguish symbolic 
interactionism and found that a rational choice account of signalling meets all of them. 
Does that mean that standard rational choice has incorporated all theoretical 
contributions by symbolic interactionism? The assumption of fixed intrinsic preferences 
limits the role of interpretation in the standard rational choice account. Signals can 
neither convey the information of intrinsic preference change, nor can interpretations 
have the force to shift intrinsic preferences. 
The next section argues that symbolic interactionism can offer more than standard 
rational choice accounts of signalling because its pragmatist heritage includes an account 
of motivational change: the theory of motivationally Problematic Situations. Introducing 
this type of preference change, information and interpretations can shape agents and 
their interactions more deeply. Although Blumer himself does not develop this contrast, 
he follows Mead and emphasises “that human interaction is a positive shaping process in 
its own right” (Blumer 1969: 66). He continues by describing interaction as follows: 
“The participants in it have to build up their respective lines of conduct by constant 
interpretation of each other’s ongoing lines of action. As participants take account of 
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each other’s ongoing acts, they have to arrest, reorganize, or adjust their own intentions, 
wishes, feelings, and attitudes […]” (ibid.). Standard rational choice models capture more 
of this process than Blumer knew, but they do not capture everything. Only by giving up 
on the assumption of fixed preferences can we reconstruct the whole contribution of 
pragmatist sociologists. 
 
Signalling and Problematic Situations 
In his book Signals, Brian Skyrms notes that signals do not only convey “information about 
the state of nature, but […] also information about the act that will be chosen” (Skyrms 
2010: 38, italics in the original). By burning the bridge, the general conveys information 
about the action that she will choose in the game of chicken: namely, to fight. 
Signals can contain information about what might affect the outcomes in a standard 
rational choice model: states of natures, preferences, chosen acts. The theory of 
Problematic Situations additionally allows for agents to signal intrinsic preference change 
and potential new intrinsic preferences. Since intrinsic preference change does not figure 
in standard rational choice models at all, it cannot figure in standard rational choice 
models of signalling. Lewis does not discuss preference change in his book and Skyrms 
concerns himself mostly with evolutionary game theory, which replaces the pay-offs in 
terms of preferences with pay-offs in terms of evolutionary fitness. Pragmatist 
sociologists, however, consider the change of goals, including the goals given by intrinsic 
preferences, to be an important aspect of human agency. 
In the previous chapter, I reconstructed the theory of motivationally Problematic 
Situations as a theory of preference change, including the change of intrinsic preferences. 
In my reconstruction, a Problematic Situation follows the disruption and confusion 
characterising an indeterminate situation, and opens the agent up for preference change. 
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The agent then explores new courses of action in an exploratory phase. This theory allows 
for the signalling of preference change and for the interpretation of signals to affect 
preference change, or so I argue in this section. 
Other models of preference change, such as the one suggested by Cohen and Axelrod 
(1984), lack an equivalent to the exploratory phase. But this phase makes all the 
difference for signalling. The agent can signal within the exploratory phase which 
preferences she assumed in a qualified tentative mode, that is, without fully committing 
to them yet. I might signal to my mother that I am reconsidering my distaste for broccoli, 
but I am not yet fully committed. She might cook broccoli, but I reserve the right to pull 
back.42 
For contrast, assume that encountering a Problematic Situation led to an instantaneous 
change of preferences. In this case the agent might signal that she has undergone 
preference change and the new preferences she has developed. But since the preference 
change occurs instantaneously, every response to the change comes after the fact. I can 
signal to my mother that I now like broccoli, but not that I am reconsidering my distaste. 
The signals of other agents cannot react to the preference change and affect it.43 
At the end of the previous chapter, I discussed a case in which the response to preference 
change comes after the fact: Simon and David want to organise a conference but find 
themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma. To get funding for their conference at least one of 
them has to read papers while they are on different flights to a meeting with their funding 
                                                          
42 I actually like broccoli more than my mother does, but I wanted to let the stereotype live on. 
43 Could one not get an equivalent to the exploratory phase if the preference change occurred in 
small increments? Say one could come to like broccoli a little better, and even more given the 
appropriate circumstances, and so on. Even though such a process might mimic an exploratory 
phase, important differences  would remain. For example, the exploratory phase allows trying out 
a different course of action which can only be reached via a large revision of preferences. No small 
increments would allow us to emulate this. 
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body. If neither of them reads the papers, they will not receive funding for the conference 
and if both read them they receive a bit more funding. 
They would prefer mutual reading (cooperation) over mutual defection. But both prefer 
to defect while the other does the reading over both doing the reading. Finally, they 
prefer mutual defection over doing the reading alone. They face a prisoner’s dilemma: 
PD David 
Read Defect 
Simon Read 2 (Simon), 2 (David) 0, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
 
Since Simon and David are on different flights, they cannot communicate, and so we 
should expect both to defect. However, as my example goes, Simon encounters a 
Problematic Situation – he left his USB flash drive back at home and so cannot follow his 
intention to work on a particular task – and as a result his intrinsic preferences change. 
Simon becomes more cooperative: 
PD David 
Read Defect 
Simon Read 4 (Simon), 2 (David) 2, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
 
Simon informs David about his preference change after his flight has landed. But by then 
he already settled on the new course of action. Simon has read the papers while flying 
and his signals come after the fact. 
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Nonetheless, Simon went through an exploratory phase. During the exploration Simon 
started looking into the papers and found that such a course of action suits him after all. 
That he settled on these new preferences is a contingent state of affairs stipulated by me. 
Simon might have found such a course of action unsuitable, even after having had a look 
at the papers. While encountering a Problematic Situation increases the chances of 
preference change, according to the pragmatist sociologists, the encounter does not 
guarantee the change. 
If David could interfere while Simon explores, he would try to move Simon towards 
cooperation. After all, David profits from Simon reading the papers, irrespective of how 
David himself acts. In Simon’s case, the flight rules communication out. All signalling 
happens after the preference change. Often, however, the exploratory phase occurs in 
an accessible setting. Then signalling during the exploratory phase plays a significant role. 
During the exploratory phase, the agents send and receive signals which convey 
information about the preference change. The agent in the exploratory phase might send 
a signal that she is open for new preferences and which preferences are candidates. 
Simon could signal that he considers ranking reading/cooperation higher. He follows a 
tentative preference without yet fully committing to the preference. 
I introduced the notion of a tentative preference for this purpose in the last chapter. The 
agent tries out a new choice that is followed from a candidate’s tentative preference. 
Simon looks into the papers and explores how reading them works out for him before he 
really gets into it. Following the tentative preference, the agent can receive signals that 
inform her of how her environment perceives the potential preference change. In 
contrast to standard rational choice theory, symbolic interactionism can account for how 
signalling affects the development of tentative preferences. 
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Cooperation can become more fundamental thanks to such signalling.44 The agents may 
not only act in mutually beneficent ways, but they might also align their intrinsic 
preferences as they develop. They exchange information about potential new 
motivations and thereby make sure the preferences fit together. Consider the following 
example: 
Each day Matilda and Martin go for separate walks after lunch. They can choose between 
two walking routes: one up the hill and one around the lake. Both Matilda and Martin 
intrinsically prefer to walk around the lake over walking up the hill and both intrinsically 
prefer to walk alone rather than together. Martin and Matilda do not particularly like 
each other. They do not even greet each other. Both prefer to go up the hill if the other 
takes a walk around the lake. For both, the worst outcome is to meet while walking up 
the hill. The pay-off matrix looks as follows: 
 Martin 
Lake Hill 
Matilda Lake 1, 1 3, 2 
Hill 2, 3 0, 0 
(The preference for walking alone deducts 2 from every walk the other shares.) 
Given this matrix and the repeated nature of the game, Martin and Matilda probably find 
one or the other routine that allows them to avoid each other. Both lake/hill 
combinations are Nash equilibria, that is, neither of them can improve the outcome for 
themselves by diverging from this state while the other sticks to it. 45 
Let us assume that they end up with a convention: one day Martin goes up the hill and 
Matilda walks around the lake and the next day they do it the other way round. They 
                                                          
44 I later discuss that such signalling and associated preference change doesn’t guarantee a more 
cooperative outcome. Further empirical assumptions are needed. 
45 Technically we have here an impure coordination problem, also known as Battle of the Sexes, 
which I discuss in chapter six as a model for climate change negotiations. 
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maximise their overall pay-offs and cooperate by avoiding each other – until a 
Problematic Situation occurs. 
Martin goes up the hill, but his walk comes to an unexpected halt right around the first 
corner because a recent thunderstorm has created obstacles. Trees lie across the path so 
that it has become impassable. Martin enters a Problematic Situation and opens up to 
preference change. He could go to the lake, but he knows that Matilda is taking a walk 
there. 
Usually the prospect of meeting Matilda would reduce the expected pay-off. It would still 
be the best remaining option, but with a reduced overall satisfaction. The Problematic 
Situation, however, opened Martin up to preference change and he starts to think that it 
might not have to be that way. Maybe he and Matilda could get along after all? He wants 
to give it a try. While his preferences have not yet changed for good, he enters an 
exploratory phase where he acts with a tentative neutrality towards sharing the walk with 
Matilda, rather than his prior aversion. 
Martin heads towards the lake and, sure enough, runs into Matilda. At this point 
signalling comes in. Following their former motivations, Martin and Matilda would ignore 
each other, but on this occasion Martin greets Matilda and even tries to strike up a 
conversation while they share the path. His actions convey the information that he might 
be willing to share the walk with her after all. He signals that his preferences might change. 
The greeting and attempt to converse increase the probability of a different preference 
and this is common knowledge between Martin and Matilda. 
Matilda can react to these signals in multiple ways. Assume that she keeps to her 
preference for walking alone. She might respond dismissively to Martin’s attempts to talk. 
If she does this, she signals back that she does not want to share a walk with Martin and 
that she therefore does not approve if he changes his preferences in such a way.  
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But Matilda might also enter a Problematic Situation when she is confronted with Martin. 
Since they usually go separate ways, she did not expect him. Matilda stops walking for a 
moment and Martin greets her, another unexpected event. He even tries to strike up a 
conversation! She identifies a problem: the usual division of walking routes has broken 
down. The Problematic Situation opens Matilda up to preference change. 
In her own exploratory phase, she also tries different courses of action, following a 
motivational profile characterised by tentative preferences. Matilda, too, tries out giving 
up her preference for walking alone.  She signals her exploration to Martin, by greeting 
him back and joining the conversation tentatively rather than killing it. This reaction 
contributes to establishing the motivational profile Martin has tried out, and both lose 
their dislike for sharing a walk.46 
 From now on Martin and Matilda enjoy the walk around the lake together. We have a 
new game: 
 Martin 
Lake Hill 
Matilda Lake 3, 3 3, 2 
Hill 2, 3 2, 2 
 
Going to the lake becomes the dominant action for both. 
My example sketches a best-case scenario for cooperation. The agents could keep to their 
old motivations in the situation. Assume that only Martin changed his preference and did 
not respond to Matilda’s dismissive signal. He no longer experiences a decreased pay-off 
for sharing the walk with Matilda, so that the new game would look as follows: 
                                                          
46 In the next section I address how this might work. For now, I just assume that signals can have 
such an impact on the change of intrinsic preferences. 
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 Martin 
Lake Hill 
Matilda Lake 1, 3 3, 2 
Hill 2, 3 0, 2 
 
For Martin, going to the lake dominates. No matter what Matilda does, he prefers going 
to the lake. This is no surprise, since he only became indifferent towards sharing a walk 
with Matilda. For Matilda, however, the rational move now becomes to always take the 
path up the hill, since she can expect Martin to take the dominant action and her pay-off 
is higher if she goes to the hill while he goes to the lake. 
Matilda’s pay-off decreases in comparison to the former convention since she never gets 
to walk around the lake any more. This change on Martin’s side is not particularly 
cooperative. Before at least they cooperated in avoiding each other, now Martin lacks an 
incentive to do so. The preference change is not coordinated, forcing one agent, Matilda, 
to live with a smaller pay-off from now on. 
But the signalling during the exploratory phase allows them to communicate how they 
might change their preferences and align in the process. Before the change, Matilda and 
Martin cooperate in the sense of contributing their share to avoiding each other. During 
their exploratory phases, they coordinate the change of their intrinsic preferences and 
both end up with a more satisfying solution.  With the aligning preferences, they enter a 
new game in which both prefer to go to the lake in the presence of each other.  
This result is more cooperative than Martin’s unilateral preference change, because they 
now both increase their pay-offs. Martin and Matilda undergo preference change 
together leading both to choose the lake and experience higher pay-offs than before. 
Signalling allowed the alignment of the new motivational profiles. 
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While this example serves as a good illustration for signalling during exploratory phase, it 
can only be the start of our discussion. At this point it remains unclear how signals can 
guide the change of intrinsic preferences. Martin might signal his tentative preference to 
Matilda by greeting her and her response supposedly influences his final motivational 
profile, but more remains to be said about the underlying mechanism. 
 
Signals, Preference Change, and Cooperation 
The example of Matilda and Martin illustrates how agents who only have one shared goal 
– avoiding each other – give this goal up in an exploratory process coordinated by 
signalling. But how can the signalling affect the preference change? By greeting her and 
starting a conversation, Martin sends the signal that he might change his preferences and 
no longer avoids Matilda. How does Matilda’s response, where she greets him back and 
joins the conversation, influence whether he adopts the different motivational profile he 
tries out? 
In the exploratory phase, the agent tries out tentative preferences and, if the feedback 
to the trial is appropriate, she adopts new preferences. In the picture offered by 
pragmatist sociologists, the response of the environment to acting on the tentative 
preference affects whether and what intrinsic preference change occurs. How other 
agents react to the new course of action is one response from the environment that 
affects preference change. The question concerns which mechanism underlies this 
influence. We can distinguish an inferential and a non-inferential mechanism. 
The first option is to postulate second-order preferences guiding the change of 
preferences. Martin might prefer to give up his preference for walking on his own only if 
Matilda is also willing to give up her preference. This solution suggests a cognitivist 
picture in which agents consider which preferences they should adopt and then draw the 
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appropriate inference. 47  On some occasions authors in the tradition of pragmatist 
sociology have put forward formulations that invite such a reading. Describing Dewey’s 
theory of changing ends, Hans Joas writes: 
“Dewey’s orientation is not […] towards a blind respect for values and a blinkered pursuit 
of goals, but rather a pragmatic participation in collective action in which all values and 
all goals are potential objects of reflection and discussion.” (Joas 1996: 155) 
The claim that goals change because agents reflect on them suggests that agents infer 
goals in conscious deliberation. While signalling would allow for such deliberation to 
become collective, it is not obvious that any deliberation can lead to different intrinsic 
preferences. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, inference to intrinsic preferences 
remains controversial. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether pragmatist sociologists endorse such an inference. 
While I offered a quote from Joas suggesting such an interpretation, Joas himself 
endorses a picture of agency which reduces the role of deliberation (cf. Joas 1996: 148-
167). He emphasises the non-intentional underpinning of action rather than intentional 
inferences. Dewey himself is not as explicit as Joas’ interpretation suggests. We should 
not be too hasty in attributing to the pragmatist sociologists the position that Martin 
infers a first-order preference based on Matilda’s signal. 
A reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach has a second option: a non-inferential 
psychological mechanism might influence the preference change. Assume that agents are 
more likely to adopt a new motivational profile after trying it out, if the preferences that 
remain unchanged are at least as satisfied as before. The agent does not infer from being 
                                                          
47  At least in principle, second-order preferences could also be involved in a non-inferential 
mechanism. However, if one postulates a non-inferential mechanism, the need to postulate 
second-order preferences is greatly reduced. I therefore disregard this possibility. 
 98 
 
satisfied that she should follow the new motivational profile, rather being satisfied 
enough causes the profile to settle in.48 
As discussed in the previous chapter, tentative preferences are qualified preferences 
which the agent holds with less commitment. The continued satisfaction of prior 
preferences could cause the qualification to fall away and the commitment to increase. 
By postulating such a non-inferential psychological mechanism, pragmatist sociologists 
can avoid committing to the claim that agents infer preferences from second-order 
preferences. 
Consider the case of Martin and Matilda again. Martin adopts the new motivational 
profile because Matilda reacts approvingly when he tries out the new motivational profile. 
We can interpret the “because” in multiple ways. We can understand Martin to have a 
second-order preference for preferences that receive approval from other people. This 
second-order preference leads Martin to adopt the tentative preference after the 
positive signals from Matilda. In this interpretation, Martin engages in an inference to an 
intrinsic preference upon receiving Matilda’s approving response. The signalling would 
affect the preference change because it leads to an inference. 
However, we can also interpret Martin as having only a first-order preference for 
approval from other human beings and to postulate a non-inferential mechanism which 
increases the chance of adopting motivational change if events satisfy this first-order 
preference. The satisfaction of the first-order preference removes the tentative 
qualification from the preference Martin tried out. In this interpretation, Martin does not 
engage in an inference to an intrinsic preference. The signalling would affect the 
                                                          
48 The non-inferential/inferential should not be confused with sub-agential/agential distinction. At 
least in principle, agents might be able to engage in sub-agential inferences, that is inferences 
which are not accessible to agential control. A non-inferential mechanism is one that does not 
involve inferential justification appropriately. 
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preference change because it satisfies a first-order preference and this satisfaction 
affects the change via a non-inferential mechanism. 
The pragmatist sociologist can choose from these two options: First, signalling affects 
preference change via a second-order preference and an inference to a first-order 
preference. Second, signalling affects preference change via a first-order preference and 
a non-inferential mechanism. 
I am still engaged in an effort to offer a charitable reconstruction of the Negotiated Order 
approach, and therefore the right option would be the one that fits the literature better. 
At no point, however, do Dewey, Blumer or Strauss distinguish appropriately between 
second- and first-order preferences in a way that enable me to just rely on following their 
word. My reconstruction, therefore, allows for both interpretations. The Negotiated 
Order approach commits to preference change in response to Problematic Situations and 
that signalling affects the preference change, but the approach remains open for various 
mechanisms of how signalling affects the preference change. 
My account remains informative, even if I only maintain that signals affect preference 
change without settling for one mechanism. However, while I can leave the question of 
the exact psychological mechanism open, both mechanisms I present rely on appropriate 
preferences supporting cooperation. This reliance raises the question as to which 
preferences have to be in place for pro-cooperative preference change through signalling. 
Consider how I described the case of Martin and Matilda: Martin is more likely to give up 
the preference for walking alone if Matilda also signals that she approves of the new 
motivational profile. He tries to strike up a conversation and, because Matilda signals 
willingness to try walking with him by joining the conversation, the revision of the 
motivational profile settles in. I assume that Martin’s psychological make-up renders him 
more likely to end up with preferences that align with those of Matilda. On this 
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assumption, his new profile settles in because Matilda signals approval. But the 
assumption could be wrong. Martin’s new motivational profile could settle in because it 
displeases Matilda. 
Both mechanisms, the one assuming second-order preferences as well as the non-
inferential mechanism, could favour anti-cooperative preferences, which lead to 
rejection by other people. Think of the cliché of a rebellious teenager who develops a 
preference for a certain kind of music only because this music annoys her parents. After 
a Problematic Situation, she might give a different band a try during an exploratory phase. 
Only when her parents signal their disapproval is she hooked. Her preference change is 
misaligned with the preferences of her parents. 
The case of the teenager fits both mechanisms. She could have a second-order 
preference for preferences her parents disapprove of. Since her parents signal 
disapproval of the new music, she infers a new first-order preference for it. Or, she could 
have a first-order preference for disapproval from her parents and the satisfaction of this 
first-order preference affects via a non-inferential mechanism regarding whether a new 
motivational profile settles in. 
In either case, the result is anything but cooperative. The positive effect of signalling for 
achieving cooperation depends on the motivations of the agents. The question as to 
whether signalling during the exploratory phase supports cooperation at the level of 
preferences becomes empirical. Should we believe that the motivations conducive to the 
cooperative effects of such signalling are widespread? Within the Negotiated Order 
approach, authors suggest a motivation that increases the likelihood of cooperation: the 
agents want to make the group work. The Negotiated Order approach focuses on agents 
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who want to get something done together (cf. Strauss 1988: 234; 2014: 88). Consider the 
following example illustrating Strauss’ idea.49 
Henry and Harriet work for a software company and want to get things done in their job. 
However, the integrated development environment (IDE) they use has become outdated 
and unable to fulfil its purpose. The inadequacy of the IDE disrupts their activity and they 
encounter a Problematic Situation. Henry and Harriet have to come to an arrangement 
about which IDE to use in the future. 
Both have intrinsic preferences concerning programming environments, but the 
Problematic Situation opened these preferences up to change. Henry used to have an 
intrinsic preference for IDEs that only have basis functionality and that you can extend 
using plugins, over IDEs that have more functions out of the box but cannot be extended 
using plugins. Harriet had exactly the reverse preference. 
On a standard rational choice approach, we would presume that the preference for 
getting things done would finally override their intrinsic preferences concerning IDEs. But 
within the Negotiated Order approach we also have the option that having to settle for a 
new IDE in response to a Problematic Situation, Harriet and Henry both undergo 
preference change. They try out various IDEs and after trying one called “NETLentils”, 
Harriet signals that she would like to use it. Henry would usually veto the use of 
NETLentils because, contrary to his intrinsic preference, it does not support plugins. 
However, because Henry entered an exploratory phase after the Problematic Situation, 
he tries it and Harriet’s signals contribute to the change of his former preference. 
                                                          
49 The need to present my own example arises, because Strauss’ examples (e.g. Strauss et al. 1963: 
164-165, Strauss 2014: 92-93) do not clearly capture the change of intrinsic preferences, although 
he endorses the intrinsic preference change (see previous chapter). 
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Harriet’s signal influences whether Henry settles on the new preference suitable for 
NETLentils. Again, we can interpret the example as working via a second- or via a first-
order preference. Henry could have a second-order preference to develop preferences 
that help the organisation work over those that do not. Giving up his preference to work 
with IDEs that support plugins helps the organisation to work, because then he and 
Harriet can agree on NETLentils as their IDE and get on with the work. He could infer from 
his second-order preference and the appropriate beliefs a new first-order preference 
over IDEs. 
Or, employing the other mechanism, Henry could have a first-order preference to get 
work done. The signals from Harriet inform him that they can get work done with 
NETLentils. The likely satisfaction of the first-order preference then leads via a non-
inferential mechanism to the final change of preferences. This description avoids 
postulating any inference to intrinsic preferences. Both options remain available to 
Negotiated Order sociologists. In either case, the signalling affects preference change and 
thereby helps to assure coordination. 
In summary, the agents belong to an organisation and have a second- or first-order 
preference directed at keeping this organisation working. This preference then functions 
in one way or another as the connecting link allowing signals between the agents to lead 
to better aligned preferences. This example illustrates the prototypical description of the 
organisational dynamics by the Negotiated Order approach. The guarantee for the 
preference to function as a connecting link is not a priori, but rather the practitioners of 
the Negotiated Order approach have found the assumption of such a motivation helpful 
for explaining organisational dynamics. I do not independently argue for the assumption, 
but apply it from a school of sociology. 
 103 
 
Using this assumption, the link between signalling and cooperation holds in cases like that 
of Henry and Harriet. But one might doubt whether signalling during the exploratory 
phase can help cooperation in cases of prisoner’s dilemma. 
 
Signalling and Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma 
I am especially interested in whether preference change and signalling affecting this 
change help to overcome a prisoner’s dilemma. Many authors think of climate change 
negotiations as being a case of prisoner’s dilemma (e.g. Brennan 2009). While this model 
proves too simplistic in chapter six, it serves as a good approximation for a worst-case 
scenario. If climate change negotiations resembled the prisoner’s dilemma, we would 
expect all parties to defect even though they themselves would have profited more from 
mutual cooperation. Exactly in such a case we would hope that preference change, 
aligned through signalling, helps us out. 
The nasty nature of the prisoner’s dilemma, however, also works against signalling. Let 
us start first with an example assuming fixed preferences. Two agents usually face each 
other in a coordination problem. They have to meet in one of two places and not miss 
each other. In response, they have developed a signal for place one and a signal for place 
two. 
Whenever an agent signals place one, they both meet there, and when an agent signals 
place two they meet there. The agents have common knowledge of the game, that is, 
they know the incentive structure and that the other signals with the intention of 
achieving cooperation. We have an example of a coordination problem solved by 
conventional signalling: 
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CG Option 1 Option 2 
Option 1 1, 1 0, 0 
Option 2 0, 0 1, 1 
 
Assume now that for whatever reason, the game changes and the pay-offs become that 
of a prisoner’s dilemma: 
 
PD Option 1 Option 2 
Option 1 1, 1 -1, 2 
Option 2 2, -1 0, 0 
 
What happens to the signalling? Let us assume that the agents play this prisoner’s 
dilemma game only once and they have common knowledge of this fact. Each of them 
now knows that the other has an incentive to send the signal for one option and then 
choose the other option. This common knowledge undermines the information formerly 
conveyed by the signal. The former signal for place one no longer increases the subjective 
probability that the agent will be at place one. 
The meaning of the signalling action changes because of the different structure of the 
interaction and the common knowledge thereof. The new situation undermines how 
signalling contributes to achieving cooperation. Even if one prisoner gives the other a 
thumbs-up from the cell to show that she intends to cooperate, the other prisoner has 
good reasons to remain wary. The prisoner’s dilemma can undermine the support for 
signalling, especially if it is played for a limited number of rounds. 
So far, I have discussed the standard case with fixed preferences, but the troubles carry 
over to the cases of changing intrinsic preferences. Assume that two agents, A and B, find 
themselves in a one-off deadlocked negotiation, which we can model as a prisoner’s 
dilemma, but which allows for signalling before the agents make their final choice. 
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To get a few chapters ahead of ourselves, assume that A and B are group agents. They 
are states engaged in an arms race with the structure of prisoner’s dilemma. Both would 
prosper more if they mutually disarmed, but each of them has an incentive to defect. We 
should expect both sides to continue their arms race. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B 
Cooperate Defect 
Player A Cooperate 2, 2 0, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
 
Assume now that both players enter a Problematic Situation and open up to changing 
their preferences. For example, a natural disaster devastates both states in the arms race. 
Their arming activities are disrupted and they identify problems. The Problematic 
Situations open them up for becoming more peaceful, but only if they each believe the 
other one will become more peaceful too. They would want to signal this to one another 
so as to coordinate their preference change. 
One of the players, A, wants to signal the tentative preference for disarming they consider 
adopting fully, but which they have not yet adopted. With their new intrinsic preferences, 
the game would change to the following: 
Transformation A Player B 
Cooperate Defect 
Player A Cooperate 4, 2 2, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
 
Cooperation becomes dominant for A if they undergo such a preference change. However, 
they are more likely to undergo such a preference change if agent B convincingly signalled 
back, that they also might undergo such a change. As long as A has a good reason to 
believe that B will develop a similar motivational profile, they will themselves settle on 
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the more cooperative intrinsic preferences. If both underwent the pro-cooperative 
change it would produce the following matrix: 
Transformation (A&B) Player B 
Cooperate Defect 
Player A Cooperate 4, 4 2, 3 
Defect 3, 2 1, 1 
 
They would both prefer cooperation and the game turns into an easily solvable impure 
coordination problem. The natural way to interpret the sketched scenario is that A shows 
a tendency to become more cooperative, but only if they believe that B becomes more 
cooperative as well. 
Because the signalling takes place in face of a prisoner’s dilemma, however, the signals 
become untrustworthy. Even if A does not open up to a preference change in favour of 
more cooperation, they have an incentive to signal such a change if she can hope to lure 
B into becoming more cooperative. A intends to make B cooperate, while they defect. 
On the other side, B also has an incentive to signal back that they might become more 
cooperative, even if they do not open up to preference change at all. They too can hope 
to lure the other into becoming more cooperative. The two states in the arms race might 
hope to fool each other into falling behind. Each of them has an incentive to signal that 
they consider becoming cooperative, although neither of them really does. 
Assuming all this is common knowledge, the situation undermines the informational 
content otherwise associated with the signals. The states in the arms race cannot trust 
the other’s signals. Just as in the case of fixed preferences, the one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma undermines how signalling contributes to achieving cooperation. If the climate 
change negotiations between states took this form, we should expect signalling to fail 
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during the negotiations. The contribution of the Negotiated Order approach becomes 
doubtful. 
However, not only does the problem carry over from the case of fixed preferences to 
those described by the Negotiated Order approach, the solution does too. The following 
circumstances are known to ameliorate the issue: 
• The prisoner’s dilemma could be recurrent rather than one-shot. In particular, 
the same agents play repeatedly against each other. 
• The signals can be costly. 
If the same agents engage with each other repeatedly in a prisoner’s dilemma without a 
definite end, then signals can establish themselves again. If an agent deceives by sending 
wrong signals and then defecting, others can punish by defecting in the future. Honest 
signalling receives rewards which allow rational agents to signal (cf. Skyrms 2004: 4-6). 
The exact outcome depends on the details: How likely is it that agents interact with each 
other again? Do they know when the repetition ends? Does each game have the same 
pay-off structure? For a wide range of answers, the agents can overcome the difficulties 
of the prisoner’s dilemma by signalling and then engaging in cooperation. 
Costly signals also allow agents to continue signalling in the face of a prisoner’s dilemma 
(cf. Skyrms 2004: 80-81).50  In the example of the arms race, one state might signal to the 
other its exploration of becoming more cooperative by shutting down and dismantling an 
arms factory. If the signal has sufficiently high costs, then faking it does not pay. The 
whole point of faking it is to get an advantage in the arms race, but dismantling an arms 
factory undermines the advantage. 
                                                          
50 The burning bridge case discussed earlier relies on costly signalling. 
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For a state sincerely tending towards becoming more peaceful, shutting down the arms 
factory has lower expected costs. After all, achieving cooperation, the state will shut the 
factory anyway. The incentive for deception is outweighed by the costs of the signal, but 
the costs are lower for an honest agent. 
The problem and the solution pertain to signalling both with fixed and with changing 
preferences. However, the cooperation achieved with preference change cuts deeper. 
Even with stable preferences, agents in a prisoner’s dilemma can signal cooperation and 
cooperate if the game is repeated or they develop costly signalling. However, in these 
fixed-preference cases the cooperation remains fragile. 
Assume that the agents managed to cooperate in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma because 
of its repetitive nature. When these agents learn that the next game is the last one, the 
incentives become once more that of a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. No longer can one 
punish the defector in the following round. The cooperation breaks down with the new 
information. 
By contrast, assume that the agents in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma aligned their 
preference change with signalling. The signalling was only trustworthy enough to support 
the mutual change of preferences because the prisoner’s dilemma was repeated. But 
with the preference change the pay-offs in the matrix changed for good: 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B 
Cooperate Defect 
Player A Cooperate 2, 2 0, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
 
became 
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Transformation (A&B) Player B 
Cooperate Defect 
Player A Cooperate 4, 4 2, 3 
Defect 3, 2 1, 1 
 
Even if the agents learned that the next game of the repeated transformed game was the 
last one, their changed preferences would support cooperation. The cooperation no 
longer breaks down with the new information. The cooperation is not built upon the 
threat of punishment for defection, but upon mutual preferences for the cooperative act. 
This case illustrates that the cooperation cuts deeper with the inclusion of preference 
change. Accordingly, the theory of Problematic Situations makes a difference to 
cooperation achieved through signalling. 
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Chapter Four: Putting the Pieces Together 
The previous two chapters introduced the theory of action underlying the Negotiated 
Order approach. In the second chapter, I discussed the theory of Problematic Situations, 
as developed by Dewey and taken up by pragmatist sociologists, which offered an 
account of preference change. 
The third chapter turned to symbolic interactionism and its emphasis on meaning and 
interpretation. I reconstructed a large part of symbolic interactionism using rational 
choice models of signalling, but also discussed how the pragmatist sociologists make an 
original contribution. In contrast to standard rational choice models, signalling and 
interpretation affect intrinsic preference change. 
This chapter puts the pieces of my reconstruction together. I present the Negotiated 
Order approach as an original account of social orders, where preference change in 
response to Problematic Situations characterises these social orders. Strauss asserted 
“that social orders are, in some sense, always negotiated orders” (Strauss 1988: 235), but 
I aim to establish a more modest conclusion. I analyse what it is for a social order to be a 
Negotiated Order and suggest that at least some social phenomena are helpfully 
conceived of as exhibiting such an order. The empirical research by Strauss and his team 
support this suggestion. 
First, I introduce the Negotiated Order approach as a theory of organisations. Although 
the approach does not limit itself to organisations, Anselm Strauss and others first applied 
it to such cases, for example hospitals. The originality of the Negotiated Order approach 
becomes apparent by contrasting it with an account of organisations structured around 
bureaucracy. Instead of bureaucratic rules and hierarchical chains of commands, Strauss 
emphasised the role of individual agents and the negotiations between them. 
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In the next step, I provide an analysis of negotiations. Building upon remarks by Strauss, 
I distinguish negotiations from other forms of interaction such as coercion and 
manipulation. Negotiations are a form of interaction directed at an agreement, in which 
the participants seek to address each other’s motivations although they face a 
motivational conflict. Such negotiations can be explicit or implicit. The agents engaging 
in them might not even conceive of them as negotiations. 
Having introduced the notion of negotiation, I provide a full analysis of Negotiated Orders. 
Negotiated Orders are revealed to be a special type of social orders characterised by 
Problematic Situations and negotiations. The contributions of the previous two chapters 
come in at this point. Intrinsic preference change of agents and their signalling belong to 
the defining features of Negotiated Orders. 
The chapter ends by contrasting a standard rational choice model of an organisation 
facing a problem with the Negotiated Order approach. I draw on Strauss’ ideas and 
illustrate with an example the contribution of the Negotiated Order approach. The 
consequences are twofold: On the one hand, the Negotiated Order approach allows us 
to make some predictions about how intrinsic preference change affects social orders. 
On the other hand, the Negotiated Order approach does not offer specific quantitative 
models as the standard rational choice theory does.  
 
The Negotiated Order Approach as a Theory of Organisations 
Historically, the Negotiated Order approach grew out of applying symbolic interactionism 
to organisations. Together with his team, Anselm Strauss spearheaded this development 
with a 1963 study on “The Hospital and Its Negotiated Order”. In this text, Strauss et al. 
report the results of their observation in a psychiatric hospital. They emphasise their 
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observation that the organisation needs limited and informal agreements to function and 
that negotiations serve as a salient means for achieving such agreements. 
To see the significance of Strauss’ contribution, consider an alternative approach: a 
theory of organisation according to which strict bureaucratic rules, codification, and 
hierarchical chains of command govern the functioning of organisations. Accounts in the 
tradition of Max Weber (1990 [1922], for an introduction see Preisendörfer 2011: 97-102) 
have taken such an approach. The following sketch of such an account serves as a contrast 
foil for the Negotiated Order approach. I do not claim, however, to offer the best version 
of a Weberian account, nor that such bureaucracy-centric theories are the only 
alternative to consider for establishing the Negotiated Order approach as the best theory 
of organisations. The purpose of this sketch is to present the Negotiated Order approach 
by giving it an idealised opponent. 
That being said, we find an enlightening difference between the Negotiated Order 
approach and Weberian approaches.  For Max Weber, bureaucracy belonged to the iron 
cage of modernity, which reduced the role of individuality. Official and codified rules 
guide the interaction of individuals and their own intentions become secondary. A 
formalised hierarchy provides a chain of command leaving negligible room for 
negotiations between the levels. Since everything becomes codified, ambiguity falls away, 
or so a strict bureaucracy in Weber’s tradition might suggest. A sophisticated version 
would grant that some minor role would remain for individual idiosyncrasies and 
negotiations. However, they would still insist that for explaining how the organisation 
works, how it settles on its aims and achieves or fails to achieve them, these other factors 
can typically be ignored. 
Given this approach, we would expect that by looking at the official rules of the hospital 
and the directives issued down a long a chain of command, we would arrive at a 
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description of how the organisation functions. We might accept some deviations, some 
minor adjustments resulting from negotiations between individuals, but these exceptions 
should be mostly random noise. 
Strauss and his team questioned such an approach. Based on their observation, they 
concluded that official rules and commands do not play the leading role suggested by 
Weberian approaches. They found that “in most sizable establishments, hardly anyone 
knows all the extant rules, much less exactly what situations they apply to, for whom, and 
with what sanctions” (Strauss et al. 1963: 151) and “that some rules once promulgated 
would fall into disuse, or would periodically receive administrative reiteration after the 
staff had either ignored those rules or forgotten them” (ibid.). 
The bureaucratic scheme of the organisations studied only mattered insofar as the agents 
took account of it in their daily interactions, which happened only occasionally and 
selectively. The members of the hospital themselves recognised that “too rigid a set of 
rules would only cause turmoil and affect the hospital’s over-all efficiency” (Strauss et al. 
1963: 153). They considered the iron cage of Weberian rationalisation dysfunctional. 
Strauss and his team agreed with this folk assessment. Rules fail to govern organisational 
behaviour in a way that satisfies the participants, so the agents only employ the rules 
when it suits them. 
Consequently, Strauss and his team suggested that the interactions of individuals have to 
receive more attention. A theory of individual agency, rather than of bureaucratic 
rationalisation from above, became central. Those seeking to explain organisation must 
consider what the members of the organisation do, rather than to presume it from the 
official record of rules and command. 
Blumer, too, noted that “[i]nstead of accounting for the activity of the organization and 
its parts in terms of organizational principles or system principles, it [symbolic 
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interactionism] seeks explanation in the way in which the participants define, interpret, 
and meet the situations at their respective points” (Blumer 1969: 58). As reconstructed 
in the previous chapter, agents act based on the meaning objects have for them and 
engage in complex interpretation processes which reshape the meaning of the objects. 
Blumer and Strauss hold that these features of interaction are crucial for describing 
formal organisations. 
Strauss and his team found in their research that organisations create Problematic 
Situations for their members. Decisions and rules have unintended consequences and the 
members have to find ways of dealing with them. In their foundational hospital study, 
Strauss et al. describe how an increase of adolescents among the patient population 
“raised many new problems, and led to feverish negotiative activity” (Strauss et al. 1963: 
165). In varying degrees, the change led to unforeseen disruptions in the working routines 
of the members, who therefore encountered Problematic Situations as described in the 
second chapter.  Not all of these Problematic Situations lead to a change of intrinsic 
motivations, but they increase the probability of such changes. 
These Problematic Situations take place in a context that demands cooperation. The 
organisation, in this case the hospital, has to continue working, even if the increase of 
adolescents disrupts the way it functioned before. In the previous chapter I noted Strauss’ 
assumption that the agents in an organisation try to work things out and negotiations are 
one salient way to do this (cf. Strauss 1988: 234). The bureaucratic rules need time to 
adapt and the hospital has to keep functioning until they do. The Problematic Situations 
cause informal negotiations to maintain the daily functioning of the organisation. During 
such negotiations, signalling can guide the preference change of group members. New 
preferences are likely to align because of this signalling, as discussed in the previous 
chapter (remember the example of Henry and Harriet). 
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In the case of the problems arising from an increased number of adolescents, the 
negotiations finally ended in a new rule, which provided an upper limit for the number of 
adolescents to be admitted. But the low-level negotiations on how to deal with the 
Problematic Situations preceded the resulting rule, which came with the proviso that if 
the situation required it, the higher levels of administration could look into it again (cf. 
Strauss et al. 1963: 166). Even the new rule remained up for negotiation, so that if further 
Problematic Situations were to occur, the rule would have fallen out of favour quickly. 
By now we see the rough outlines of the Negotiated Order approach to organisations: 
Based on his empirical findings, Strauss denies that bureaucratic rules and a chain of 
command suffice to keep organisations functioning; instead he points to interactions 
such as negotiations. For describing these interactions Strauss endorses the theory of 
Problematic Situations, and Blumer’s theory of meaning and interpretation. If we 
combine these elements adequately, we end up with the Negotiated Order approach to 
organisations. 
In the following, I discuss Strauss’ notion of negotiations and then present my 
reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach along the lines just sketched. This 
reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach, however, will not be limited to formal 
organisations. Although the Negotiated Order approach arose out of research into 
organisations, it has since been extended. Sociologists have argued that various kinds of 
groups and social arrangements exhibit a Negotiated Order, including public pools (Scott 
2009). Strauss went so far as to assert “that social orders are, in some sense, always 
negotiated orders” (Strauss 1988: 235).51  While I commit only to the claim that the 
Negotiated Order approach can shed light on some important social phenomena, the 
                                                          
51 As Strauss clarifies in the next sentence, “in some sense” is supposed to guard against the belief 
that negotiation fully explains all features of the social order. 
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following reconstruction of negotiations and Negotiated Orders respects the breadth of 
the approach.  
 
Analysis of Negotiations 
Unforeseen difficulties in the hospital, the problems following an increase in the 
adolescent patient population, lead to negotiations. For Strauss negotiations are a way 
of “getting things accomplished” (Strauss 1988: 2, 234). Negotiations in the hospital help 
to keep it functioning in response to such unforeseen complications. 
Not all interactions that allow organisations and groups to keep going are negotiations, 
however. Strauss compares negotiations with manipulation and coercions, which both 
can serve as means to getting things accomplished (Strauss 1988: ix-x, 221). These forms 
of interaction serve as a contrast class which highlight the characteristic features of 
negotiations. 
While manipulation, coercion, and negotiations are often mixed in human interaction, 
they also offer clearly distinct cases. Pure cases of manipulation and coercion serve to 
meet a goal by bypassing the motivations of the other agent. If I tell you the wrong date 
of the departmental meeting, I manipulated you into missing it by supplying false 
information. If I tie you down with chains and shackles, I coerce you into missing the 
departmental meeting. If I offer you an incentive not to attend the departmental meeting, 
I negotiate with you. 
To negotiate with another agent implies an attempt to reach agreement based on their 
own motivations.  Nonetheless, negotiations do not imply altruism on any side of the 
interaction. Two agents haggling on the market negotiate without being altruistic at all. 
Neither do negotiations imply that one tries to meet all motivations of the other agent, 
 117 
 
one only has to try to meet enough of them to reach one’s goal. The hagglers in the 
market try to meet each other’s demands so that the exchange occurs, but no more than 
that. 
Of course, a negotiation might also fail because the agents are, in the end, unwilling to 
meet each other’s demands. The two hagglers might be unable to agree on a price, but 
as long as they try to find a price that suits the motivations of both, they negotiate. If one 
of them robs the other, the interaction turns predominantly into coercion. If the haggler 
knowingly pays with counterfeit money, she engages in manipulation. 
For many interactions the negotiative, coercive, and manipulative elements are difficult 
to untangle. When the boss in the company negotiates with the personnel about how 
they will divide up work this week, the boss can use coercion.52 She can simply assign one 
employee to one slot regardless of his own preferences. When the boss splits up the work 
for this week and informs everyone that they have to do this or get fired, she tries to 
circumvent some motivations of the employees. She bypasses their desires for a certain 
division of work and rather coerces them. But, of course, negotiative elements remain as 
well, since the boss is still taking into account the employees’ motivation to keep their 
job. 
By contrast, if she considers their motivations and offers incentives for accepting the 
division of working time, she engages more directly in negotiations. How much the agents, 
in this case the boss, use their power to limit the amount of motivations that can even be 
met in the interaction determines the degree to which the interaction is coercive rather 
than negotiative.  
                                                          
52 “Coercion” as used by myself and Strauss does not imply illegitimate force. A police officer 
correctly arresting a criminal would count as coercion based on my and Strauss’ use. 
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Given these boundaries suggested by Strauss’ discussion of coercion, manipulation and 
negotiation, I propose the following analysis: 
An interaction between two or more agents is a negotiation if and only if 
i. the interaction is directed at establishing and/or maintaining an agreement, 
ii. the agents have to overcome a motivational difference for the agreement, 
iii. the agents seek to address motivations of one another in this interaction in 
overcoming this difference, and 
iv. the agents suppose that the matter to be agreed upon depends on their 
agreement. 
For an interaction to be directed at an agreement, the direct participants in the 
interaction need to have a motivation to agree and this motivation must guide the 
interaction at least partially (condition 1). If a boss and her employees have no motivation 
to reach an agreement on how to split up the work, then they do not negotiate. The boss 
might still try to coerce the employees into working, but she is not motivated to reach an 
agreement. 
Strauss and his team found that in actual organisations the wish to keep the group 
working usually motivates group members to look for an agreement. They need to agree 
on one course of action or otherwise the hospital, the corporation, or the family cannot 
function. In standard cases, the pure imposition of an order from above does not allow a 
group to achieve its goals. Groups rely on their members to try to achieve agreements. 
Agreements can concern a variety of things, such as how to divide working hours or the 
basic goals shared by a group.53  When the personnel at the hospital starts to negotiate 
                                                          
53  I rely on an everyday understanding of agreement. Gilbert 1993 and Mintoff 2004 have 
proposed two accounts. As far as I can see both should suit my purposes, although Mintoff’s 
account restricts agreements more by analysing them as exchanges of intentions. 
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about the problems caused by the increased adolescent population, they might find 
middle ground by establishing a rule limiting the admission of adolescents. They have 
come to an agreement about how to handle the situation. 
The first condition distinguishes real negotiations from pretence negotiations. In 
pretence negotiations, one of the parties only acts as if they are trying to come to an 
agreement with the other, while secretly aiming for something else. During a war, a party 
might pretend to participate in peace negotiations, while in fact not trying to come to an 
agreement with the other parties, but rather using the time to regroup. The interaction 
might be considered a case of manipulation rather than negotiation. For a negotiation to 
take place, all participating agents must aim for an agreement. Such pretended 
negotiations illustrate that an agent can be mistaken about whether they are engaging in 
negotiation with another agent. The other party might believe that they are engaging in 
peace negotiations, while the interactions are only pretence negotiations. 
For the interaction to be a negotiation, the agents need to face motivational differences 
that need to be overcome to arrive at an agreement (condition ii). This motivational 
difference exists if and only if the motivations of the agents do not allow an agreement 
without trade-offs.  There has to be some conflict between the desires of the agents that 
is required to overcome in order to make agreement possible. 
For example, two employees want to take the Thursday morning shift, but only one slot 
is available. These two employees have a motivational difference insofar as their 
immediate desires are not co-realisable. Both desire a scarce resource, which they cannot 
share. But such a motivational difference does not rule out an agreement, since the 
parties can engage in side transfers. They might negotiate an exchange of other slots until 
they find a solution to which both can agree. 
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The demand for a motivational difference rules out cases in which one agent makes a 
proposal and the other happily agrees right away. One employee proposes to another 
that she will do the Monday shift and the other one will do the Tuesday shift. The other 
accepts, because this suits her motivational profile as well. In this case the agents are 
engaging in an interaction directed at an agreement, but they do not have to overcome 
a motivational difference. The case fulfils all conditions for a negotiation except for the 
second. The two employees have reached an agreement without having had to engage 
in any negotiations. For one agent to make an offer and for the other to accept it is an 
interaction, but it is not enough for a negotiation. We don’t negotiate every time I offer 
you a biscuit and you accept it.  
Including such a motivational difference in the conditions not only suits our everyday use 
of the term, but also Strauss’ sociological use. According to Strauss, negotiations serve to 
work things out. If everyone can agree to everything immediately, they have nothing to 
work out. We do not work things out when I offer you a biscuit and you accept it. However, 
if our desires conflict because both of us want the last biscuit, we start to discuss the 
situation, and you promise to do the dishes in exchange for the biscuit, then we have a 
negotiation. 
The third condition, that agents seek to address the motivations of one another, 
distinguishes negotiations from pure coercion and manipulation. These other forms of 
interaction try to bypass the motivation of the other agent.  Mixed cases occur if agents 
try to bypass some motivations and meet others. If the boss uses her power to bypass 
the employee’s preference not to work on Friday, then she coerces her employee. But 
the boss might still negotiate as to when the employee works during the rest of the week. 
As a result, the entire interaction is a mix of negotiation and coercion. 
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This condition demands that all participating agents seek to meet the motivations of one 
another. If in an interaction between two agents only one tries to meet the motivation of 
the other, this is not a negotiation. Take the example of a kidnapping where the hostage 
tries to convince the kidnapper to let him go. He makes promises to her on the condition 
that she lets him go, but the kidnapper just silences the hostage. In this scenario, the 
hostage tried to engage in a negotiation, but the attempt failed. No negotiations took 
place. 
Accordingly, an interaction among three agents is only a negotiation among all three of 
them if each of them tries to meet the motivations of the others. If only two out of three 
do so, then only the interaction between the two counts as a negotiation. 
The fourth and last condition demands that the agents suppose that the negotiated 
matter depends upon their agreement. An appropriate account of agreement might 
already provide such a limitation, but since I provide no account, but rather depend on 
our everyday understanding, I included the clarification in my analysis of negotiation. 
The condition rules out that physicists engaging in a discussion about whether a law of 
physics holds are thereby negotiating the laws of physics. The physicists engage in an 
interaction directed at a theoretical agreement and they try to meet each other’s 
motivations. Nonetheless, they do not negotiate the laws of physics. Negotiators can only 
negotiate what they deem to be within their power. The physicists can negotiate which 
model to use in a simulation, but they cannot negotiate the laws of physics. 54  My 
definition allows for mistaken negotiations, that is, cases in which the agents mistakenly 
believe that the matter is up to them. 
                                                          
54 I assume here that they endorse a sort of realism about the laws of physics. According to such 
realism one might negotiate how to formulate a physical law, but the law remains independent of 
the formulation. An analogous case can be constructed for moral realists, who discuss what they 
morally ought to do. 
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Those are the four conditions for negotiations. One might be tempted to add a fifth 
condition demanding common knowledge of the previous four, i.e. that each agent 
believes that the conditions are fulfilled, and that the other believes that they are fulfilled, 
and so on. I do not see the need for this further limitation. Consider the case of the two 
warring parties engaged in peace negotiations, in which each side believes that it is more 
likely than not that the other is just using the interaction to gain time to regroup. But 
while both have this fear and therefore lack the common knowledge that the first 
condition is fulfilled, both in fact meet all the conditions and try to reach an agreement 
in their interaction. I would call this a case of a negotiation. Therefore, we should not 
include common knowledge among the requirements for negotiations. 
My proposed analysis of “negotiation” remains very broad, but this fits Strauss’ use. In 
particular, Strauss asserts that “negotiations can also be implicit, their products being 
tacit agreements or understandings” (Strauss 1988: 224).  Consider the following example. 
A boss and her employees want an unspoken agreement about how many minutes late 
one can arrive in the morning. Given their different roles, they face a motivational 
difference that needs to be overcome: the boss wants the employee to be on time as 
much as possible and the employee wants to have some leeway. Even without words 
spoken, we can find side transactions: one employee might stay longer, hoping that the 
boss in return will become more lenient about arriving late. They try to meet each other’s 
motivations and they suppose that the matter to be agreed upon is up to them. They 
negotiate implicitly about how late employees can come. 
Negotiators do not have to explicitly state that they are engaging in negotiations. They 
might even be surprised to learn that they engaged in negotiations. Nonetheless they can 
meet the necessary and jointly sufficient condition for a negotiation. 
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While not an essential part of the analysis of negotiations, they notably serve as means 
to address Problematic Situations within organisations. During such negotiations, 
participating agents have a propensity to change their intrinsic preferences and signal so 
to each other. The previous chapter’s example of Harriet and Henry’s negotiation about 
which integrated development environment (IDE) to use illustrates this connection. 
Harriet and Henry try to settle on one program for the software company to work. Their 
interaction is directed at agreement and they must overcome a motivational difference. 
They intrinsically prefer different types of IDEs. Neither of them tries to bypass the 
motivations of the other, but rather they seek an agreement suiting everyone. In other 
words, they negotiated with one another. However, they overcome their motivational 
difference not just by engaging in an exchange. Henry undergoes a change of intrinsic 
preferences that allows them to leave the motivational difference behind. 
In the Negotiated Order approach, agents can overcome the motivational difference 
necessary for negotiations by a change of intrinsic preferences. A standard rational choice 
perspective on negotiations neglects this option. 
 
Analysis of Negotiated Order 
With my analysis of negotiations in place, I can reconstruct the core of the Negotiated 
Order approach: the notion of a Negotiated Order. While Strauss introduced this 
technical term, which I capitalise to distinguish it from the colloquial use, he never offered 
an explicit analysis in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. 
It is a conceptually necessary feature that Negotiated Orders are social orders which 
cannot be explained by a model of strict bureaucracy, but are shaped by Problematic 
Situations and reactions to such situations, including negotiations and intrinsic 
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preference change. All elements from the previous chapters come together in this notion 
of the Negotiated Order: 
A social order is a Negotiated Order if and only if 
(i) its features cannot be satisfactorily explained by reference to bureaucratic rules, 
(ii) agents within the social order encounter Problematic Situations threatening the 
persistence of the social order, 
(iii) these situations cause these agents to negotiate with one another, and 
(iv) the resulting negotiations shape the social order, 
(v) the Problematic Situation opens agents up for preference change, and 
(vi) these agents signal with each other during the exploratory phase. 
Strauss does not analyse the term “social order” further. As an approximation, a social 
order is a sustained pattern of a social phenomenon. In this sense, an organisation 
exhibits a social order. If problems arise in the organisation, the members follow certain 
procedures and look to certain other members for help. Paradigmatically, families, 
corporations, and states exhibit such social orders. For example, in a family the father 
might always do the dishes, in the corporation the boss might fire employees, and in 
states the head of government might be elected. All these examples illustrate parts of 
the social order. 
Negotiated Orders are social orders that fulfil the six conditions given above. For example, 
the pattern according to which the hospital investigated by Strauss and his team 
functions, is a Negotiated Order because it fulfils all six conditions. 
The first condition denies that the features of the social order can be satisfactorily 
accounted for in terms of bureaucratic rules. This is a conceptual feature of Negotiated 
Orders rather than just an empirical finding. As we have seen at the beginning of this 
chapter, Strauss and others developed the Negotiated Order approach in contrast to 
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theories that explain the features of organisations by pointing to bureaucratic rules and 
the associated hierarchic chains of commands. Given the importance of this contrast for 
the Negotiated Order approach, I included the denial as condition (i). 
Instead of bureaucratic rules and commands, the Negotiated Order approach emphasises 
informal agreements. In the psychiatric hospital they investigated, Strauss and his team 
found the “somatically oriented physicians have long-standing agreements with a 
secretary who is attached to the two wards upon which their patients tend to be housed” 
(Strauss et al. 1963: 162). We find a pattern of interaction between certain physicians and 
a certain secretary associated with a pattern of housing patients. The pattern results from 
an informal agreement rather than a codified bureaucratic rule. 
According to Strauss et al. no one knows the hospital “on any given day unless he has a 
comprehensive grasp of what combination of rules and policies, along with agreements, 
understandings, pacts, contracts, and other working arrangements, currently obtains. In 
any pragmatic sense, this is the hospital at the moment: this is its social order” (Strauss 
et al. 1963: 165).55  Only knowing the bureaucratic rules and the commands along a 
hierarchical chain does not suffice for explaining the social order. Therefore, the social 
order of the hospital fulfils the first condition. 
While this first condition is directed against Weberian theories of bureaucratic 
organisations, it allows that bureaucratic rules to play a role in explaining the features or 
the social order. Codified safety rules ordered from above make a difference in the 
psychiatric hospital. However, if we tried to account for the order only in terms of 
bureaucratic rules, the explanation would remain partial and miss important features of 
the social order. The other conditions for a Negotiated Order specify further factors that 
                                                          
55 Strauss and his team leave aside the coercive and manipulative elements of the social order in 
this quote, which were probably substantial in a psychiatric hospital during the early 60s. 
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must be included in a satisfactory explanation and should be familiar from the previous 
discussions. 
Condition (ii) introduces Problematic Situations. The agents within the social order 
encounter a Problematic Situation that threatens the continuance of the social order. In 
the case of organisations and other groups, the agents are the members. To refer to the 
example in the psychiatric hospital given above, an increase in the number of adolescents 
among the patient population disrupted the action routines of the staff. The hospital’s 
patterns of functioning were under stress and the members could no longer follow their 
usual routines. A Problematic Situation occurred. 
As indicated by the capitalisation, I use “Problematic Situation” in the technical sense 
introduced in chapter two. According to this sense, a Problematic Situation arises out of 
the disruption and confusion characterising an indeterminate situation, starts with the 
identification of a problem, and causes the agent to open up to preference change. The 
change of intrinsic preferences is not ensured, but more likely. All of this applies in the 
case of the hospital. The higher number of adolescents leads to disrupted activity and 
confusion, the members identify the problem, and they open up to preference change. 
Admittedly, Strauss and his team do not explicitly distinguish between intrinsic and 
extrinsic preferences, but given the background of their pragmatist action theory, I 
suggest an interpretation that includes intrinsic preference change as the most charitable 
one. 
Condition (iii) specifies that agents used negotiations to cope with these Problematic 
Situations. As Strauss and his team write, the problems resulting from the higher number 
of adolescents “led to feverish negotiative activity” (Strauss et al. 1963: 165). These 
negotiations give the Negotiated Order its name and thus their inclusion in the necessary 
conditions shouldn’t come as a surprise. 
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Condition (iv) adds that the negotiations reshape the social order. If the negotiations 
always failed, so that no agreement was reached, they might leave the patterns of the 
group’s functioning untouched. But in this case the negotiations would remain too 
peripheral to warrant calling the social order a Negotiated Order. The negotiations must 
reshape the social order. Usually they will do so by establishing new agreements, which 
include agreements to rescind former agreements. 
In principle, failing negotiations, those which do not end in an agreement, can also change 
the patterns of interaction in a group and therefore the social order would meet the 
conditions for a Negotiated Order. For example, the group members might start to dislike 
each other because of the failed negotiations, and therefore stop cooperating. My 
conditions for a Negotiated Order would be met by such a case. However, the core cases 
discussed in the literature concern successful negotiations. 
This fourth condition has a basis in Strauss, since he and his team wrote that 
renegotiations in response to Problematic Situations lead to “consequent changes in the 
organizational order” (Strauss et al. 1963: 165). In the case of the hospital, the 
negotiations result in a new rule that influences further admissions of adolescent patients. 
Condition (v) specifies that the agents have to function according the theory of 
Problematic Situations and open up to preference change.56 As discussed in the second 
chapter, agents enter an exploratory phase after opening up to preference change during 
which they explore different courses of action. This exploratory phase will typically occur 
together with the negotiations prompted by the Problematic Situation. 
                                                          
56 Strictly speaking, condition (v) is redundant since condition (ii) already employs the technical 
notion of a Problematic Situation and this notion implies opening up to preference change. 
However, to clarify this issue and underline the importance of intrinsic preference change I added 
this condition. 
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Consider the fictional case in which the increasing number of adolescents leads to a 
Problematic Situation and the personnel opens up to preference change. In response, 
one psychiatrist might become more likely to give up her intrinsic preference which 
underlies her preference to work on Tuesdays rather than Mondays. She might explore 
these new intrinsic preferences in the exploratory phase coinciding with the negotiations. 
The last condition, (vi), refers to this exploratory phase and demands the agents signal in 
this phase. In chapter three I offered an account of signalling affecting preference change. 
The psychiatrist trying out new intrinsic preferences leading to her indifference regarding 
working on Monday or Tuesday signals so to other participants of the negotiation. As I 
argued in the last chapter, the response from other participants can then increase the 
chance that this preference change occurs. That way, a deep form of cooperation as 
described in the previous chapter becomes possible. 
All social orders that fulfil these six conditions are Negotiated Orders. However, one 
might object that not all social orders, which agents negotiate, fulfil these conditions. At 
least conceptually, a population of agents with fixed intrinsic preferences can negotiate 
with one another. These negotiations can shape the social order of the agents with fixed 
preferences. We find an order which is negotiated and does not fit the analysis, because 
conditions two and four are not met. 
At the root of this objection lies a confusion invited by Strauss’ terminology. “Negotiated 
Order” is a technical term, as I indicate by capitalisation, not the result of predicating 
“being negotiated” to “order”. Not all social orders, which agents negotiate, are 
Negotiated Orders. Just as in the case of the term “Problematic Situation”, we have to 
distinguish a colloquial and a technical use. My analysis provides the necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for the technical term “Negotiated Order” as employed by Strauss 
and others who follow his approach.  
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I provide necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a social order to be a Negotiated 
Order, but one can also say of a social order that it is a Negotiated Order to a greater or 
lesser degree. One hospital might exhibit more of a Negotiated Order than another. I 
propose that two variables determine the degree: 
1. the extent to which negotiations in response to Problematic Situations shape the 
social order, 
2. the extent to which agents function according to the theory of Problematic 
Situations and signalling. 
If a social order creates few Problematic Situations, or the agents rarely deal with these 
Problematic Situations by negotiating, then the social order is a Negotiated Order to a 
lesser degree. For example, if the agents deal with most problems by coercing one 
another, then the order is hardly a Negotiated Order. 
In the Negotiated Order approach, sociologists usually concern themselves with social 
orders that are Negotiated Orders to a high degree. If coercion dominates a social order, 
the phenomenon is of little interest to Negotiated Order sociologists. However, the 
assumption of the approach is that very few social orders remain Negotiated Orders to a 
small degree. Even all-out war exhibits a Negotiated Order to a considerable degree. 
Although the parties engage in coercion with one another, internally they have to 
negotiate. Strauss clearly thought that for most if not all social orders, the Negotiated 
Order perspective proves illuminating. 
In the next section, I discuss what difference it makes for understanding an organisation 
if it has a Negotiated Order rather than a social order fitting the standard rational choice 
approach. 
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Comparing the Standard Rational Choice Theory with the Negotiated Order 
Approach. 
I introduced Negotiated Orders by contrasting them with a quasi-Weberian approach to 
organisations emphasising bureaucracy. Strauss and his followers stressed the role of 
daily interactions and, in particular, negotiations rather than those of codified rules and 
chains of command. But while this contrast allowed me to emphasise the characteristic 
features of the Negotiated Order approach, the rational choice approach is not 
committed to a quasi-Weberian take on social orders. Common game theory models also 
apply to informal negotiations just as much as to bureaucratic structures. As discussed in 
previous chapters, however, the Negotiated Order approach introduces intrinsic 
preference change and therefore differs from standard rational choice theory. In this 
section, I develop an example to illustrate the difference. 
Since in the end standard rational choice theory is the rival to my proposal, I have to show 
the interesting differences that result from introducing intrinsic preference change as 
suggested by the Negotiated Order approach. In this section, I develop an example for 
this purpose that takes inspiration from Strauss et al.’s discussion of how an increase in 
the adolescent population disrupted the hospital. I first describe the case assuming stable 
preference before I introduce preference change in response to Problematic Situations. 
Assume that two nurses, let’s call them Bert and Andrea, engage in a daily programme 
with their patients on the ward. For the programme, Andrea and Bert have to split the 
patients into a group of all adolescents and a group of other patients. Each of the two 
nurses then carries out the programme with one of the two groups. 
I stipulate, furthermore, that Bert and Andrea differ in how much effort it costs them to 
carry out the programme. Bert can deal twice as well with adolescents than with non-
adolescents. He is indifferent as to whether two adolescents or one non-adolescent are 
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added to his group. Assuming that we can provide a utility function for Bert, we can 
specify the indifference relation as follows:  2*u(added adolescent) = u(added non-
adolescent). The utility is negative since the larger the group the more effort is required. 
For convenience, let us assign the following utility values: u(added adolescent) = -1; 
u(added non-adolescent) = -2.57 
Andrea has exactly the reverse preference. Adolescents cost her more effort than non-
adolescents. She is indifferent regarding the options of adding two non-adolescents or 
one adolescent to her group. Thus, for her we can write the following equation: 
2*u(added non-adolescent) = u(added adolescent). Let us assume that the values are 
exactly the reverse as for Bert:  u(added adolescent) = -2; u(added non-adolescent) = -1. 
Before the relative rise in the adolescent population, the ward has 10 adolescents and 10 
non-adolescents. Andrea and Bert can run the programme with each of the two groups. 
If both groups undergo the programme, then they both receive the utility of having their 
work accomplished. I stipulate the following utility value: u(both groups undergo 
program) = 15. 
If Bert works with the adolescents and Andrea works with the non-adolescents, Bert 
experiences a negative utility of -10 from the work, but a positive utility of 15 from having 
it accomplished. His overall payoff would be 5. Likewise, Andrea would receive -10 utility 
points and 15, so that she would experience the same overall payoff as Bert. If both carry 
out the programme with the same group, then both experience a high negative utility 
since they do not receive the positive utility of having their work accomplished, but have 
to spend the effort on the one group.58 
                                                          
57 For simplicity, I assume there that the marginal (negative) utility remains the same. 
58 I assume that the costs of their work are not reduced if they both undertake the programme 
with the same group. This might be the case, because they only experience costs by virtue of 
having to spend time with the members of the group. 
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Going through the calculations for all options, we can specify the game Andrea and Bert 
face: 
 Andrea 
Adolescents Non-Adolescents 
Bert A -10 (Bert), -20 (Andrea) 5, 5 
NA -5, -5 -20, -10 
 
(I write “Adolescents” or “A” for the choice of undertaking the program with the group 
of adolescents and “Non-Adolescents” or “NA” for undertaking it with the group of non-
adolescents.) 
Both ways of dividing the groups between Bert and Andrea, so that they both work with 
one of them, are Nash equilibria. In either case, the agent has no incentive to change the 
action if the other agent sticks to her action. However, one of those equilibria has a better 
payoff for both nurses. Since Andrea and Bert can communicate, they find it easy to settle 
on this combination of choices. Accordingly, they follow a daily pattern of action: Andrea 
implements the programme for the non-adolescents and Bert for the adolescents. Both 
receive a positive utility of 5 during each round. 
This division of labour is part of the social order of the hospital. It belongs to the pattern 
of interaction that keeps the hospital functioning. So far, negotiations play no role for 
shaping the social order.59 Bert and Andrea do not have any motivational differences to 
overcome. They simply agree to divide the two groups to maximise their utility. 
                                                          
59 The interaction to agree on one Nash equilibrium does not constitute a negotiation because the 
motivational difference is lacking. They both want to settle on the one equilibrium solution. 
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At some point, however, the hospital admits more adolescent patients so that the overall 
ward size increases and the proportion of adolescents and non-adolescents changes. 
Before, the population on Bert and Andrea’s ward was split 10:10. Now the population is 
split 25:3. They have a group of 25 adolescents and a group of 3 non-adolescents. 
Assuming the same utilities given above, the game changes to the following one: 
 Andrea 
Adolescents Non-Adolescents 
Bert A -25 (Bert), -50 (Andrea) -10, 12 
NA 9, -35 -6, -3 
 
No intrinsic preferences have changed, only the extrinsic preferences following from 
intrinsic preferences have changed because of the different situation the two nurses face. 
Nonetheless, we find an importantly different game. The common-sense solution of Bert 
carrying out the programme with the adolescents and Andrea with the other group is no 
longer an option. Since the group of adolescents is now much larger, Bert would also 
prefer to work with the non-adolescents while Andrea works with the adolescents. 
Andrea, of course, prefers to stick with the old pattern of splitting up the groups. 
Andrea and Bert are headed for a conflict. They face a motivational difference and so the 
two nurses start negotiating. Mutual defection, in this case both Bert and Andrea treating 
the non-adolescents, satisfies neither of the two. They look for an agreement which 
satisfies both sides. 
As a one-shot game the above matrix provides little hope for reconciliation. However, 
ways out of the conflict remain on a standard rational choice account, because the 
situation consists of more than the one matrix. First, the game is repeated which allows 
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for compromises over multiple rounds. Bert and Andrea could endorse a mixed strategy. 
For two rounds Bert takes the adolescents and Andrea the non-adolescents, then Andrea 
takes the adolescents for one round and Bert the non-adolescents. The average payoff of 
this mixed strategy is 5/3 for both. 
Second, they could engage in side-transfers. Andrea might propose to take over an 
unpleasant shift from Bert in exchange for sticking to the old pattern. If Andrea can 
compensate for the difference of utility, Bert will accept the exchange.  
Or Andrea and Bert could lobby for a limitation on the overall number of adolescents, so 
that they can return to their former more cooperative game. This fits with Strauss’ 
observation that the negotiations ultimately led to a cap on the adolescent population. 
How the cap affects the game depends on how strict it is. 
Bert and Andrea can combine different solutions, for example a mild cap on adolescents 
with a mixed strategy. In all these scenarios, Bert and Andrea negotiate and this 
interaction shapes the social order of the hospital. Whether the nurses agree on a mixed 
strategy or agree to lobby for a cap on adolescents, or both, their negotiations shape the 
pattern according to which the hospital functions. However, while the social order of the 
hospital is negotiated in these cases, it does not become a Negotiated Order in the 
technical sense. 
I assumed fixed intrinsic preferences underlying a changing game. But the Negotiated 
Order approach allows intrinsic preference change in response to Problematic Situations. 
It demands that agents open up to preference change. To contrast the Negotiated Order 
approach with the standard rational choice models, I provide an example of how the 
inclusion of intrinsic preference change can affect the change of the social order. 
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We start with the same situation, the same agents, the same preferences, the same game. 
In the beginning, Andrea and Bert have no problem settling on one solution: Andrea 
works with the non-adolescents and Bert with the adolescents. However, again more 
adolescents join the ward. We go from a ratio of 10:10 to the 25:3 ratio. 
The changed number of adolescents leads to a disruption of prior activity, of the routines 
the nurses followed before, and confusion ensues. Bert and Andrea identify a problem. 
Upon encountering the Problematic Situation resulting from an increased adolescent 
population, Bert opens up to preference change. I gave the following utilities for adding 
another patient: u(added adolescent) = -1; u(added non-adolescent) = -2.60 As we have 
seen, this leads to a game with conflicting motivations. But that was before we 
introduced preference change in response to a Problematic Situation. 
Assume now that in response to the Problematic Situation, Bert and Andrea start to 
negotiate. During these negotiations Bert tries working with more adolescents. He has a 
new set of preferences favouring adolescents even more. He signals the new course of 
action to Andrea who signals back approvingly. (She has a reason to do so as we will see.) 
Bert finds the tentative motivational profile he explores congenial and his preferences 
change accordingly. Adolescents are even less costly for him. Let us assume that u(added 
adolescent) becomes -0.5 for Bert. On this assumption, we also have a new game, but a 
different one than before: 
 Andrea 
Adolescents Non-Adolescents 
Bert A -12.5(Bert), -50 (Andrea) 2.5, 12 
NA 5, -35 -6, -3 
                                                          
60 For simplicity, I assume again that the utility does not marginally decrease. 
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Bert and Andrea are no longer heading for a conflict. The same solution as before, Bert 
taking care of the adolescents and Andrea the non-adolescents, stands out as the only 
Nash equilibrium. 
Andrea and Bert can overcome the difficulties resulting from the increase in adolescents 
not only by finding a compromise mixed strategy, side-transfers, or imposing a cap on 
adolescents. A change of preferences can also help to maintain an old routine. We see 
that including preference change opens the space of potential developments the social 
order can undergo in response to unforeseen events. 
These results should not come as a big surprise. No one questioned that with different 
preferences, agents react to situations differently. The finding that preference change 
influences the social order of groups is important but expected. 
The significant contribution of the Negotiated Order approach is not so much to introduce 
change of intrinsic preferences in general, but to give a specific framework for how these 
changes occur. They occur in response to Problematic Situations and are part of an 
exploratory phase during which the agents can signal. 
Bert and Andrea do not just randomly change their intrinsic preferences, but they have 
an increased chance of doing so in response to Problematic Situations. Furthermore, they 
can signal and therefore align in their preference change. Accordingly, we have a higher 
expectation that they change preferences in a way that maintains the basic functioning 
of the organisation. The framework of the Negotiated Order approach gives us clues 
about the consequences of the intrinsic preference change. 
Admittedly, endorsing the Negotiated Order approach renders predictions more difficult. 
Assuming fixed preferences, the information about the changed number of adolescents 
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allows us to predict in which game Andrea and Bert will find themselves. But if Bert and 
Andrea might undergo some preference change with some thus far unspecified 
probability, we have hardly a clue what game results from the Problematic Situation. 
Before the adolescents join the ward, we can only lay out a variety of games that might 
result from the increase. The current Negotiated Order approach lacks the means for a 
detailed prediction. A group with a Negotiated Order becomes harder for us and for its 
members to predict, but that does not prove that the account is wrong or uninformative; 
it provides guidance for limited predictions. Furthermore, by including preference change 
it also opens possibilities. What seems doomed from the perspective of standard rational 
choice theory, can appear more hopeful in light of potential preference change. This 
difference matters in my later discussion of climate negotiations. First, however, I turn to 
the question of group agency. 
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Chapter Five: Group Agency for the Negotiated Order 
Approach 
After having reconstructed the Negotiated Order approach, I now turn to the question of 
group agency. After all, I intend to apply this theory to the interaction of group agents, 
paradigmatically to climate change negotiations. In this picture, states serve as 
negotiators and at least some of them follow the theory of motivational change described 
by the Negotiated Order approach and reconstructed by me. 
As is common in the debate on group agency (e.g. List & Pettit 2011, Huebner 2014, 
Tollefsen 2015), I will use the term “group” broadly so as to include organisations and 
states. Group agents are groups which have and act on propositional attitudes such as 
beliefs, desires, and intentions. For example, a philosophy department that intends to 
hire a philosopher in a popular field and believes that metaphysics is a popular field, and 
that accordingly hires a metaphysician, is a group agent.  
Robert Wilson (2001) has distinguished the “group mind” thesis, which attributes mental 
capacities to groups, from the “social manifestation” thesis, which attributes special 
mental capacities to individuals in social contexts. For example, Searle’s (1990) account 
of joint action attributes special mental capacities to individuals, namely the capacity to 
have intentions in a primitive we-mode, but denies the group mind thesis. Postulating 
group agents, such as a philosophy department intending to hire a professor, clearly 
implies the group mind thesis.61 In our case, the idea is not that the individual negotiators 
in climate change negotiations exhibit special mental capacities in this particular social 
context, but rather that the states are the negotiators. 
                                                          
61 For a discussion of the difference between joint action and group agency see also Pettit & 
Schweikard 2006. 
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As Wilson noted, the group mind thesis is the more controversial of the two. It creates a 
number of difficult problems in social ontology and philosophy of mind. However, within 
the constraints of my thesis I cannot address all issues associated with group agency. 
Instead I provide a map of these issues and pick out those that can be answered within 
my project. 
Overall, we can distinguish five salient questions that arise from taking climate 
negotiations between states to be an interaction of group agents. First comes the 
question of which groups, if any, are agents. This formulation encompasses the 
controversial issue regarding whether group agents exist at all (for discussion see French 
1979, Rupert 2005, 2011, List & Pettit 2011, Pettit 2014, Huebner 2014, Tollefsen 2015, 
Epstein 2015, 2017, Ludwig 2017). While one of the most prominent debates within 
philosophy of the social sciences and social ontology, I will avoid this issue because it is 
settled by the school of sociology I follow within this thesis. 
Strauss asserts that group agents exist.62 Already when he introduces the term “actor” he 
includes groups, writing that an actor “will be the agent of an action–a person, a group, 
an organization, or other social unit” (Strauss 2014: 23). 63  Strauss’ (1988: 210-218) 
example of the Balkan negotiations between the USA and the USSR can be interpreted as 
an illustration of negotiations between group agents. He explicitly intended it to 
undermine the view that the Negotiated Order approach is limited to the microsphere of 
individuals (see Strauss 1988: 249). In sum, there remains little doubt that Negotiated 
Order sociologists attribute agency to groups,64 despite the fact that they tend to focus 
                                                          
62 Herbert Blumer also seems to allow for group agents. However, he endorses a picture of group 
agents where a dictator or an oligarchy directs the action of the group, making it little more than 
the extension of individual agency (see Herbert Blumer 1969: 55-56). 
63 I assume here and in the following that organisations are a special type of group. This fits with 
debate on group agency (see the examples of List and Pettit 2011 and Tollefsen 2015). 
64 For one example of a Negotiated Order sociology paper that attributes agency to organisations, 
see Nathan & Mitroff 1991. 
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on individuals. I rely on this sociological endorsement of group agency rather than arguing 
for it independently. 
A second and closely related question, however, is not addressed by Strauss: Which 
theory of mentality, that is of mental states, should we employ for groups? While I can 
rely on pragmatist sociologists to put group agents into my ontology, they do not offer a 
philosophical theory of group agency. It would be a stretch to attribute an account of 
mental states to Strauss and his followers.  The present chapter fills the gap and argues 
for an endorsement of functionalism. The intentions, beliefs, and other propositional 
attitudes of group agents are functional states. Consequently, groups are agents only if 
they have internal states with the appropriate functional profile to realise propositional 
attitudes. These functional profiles, in their turn, should be the same as in the case of 
individual humans, although the realising states will, of course, differ in other respects. 
The present chapter will not specify these profiles in any detail but rely on our everyday 
understanding. For example, if a group has an intention to achieve a certain goal and a 
belief that it can be achieved in a certain way, then (other things being equal) it will try 
to achieve it in this way. 
With functionalism in place, a third question arises: which internal states of groups realise 
the functional profiles of the relevant propositional attitudes? I will only provide a partial 
response because empirical research beyond the boundaries of philosophy is needed for 
a complete answer. Since functional profiles can be realised by a large variety of internal 
states, and groups come in diverse configurations, we have no reason to assume that 
there will be one identifiable type of realiser for all kinds of groups. 
For example, if an egalitarian group of pre-industrial peasants and a highly developed and 
hierarchically structured state both have beliefs and intentions, the realisers probably 
vary to a large degree. In the egalitarian case, discussions, verbal agreements and the 
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propositional attitudes of all the members might play a more significant role than in the 
case of a hierarchical state. Here we should expect formal procedures and the mental 
states of the ruling members to play a larger role. We have no reason to expect that 
realisers of propositional attitudes are of one kind for all group agents. 
In light of the empirical nature of this question, the present chapter cannot fully answer 
what kind of states in group agents realise the functional profile of the relevant 
propositional attitudes. It is a task for the social sciences to find the exact realising states 
within the various human groups. I will, however, provide a partial response drawing on 
the Negotiated Order approach. Its emphasis on local agreements and negotiations puts 
restrictions on which states are likely to realise functional states within groups, as I argue 
later. 
But further questions remain open: the fourth asks whether group agents comply to the 
same theory of motivational change that Negotiated Order sociologists apply to 
individuals. Do group agents also respond with an exploratory phase to Problematic 
Situations, during which they exhibit an increased probability of preference change? In 
the end, this question can only be answered by empirical research since the theory 
describes contingent regularities in decision processes. I rely once more on the 
Negotiated Order sociologists and will therefore not argue further for the proposition 
that group agents have an increased probability of preference change in the aftermath 
of a Problematic Situation. 
Since, as mentioned above, Negotiated Order sociologists applied their account to group 
agents, I follow their example. My discussion in the next chapter will reveal, however, 
that even if only a limited number of states in climate change negotiations fit this account 
of motivational change, this could already have significant consequences for how such 
negotiations could work. Accordingly, I only have to assume that the Negotiated Order 
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approach applies to a few but significant group agents for my proposal to have important 
consequences. Exceptions can be accommodated. 
The fifth and final question follows from postulating the same theory of motivational 
change for individual and group agents: what is the relationship between preference 
change in response to Problematic Situations on the individual and on the group level?  
One might suggest that group agents undergo preference change because their members 
do so. Consider the hospital example I discussed in the previous chapter. Arguably the 
hospital developed a new preference for a smaller number of adolescent patients 
because the members of the hospital encountered Problematic Situations. The 
Problematic Situations and the associated preference change occurred on the group level, 
because it occurred on the level of individuals. But while such claims have prima facie 
plausibility, they have to be stated with care and qualified. 
As already mentioned, groups come in a wide range of diversity and thus one should not 
simply presuppose that all group preferences result from an aggregation of the 
preferences of their members (cf. Hubener 2012: 611). For the pre-industrial egalitarian 
group and the small hospital, the preference change in response to a Problematic 
Situation might be traced back to such changes on the level of the individuals. In the 
hierarchical developed state, such a connection becomes more dubious. We can imagine 
that the state undergoes preference change because its structure is shaken up by a 
Problematic Situation without any of its members encountering such a situation. Only 
large-scale research in the social sciences will reveal whether intrinsic preference change 
on the group level commonly follows from intrinsic preference change on the individual 
level. Once more a question about group agency becomes an empirical matter and 
therefore beyond the boundaries of the present philosophical inquiry. 
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Out of the five pressing questions concerning group agency, this chapter offers a 
response to one and a half of them. This limitation does not result from a lack of ambition 
but follows from respect for empirical inquiry as the arbiter of the salient questions. 
Group agency and the theory of preference change will be assumed because Strauss and 
other Negotiated Order sociologists endorsed it. But I will argue for a functionalist 
construal of the mental lives of group agents, and for a restriction on which kinds of states 
in a group realise the functional profile of propositional attitudes. 
I will support a functionalist theory of group by arguing against the main competitor: 
interpretivism about group agency.65 Interpretivist theories of mind exert an immense 
attraction on proponents of group agency. Although their versions differ, Christian List 
and Philip Pettit (2011) as well as Deborah Tollefsen (2015) put forward interpretivist 
accounts of group agency. They endorse the principle that if one can interpret an object 
as an agent with predictive success, then the object is an agent. 
This chapter argues that there is a class of cases which functionalism can accommodate, 
but interpretivism cannot. Two features characterise this class: First, distinct groups 
coincide, that is, numerically distinct groups share all their members at all time. Second, 
we have access to the inner mechanisms of the groups agents because members know 
what they have decided on. I construct a counterexample with these features allowing 
me to reject interpretivism about group agency in favour of functionalism. 
First, I introduce the distinction between functionalism and interpretivism, at the heart 
of which lies the difference between behaviour on the outside and mechanisms on the 
                                                          
65  Sometimes pragmatist sociology together with ethno-methodological approaches is called 
“interpretivist sociology”. The sense of “interpretivist” is different and should not be confused. I 
always stick to the philosophical use. 
Perhaps Rovane’s 2014 approach to group agency can serve as a third proposal. But it has gained 
little traction in the literature and it is also not entirely clear whether it stands in conflict with a 
broad notion of functionalism. 
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inside. Because they limit themselves to outer behaviour, interpretivists are sometimes 
accused of overgenerating group agents. After having discussed the interpretivist 
responses to this charge, I present my own argument against interpretivism. As I show, 
especially challenging problems arise from examples of coinciding group agents, 
undermining recent defence strategies devised by interpretivists. I conclude by hinting at 
how functionalist accounts of group agency can succeed where interpretivists fail. 
In addition, I argue for certain restrictions that a functionalist theory of group agency 
must fulfil to fit the Negotiated Order approach. I look at the account offered by List and 
Pettit from another perspective in order to provide a contrast. Their works suggest that 
bureaucratic procedures, such as formal votes, take centre stage in realising mental 
states. From the perspective of the Negotiated Order approach, we instead expect 
informal interactions, and in particular negotiations, to play a central role. The 
Negotiated Order approach presents an original account of what kind of states within 
groups realise the mental states needed for group agency. 
With these two questions about group agency addressed and the others delegated to the 
appropriate social sciences, we will be able to apply the Negotiated Order approach to 
climate change negotiations in the next chapter.  
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The Functionalist Principle 
Since the introduction of multiple realizability arguments, functionalism has become the 
standard account of propositional attitudes. 66  One can distinguish a variety of 
functionalisms, but they share the functionalist principle that for an entity, whether 
individual or group, to have states with the right functional profile is to have the 
corresponding propositional attitudes:  
(F) An entity has propositional attitudes if and only if it has states with the 
appropriate functional profiles.  
Ramsey sentences, that is sentences that describe the theory of propositional attitudes 
completely but replace mention of them with existentially quantified variables (cf. Lewis 
1970), provide another way to introduce functionalism and the idea of a functionalist 
principle. Functionalism claims that propositional attitudes can be defined via Ramsey 
sentences which effectively specify their functional profiles. 
For a garden-variety functionalism, such Ramsey sentences would describe the causal 
roles of the propositional attitudes.67 Proponents of group agency have a natural affinity 
for this kind of functionalism. If all there is to having a propositional attitude is having a 
state with the appropriate functional profile, which specifies causal roles, then why 
should groups not have propositional attitudes? 
Consider a coarse-grained functionalism, according to which “mental states are internal 
states of an agent that are caused by certain inputs to the system and cause both certain 
other internal states and certain behaviour outputs, where these causal dynamics will be 
specified by common sense.” (Tollefsen 2015: 81) For example, an individual has the 
                                                          
66 In line with the literature I will assume that all mental states of group agents, such as desires 
and beliefs, are propositional attitudes. 
67 However, a Ramsey sentence could also specify a realiser and, for example, define a certain 
propositional attitude as only being instantiated by a certain kind of neuron. This would be an 
unusual realiser-dependent functionalism, which I ignore in the following. 
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belief that the supermarket is on the corner because they have an internal state which 
makes them go to the corner when they want to buy groceries. In such a functionalism, 
the group mind thesis might appear plausible. A corporation could have a state that 
meets the functional description of a propositional attitude. For example, if it shows the 
behaviour of entering a market, this might be part of the functional description of having 
the belief that it can make profit in this market. The main difficulty lies in specifying the 
functional profiles correctly to attribute attitudes to the appropriate groups and 
individuals, but not beyond. 
Functionalist approaches to group agency have a long history going at least back to Ned 
Block’s China Brain (1978), purportedly a counterexample to functionalism, and D. H. M. 
Brooks’ (1986) paper “Group Minds”, which endorses the possibility of a city being the 
functional equivalent of a brain. Bryce Huebner (2014) is one of the recent proponents of 
a functionalist account of group agency. While he argues that the functional profile of 
propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires are rather demanding, he suggests that 
some groups meet the requirements and become full agents. Brian Epstein (2015, 2017) 
has also endorsed a functionalist theory of group agency.68 
 
The Interpretivist Principle 
Christian List and Philip Pettit (2011) in Group Agency, and Deborah Tollefsen (2015) in 
Groups as Agents endorse Dennett’s theory of the intentional stance in place of coarse-
grained functionalism. To use the intentional stance “is to set aside non-intentional 
possibilities of explanation, to presuppose that the system under explanation is an agent, 
                                                          
68 Epstein’s version departs from the others, however. He argues that we should attribute agency 
on the levels of kinds of groups, rather than to individual groups. That is, we would attribute group 
agency to committees in general rather than look at one specific committee to discern whether it 
is a group agent (Epstein 2017). 
 147 
 
and to try to ascribe representations and motivations to it that make sense of its actions” 
(List & Pettit 2011: 23).69 
Consider an example adapted from List and Pettit (2011: 19-31): I look at a robot’s 
behaviour and predict its future behaviour by ascribing propositional attitudes such as 
desires and beliefs.  The robot moves towards some cylinders that are lying down and 
puts them upright. I ascribe perceptual beliefs and a desire for upright cylinders to the 
robot. To test my ascription, I topple a cylinder. The robot puts it upright again. Having 
acquired the belief that a cylinder is lying down, the robot satisfies its desire for upright 
cylinders by showing appropriate behaviour. My ascription results in successful 
predictions, which is explanatorily more powerful than a non-intentional description. 
Accordingly, the robot is an agent with perceptual beliefs and the desire to put cylinders 
upright. 
In agreement with List and Pettit, Tollefsen describes interpretivism as “the view that, if 
we can successfully make sense of another being – understand and interpret its 
behaviour by using our folk psychology – it is an intentional agent” (Tollefsen 2015: 97). 
We interpret the behaviour of an object by ascribing propositional attitudes, and if the 
interpretation allows us to predict the object’s behaviour, the success validates the 
ascriptions. 
To use an example of a group, if the philosophy department’s library team shows the 
behaviour of sorting books on its shelves, I attribute to it the desire to have its books well-
ordered and the belief that the sorting behaviour helps to achieve this goal. These 
ascriptions allow me to predict that if I put a book from the shelf on the table, the team 
will put it back in the right place. The success of the predictions validates my ascriptions. 
                                                          
69 See also Dennett (1987: 15; 1991). 
 148 
 
Since ordinary people do not have access to all facts about the behaviour of entities, 
interpretivists assume an interpreter who is idealised in that she has access to all 
behavioural facts about the entity in question. 
We can formulate the following interpretivist principle:70 
(I) An entity has propositional attitudes if and only if an idealised interpreter would 
successfully predict the behaviour of an entity from the intentional stance by 
ascribing these attitudes. 
The interpretivists offer their own principle for the attribution of propositional attitudes, 
raising the question of how it relates to the functionalist principle. 
 
Functionalism and Interpretivism: The Outer Behaviour/Inner Mechanism 
Distinction 
Tollefsen suggested that, in contrast to functionalism, interpretivism entails that 
“[p]ropositional attitudes are not internal states of a system but dispositional states of 
whole systems” (Tollefsen 2015: 110). Accordingly, the truth of an ascription of 
propositional attitudes does not depend on any facts about the internal life of the entity. 
In the case of the robot. its movements count, but not the calculations by its processor 
unit. In the case of the library team, moving the books onto the shelf counts, but not the 
internal deliberation about where to put them. 
Functionalist accounts typically do not care whether agents are made of carbon or silicon, 
but they often demand that internal states fulfil certain functional roles to realise 
                                                          
70 One might emphasise in addition that the intentional ascription has to provide more predictions 
than other available approaches, but I leave this out of the principle to keep it simple. 
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propositional attitudes. Tollefsen denies such internal realisers any role for defining 
propositional attitudes. 
The distinction becomes slightly muddled in List and Pettit’s work, who not only endorse 
Dennett’s intentional stance theory like Tollefsen, but also what they consider a 
functionalist analysis of “intentional states – beliefs and desires – in terms of the roles 
they play in directing the agent and guiding action” (List & Pettit 2011: 171). But since 
their endorsement of Dennett’s intentional stance is beyond doubt (see List & Pettit 
2011: 11, 13, 23), we should understand List and Pettit as using an unusually broad notion 
of functionalism, which does not commit to the existence of internal states and is 
therefore compatible with interpretivism.71 
In the following I use “functionalism” for non-interpretivist versions of functionalism, that 
is, versions of functionalism according to which the Ramsey sentences of propositional 
attitudes involve internal states. Thus, the separation of the two theories relies on a 
distinction between outer behaviour and inner mechanism. 
For individuals giving an approximate criterion for the outer behaviour/inner mechanism 
distinction proves easy: 72  Everything that stays within the skull is part of the inner 
mechanism rather than the outer behaviour. We might make some exceptions, but as a 
general heuristic the criterion will do. 
The intracranial criterion, however, proves unsuitable for drawing the distinction with 
regard to groups. Groups do not have a skull of their own. Neither List and Pettit, nor 
                                                          
71  Tollefsen reads List and Pettit as suggesting “that the formation of group judgements […] 
somehow realizes group beliefs” (Tollefsen 2015: 81). According to Tollefsen, List and Pettit 
endorse a coarse-grained functionalism in which the functional profile includes internal 
mechanisms. I consider this a misreading, although one that can be made productive as I show 
later. 
72 This matter is complicated by the debate on the extended mind, which is also discussed by 
Tollefsen as supporting group agency (2006, 2015). In the following, I will leave this complication 
aside. 
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Tollefsen, offer an explicit criterion suited for groups, leaving it to their readers to judge 
where inner mechanism ends and outer behaviour starts. But while explicit limitations 
are lacking, the dialectic of the debate imposes restrictions on how to construe the outer 
behaviour/inner mechanism distinction. 
For interpretivism about group agency to be interesting, enough events need to fall into 
the inner mechanism category. An overextended category of outer behaviour threatens 
to render the difference to functionalism negligible. Interpretivism about group agency 
would not be of interest if it used all information about documents and discussion within 
the group as the basis for attributing propositional attitudes. 
In the case of individuals, any neural behaviour falls into the inner-mechanism rather than 
the outer-behaviour box. But then for groups, does everything that is individual 
behaviour fall into the inner-mechanism box too? One should not push the analogy 
between neurons and individuals too far. While Tollefsen (2015: 106-107) suggests that 
an interpretivist could ignore some individual behaviour, for example they could ignore 
the actions of individual managers to predict the Ford Motor Company’s response to an 
increase in gas prices, ruling out all individual behaviour goes too far. 
If we ignore the behaviour of all members of the library team, no group behaviour would 
remain. The library team showed the behaviour of sorting books, but so did the relevant 
individuals. At least for groups exhaustively constituted by individuals we want to allow 
that an event can be both outer behaviour of the group and individual behaviour. 
However, this individual behaviour should not be internal to the group, but rather relate 
it to the outside. In the book sorting scenario, the individual members engage with the 
books, which are external to the library team. A deliberation about book sorting, however, 
would remain internal, because the members only engage with one another. 
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Let me then propose the following criterion: A behaviour of a constituent73 of a group is 
an instance of an outer behaviour of the group if and only if the behaviour engages with 
an entity external to the group. Only those outer-behaviour events of constituents of the 
group are outer-behaviour events of the whole group, which involve non-constituents as 
well. 
Without limiting which individual behaviour counts as outer-group behaviour in such a 
way, the interpretivist approach to group agency is not interestingly different from its 
functionalist rival. After all, the functionalist is likely, at least in some cases, to identify 
the internal states of group agents realising propositional attitudes with states of 
individuals and their behaviour. The constituents of these states can then no longer serve 
as the basis for applying the intentional stance on pain of rendering interpretivism and 
functionalism effectively equivalent. 
Of course, many difficulties remain for applying the distinction. My proposed criterion 
suggests that a conversation between group members would be outer behaviour if 
someone from outside the group happened to participate in it, but not if the same 
contributions were made by a group member. Furthermore, my criterion leaves open 
what counts as an engagement or involvement of non-constituents. Moving air or 
radiating heat are not enough, otherwise internal deliberations of groups would also 
count as outer behaviour. After all, our neuronal activities also create external traces and 
interpretivism does not consider them behaviour. But glossing over such difficulties is 
only charitable towards the interpretivist. If it turned out that there is no principled 
criterion for distinguishing outer behaviour from inner mechanisms, then this would just 
settle the issue in favour of functionalism. 
                                                          
73 I use the notion of a constituent rather than a member to allow that more than individuals might 
constitute a group and contribute to the behaviour of the group. 
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The Overgeneration Worry 
While only taking predictive success about outer behaviour into account distinguishes 
interpretivism from functionalism, it raises the concern that interpretivism hopelessly 
over-attributes group agency. Will we not always have some predictive success using the 
intentional stance towards groups? Might I not predict some outer behaviour of the 
global human population using intentional vocabulary? Although I can roughly predict 
the behaviour of humanity by ascribing it the intention to increase the global 
temperature, it does not form a group agent, certainly not one intending global warming. 
Dismissing interpretivism proves more difficult, however, because interpretivists demand 
sophisticated behaviour for agency. List and Pettit (2011: 24-25) introduce strict 
rationality criteria, for example that attitudes must track facts, that attitudes be internally 
coherent, and that actions must follow attitudes. It is doubtful whether the behaviour of 
humanity allows such rational interpretation. For most intentions we might ascribe to 
humanity, we will find considerable violations of rationality. While we have some 
predictive success attributing the intention to increase the global temperature, some of 
humanity’s behaviour, such as a reduction of coal plants, conflicts with it. 
Tollefsen (2015: 102, 108) reminds us that Davidson suggested linguistic intelligibility as 
an interpretivist requirement. An agent must engage in linguistic behaviour which we can 
interpret. Since we cannot attribute any rational linguistic output to humanity, it is no 
agent. In effect, Tollefsen further narrows what counts as a successful predictive 
interpretation from the intentional stance: It has to include successful predictions which 
are either based on or concern linguistic behaviour. 
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While I am willing to grant to interpretivists that they have found ways to avoid the 
overgeneration of group agents, they cannot evade the problems resulting from 
coinciding group agents. 
 
The Counterexample 
The interpretivist principle implies that any difference between the mental lives of two 
group agents is to be justified with reference to the outer behaviour of the groups. This 
consequence of the interpretivist principle creates a problem for certain cases of 
coinciding group agents. 
Consider two coinciding groups, which are completely constituted by human individuals. 
Perhaps no such individualist constitution holds for Tollefsen’s example of the Ford Motor 
Company, but imagine that a philosophy department assigns each of its members 
randomly to committees, where such committees are exhaustively constituted by their 
individual members. The department throws all the names of the faculty in a big urn and 
picks five names from it for a committee. It then throws the five names back in and draws 
again for the next committee. By pure chance, the teaching committee might end up with 
the same members as the public engagement committee. 
In such a case, each event that is an outer behaviour of the one group is also an outer 
behaviour of the other group since the groups are only constituted by individuals. They 
have no other constituents which could realise the behaviour of the group. “Behaviour” 
must be understood here in a thin sense, preceding any attribution of mentality, since 
only such behaviour can serve as the basis for attributing mentality using the intentional 
stance. It follows that when the teaching committee shows the behaviour of sending out 
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a resolution about pedagogical methods, the public engagement committee shows the 
same behaviour.74   
Given that the two groups show the same behaviour, the question arises as to which of 
the two committees had the intention to distribute the resolution. Assume that it was 
the teaching committee, not the public engagement committee, which intended to send 
out the email. How can an interpretivist justify this difference in propositional attitudes 
between the groups, given their behavioural coincidence? 
While it becomes difficult for interpretivists to pry the mental lives of two coinciding 
group agents apart, they can still respond to this example. The behaviour of the two 
groups might be indistinguishable, but the features of the behaviour clearly indicate 
which committee is acting in sending out the resolution. The appropriate email might be 
signed by the teaching committee. Tollefsen suggested linguistic interpretability as a 
condition for attributing propositional attitudes, and linguistic behaviour can help the 
interpretivists out again. 
A variation of the example undermines this response. Assume that the teaching 
committee forms an intention to play a prank on the department. The group decides to 
hide alarm clocks, which will disrupt lectures. The deliberation about the prank is an 
inner-mechanism event which results in an outer behaviour of hiding clocks. However, 
the group never shows any behaviour revealing that it was the teaching committee rather 
than the public engagement committee which decided to play the prank. The deliberative 
behaviour of the group members does not count as group behaviour since, as I discussed 
                                                          
74  One option I am not considering here and in the following is that groups might exist 
intermittently, so that the teaching committee only exists whenever the public engagement 
committee doesn’t. While this would work against my examples, they could easily be adapted to 
avoid this issue. 
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above, a behaviour of a constituent of a group is an instance of an outer behaviour of the 
group if and only if the behaviour engages with an entity external to the group. 
The inner mechanism of the group deliberation would give us a clear answer to which 
group intended the prank: the teaching committee. The members decided to play the 
prank as the teaching committee during one of its meetings, not during a meeting of the 
public engagement committee. The interpretivist, however, cannot let this inner 
mechanism make the difference at the risk of becoming indistinguishable from the 
functionalist. At the same time, the outer behaviour, the hiding of alarm clocks, does not 
allow a clear attribution of the intention to the one committee rather than the other. 
At this point, interpretivists feel some pressure but they can still go dispositionalist. In 
addition to actual behaviour, behavioural dispositions might count in the attribution of 
propositional attitudes. The two committees have the disposition to show behaviour 
clarifying which committee played the prank under appropriate circumstances. Prompted 
by an inquiry, perhaps enforced by threats of being fired, the individual members would 
say that the teaching committee hid the alarm clocks.  
Tollefsen’s quote that “[p]ropositional attitudes are not internal states of a system but 
dispositional states of whole systems” (Tollefsen 2015: 110) suggests such a 
dispositionalist interpretivism. However, the dispositionalist move risks making 
interpretivism uninteresting as a position if taken too far. 
As I emphasised, interpretivism is substantially different from functionalism because it 
avoids giving the inner mechanisms any role in ascribing propositional attitudes, and 
rather focusses on the prediction of behaviour. Accordingly, an interpretivist cannot just 
ascribe behavioural dispositions based exclusively on the inner mechanisms. At least in 
one plausible scenario, the entity in question must show the behaviour. Since 
interpretivism takes the attribution of propositional attitudes to be all about prediction 
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of behavioural patterns, pointing to an unrealisable disposition, for example a finkish 
disposition, is an illegitimate move within the framework. Only by limiting themselves in 
such a way can interpretivists turn dispositionalist without becoming uninteresting. 
 For the previous example this limitation does not matter. The teaching committee has a 
plausibly realisable disposition to reveal its authorship of the prank. The nature of group 
agency, however, allows us to construct a revised counterexample of coinciding groups.75 
Assume that for some arcane reason of university bureaucracy, both the teaching 
committee and the public engagement committee have the capacity to dissolve 
themselves and each other by simply intending to do so.  At any point in time, each group 
can end its own existence or that of the other group by forming the appropriate 
intentions. Let us furthermore assume that both groups have a joint session at the end 
of which both groups end their tenure. The two intentions are instituted by a committee 
member stating: “It is hereby decided that the teaching committee intends to end its 
tenure and the public engagement committee intends to end its tenure.” 
Both groups came to an end, but how could interpretivism settle which group intended 
to dissolve which? Did each group intend to dissolve itself, or the other, or perhaps one 
group intended to dissolve both? The interpretivist cannot tell. The group life ceases 
immediately with the act of forming the intention, otherwise resulting behavioural 
disposition might be realised. As sketched in my counterexample, neither committee 
could ever realise a behavioural disposition following from its intention. 
One might try to solve the problem by pointing to behavioural dispositions prior to 
forming the intention.76 For example, the groups might have a disposition to clarify which 
intentions they are about to form. Just interrupt the speaker after “It is hereby decided…” 
                                                          
75 The following counterexample has been improved with considerable help from Luca Barlassina. 
76 I thank Yonatan Shemmer for raising this problem. 
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and before the end of their sentence and ask about what will be decided. However, such 
cases can also be ruled out with a simple tweak, namely the introduction of some 
randomness. Let the group member say: “It is hereby decided that if the coin comes up 
heads, the teaching committee intends to end its tenure and the public engagement 
committee intends to end its tenure, and if it then comes up tails, the intentions will be 
the other way round.” Now neither dispositions prior to the formation of the intentions, 
nor any later dispositions, can reveal the content of the intentions. 77  At best the 
combination of a prior disposition plus facts about the coin can do so. For all practical 
purposes, however, whether the coin comes up heads or tails does not constitute outer 
behaviour of the groups. 
I do not deny that the group members exhibit a different behaviour because of the groups’ 
intentions. Asked which group formed which intention, they can clarify that each group 
intended to end itself and not the other. But my neurons also exhibit behaviour and 
dispositions when I form an intention, and interpretivism is committed to ignoring them. 
Only the realisable outer behaviour of the entity in question counts, and the groups 
cannot show such behaviour after the end of their existence. Interpretivism does not 
have the resources to justify the correct attribution of different intentions to the two 
group agents. 
To summarise my counterexample, we have here a difference in the mental lives of the 
two committees, each intended to end itself rather than the other, although each could 
have intended to dissolve the other.  The interpretivist faces a puzzle: Which group 
formed what intention? The group behaviour and realisable dispositions do not allow us 
to answer the question. 
                                                          
77 I used the coin example for simplicity. If we assume that some randomness occurs in the 
decisions of individuals, it would suffice to let them make a decision. 
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The two special features of group agency pose a particularly difficult challenge to the 
interpretivist: Since the groups coincide and are exhaustively constituted by human 
individuals, they show no behavioural difference. Nonetheless, the interpretivist will find 
it hard to deny the mental difference between the two groups because we have access 
to the mental lives of the groups. We can simply ask the members about the meeting. 
 
Four Interpretivist Responses 
An interpretivist might respond in four ways to my challenge. First, they might be 
tempted to deny that we have two groups and try to collapse them into one group agent. 
They would attribute the intention to end the committee tenures to the one overarching 
group.  
But collapsing the groups goes against the growing consensus in the group ontology 
debate (see Gilbert 1992: 220-221, Uzquiano 2004, Sheehy 2006, Ritchie 2013 and 2015, 
Thomasson 2016): Groups which share all their members can remain numerically distinct. 
The teaching committee has duties that the public engagement committee does not have. 
The groups differ in their properties. Leibniz’s law dictates that they cannot be one group. 
We have to attribute the different intentions to separate groups. 
Second, interpretivists might accept that the groups are numerically distinct but suggest 
that both groups, the public engagement committee as well as the teaching committee, 
formed intentions to end both groups. Here I rely on our intuitions about the case. The 
individuals discuss the two intentions and know which group formed which intention 
since they debated it. 
Given these details about the meeting, that is, the inner mechanisms of the groups 
sustaining the outer behaviour, it appears wrong to attribute the same propositional 
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attitudes to the two distinct groups. But the inner mechanisms are not allowed to play a 
role in the attribution of propositional attitudes according to interpretivism. 
Third, interpretivists could attempt to deny that the groups formed any intentions at all, 
because they show neither the required outer behaviour nor realisable behavioural 
dispositions. This solution might have some plausibility for individuals, where 
interpretivists might assert that if an individual shows no behaviour and not even 
behavioural dispositions indicating an intention, we have no reason to attribute one. 
There are, however, two reasons why this response fails for the counterexample. The first 
reason is that the groups ended. If there were no intentions to this effect, we have no 
explanation regarding why the committees went out of existence. The second reason 
returns to the special feature of group agency: Group members know what they decided 
on and in particular which committee intended what. Their knowledge derives from their 
involvement with the inner mechanisms of the group. In the case of group agents, 
especially those only constituted by individuals, we have a kind of access to the inner life 
of the agent, which we do not have for individual agents. This peculiarity of group agency 
allows us to pre-empt the third interpretivist response. 
As a fourth and last refuge, interpretivists could argue that I have drawn the line between 
inner mechanism and outer behaviour wrongly. If the deliberation between the teaching 
committee members, their discussion about which group intended what, were to count 
as outer behaviour of the committees, then we could account for the difference in the 
mental lives. The behaviour of the members deliberating for the committees would allow 
the interpreter to make the correct attribution. 
But this retreat renders interpretivism about group agency uninteresting. Interpretivism 
about individuals is a substantial thesis because it stops, roughly, at the skull. As discussed, 
interpretivism about group agents is only interesting if it endorses an analogous limit. 
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Tollefsen (2015: 106-107) herself recognises this in her discussion of the Ford Motor 
Company: the interpretivist position is interesting because it allows us to ignore the 
behaviour of individuals, the discussion between the president of the company and other 
members, and exclusively considers the outer behaviour when we attribute to the 
company the intention to raise prices. If the deliberations between the members also go 
into the outer-behaviour box, then little difference to functionalist accounts of group 
agency remains. Similarly, an interpretivist who responds to worries about misattributing 
intentions to an individual cannot just solve the issue by categorising neuronal processes 
as behaviour of the individual. 
In conclusion, my counterexample of the coinciding groups establishes that interpretivists 
cannot offer an interesting account of group agency and correctly attribute different 
mental lives to coinciding group agents in all cases. 
 
The Underlying Flaw and Another Failed Response 
My counterexample exposes an underlying flaw of interpretivism: Interpretivism wrongly 
limits the basis of interpretation to outer behaviour. Other counterexamples against 
interpretivist theories of individual agency also rely on this flaw. Lycan (1987: 5) proposed 
the tinfoil man against behaviourist theories of mind, 78  Peacocke (1983) brought in 
Martian marionettes, and Block (1981) has his Blockheads. These are all variations on a 
theme. I focus on the Martian marionettes, since Peacocke explicitly directs the example 
against Dennett’s theory. 
Peacocke invites us to imagine a human body without a brain; instead a radio transmitter 
controls the nerves. A computer on Mars calculates the behaviour and manages to make 
                                                          
78  Bryce Huebner (2014: 90) has pointed out that the tinfoil man example speaks against 
attributing agency to groups based only on the intentional stance. 
 161 
 
the body, its marionette, behave like an ordinary human. As Peacocke observes, the 
marionette “is voluminously and reliably predictable via the intentional strategy, as 
voluminously and reliably as for any normal human being” (Peacocke 1983: 205). 
Interpretivism gives the wrong conclusion for the Martian marionette. It finds an agent, 
where we only see a puppet. 
For Martian marionettes and coinciding groups, looking only at the outer behaviour gives 
the wrong answer. In both cases, behaviour does not suffice for our attribution of 
propositional attitudes. We have to look under the skin. Thus, one might hope that the 
interpretivist response to Martian marionettes also solves the problem of coinciding 
group agents. 
Bruno Mölder, whom Tollefsen (2015: 97) quotes as a recent defender of interpretivism, 
has responded to the marionette-type counterexamples. He admits that looking at 
predictive success is insufficient, but suggests that folk psychology imposes restrictions 
on the possible objects of the intentional stance. According to Mölder “[i]t is part of folk 
psychology that people have beliefs whereas tables and lecterns do not” (Mölder 2010: 
193). The Martian marionette does not fall into the range of objects covered by folk 
psychology, because it does not take objects with empty heads seriously. If folk 
psychology only covers a limited range of objects, then it limits our interpretations and 
rules out Martian marionettes. 
Leaving aside whether Mölder’s response to the Martian marionettes succeeds, it fails 
against my counterexample. Mölder objects to the far-fetched sci-fi character of the 
counterexamples. But in the case of the teaching and the public engagement committees 
we do not have an empty head and radio controls. We have two groups, which look like 
agents with different mental lives. Folk psychology rules out neither group as an odd 
fringe case. Excluding these two committees as weird from the scope of interpretivism 
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would be tantamount to admitting that the interpretivist theories of group agency 
offered by Tollefsen and List and Pettit are broken. 
While my counterexample hinges on the same underlying flaw as the Martian marionette 
example, interpretivist theories of group agency cannot evade it using Mölder’s strategy. 
The two committees differ in their mental lives and the members know it from the inside 
even though it never shows in behaviour or behavioural dispositions of the groups.  
Although interpretivism has notable followers in the debate on group agency, it fails 
particularly badly in this area. 
 
The Functionalist Solution 
If interpretivism cannot distinguish between the mental life of the two committees, how 
do we pull it off? We know that the teaching committee intended to dissolve itself, 
because we know that its members discussed this at the meeting. By looking more closely 
at the interaction of members, we can pry apart the mental lives of the two groups. A 
functionalism which considers how the members realise the group’s propositional 
attitudes provides the correct answer. 
Tollefsen rejects such a functionalism claiming that “[p]ropositional attitudes are not 
internal states of a system but dispositional states of whole systems” (Tollefsen 2015: 
110). For the case of the two committees, the internal states of how the members realise 
the groups’ mental lives make all the difference, while the outer behaviour, realised and 
dispositional, of the two committees remains indistinguishable. 
List and Pettit do not fare any better since they, too, state that “the performance itself 
should dictate the representations and motivations we ascribe to the agent” (List & Pettit 
2011: 28). For the case of coinciding group agents, this principle fails since the 
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behavioural performances of the groups remain indistinguishable. Only a functionalism 
that looks beyond the performance of the system and considers how internal 
mechanisms realise it can solve the problem. 
Functionalist proponents of group agency have yet to explain why the deliberation 
between group members matters for the realisation of the teaching committee’s 
intention. They must specify the Ramsey sentences in such a way that the intentions are 
attributed to the appropriate committee. For example, the Ramsey sentence for an 
intention might demand that the realiser stands in a certain causal connection to a 
realiser of the agent’s self-representation. This link to a self-representation of the group 
would allow the functionalist to argue why the teaching committee forms one intention 
and the public engagement committee the other: there are two self-representations for 
each group and each of them only stands in an appropriate relation to one of the 
intention-realisers. In the case of the coinciding group agents, the connection might be 
realised through the individual members and how they conceive of their deliberation. In 
the case of individual agents, the realiser would presumably not involve other agents. 
Of course, the functionalist would have to justify such a requirement independently of 
the presented problem case so as not to appear terribly ad hoc. However, the mere 
possibility of such a response renders functionalism the more attractive theory of group 
agency. While functionalist proponents of group agency face the challenge of providing 
the correct Ramsey sentences, interpretivists close the door to a solution. 
If interpretivists want to persist in basing the attribution of propositional attitudes on 
group behaviour, they must find a better response to the problem of coinciding group 
agents. For now, the functionalist proponents of group agency remain vindicated. I 
therefore conclude that sociologists who adopt the Negotiated Order approach should 
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endorse a functionalist theory of mind, for which one can accept Tollefsen’s 
characterisation: 
“According to coarse-grained functionalism […], mental states are internal states of an 
agent that are caused by certain inputs to the system and cause both certain other 
internal states and certain behaviour outputs, where these causal dynamics will be 
specified by common sense.” (Tollefsen 2015: 81) 
In my proposal, we identify internal states of groups as their mental states based not only 
on the behaviour of the group, but also on facts about the internal mechanisms of the 
group. In particular, facts about how the individuals conceive of the group’s behaviour 
figure in the realising states. This way, my broad functionalism can avoid the problems 
with coinciding group agents. 
The kind of functionalism I have hinted at also fits exceptionally well with the Negotiated 
Order approach. Like symbolic interactionism, in the Negotiated Order approach, the way 
agents interpret their actions matters greatly. In chapter three I discussed the importance 
of meaning in interactions for the Negotiated Order approach. As I just argued, for the 
example of the two committees the interpretations of the individuals make the difference. 
My functionalism and the Negotiated Order approach both give a role to individuals 
interpreting group behaviour.79 
Intentional stance theory would not have exhibited the same affinity to a theory of action 
endorsed by the Negotiated Order approach. It would have reduced the interpretations 
of the group members to a secondary phenomenon. The outward behaviour of the group 
would have determined the assignment of agency. My proposal combined functionalism 
and the Negotiated Order approach in a congenial unified theory of group agency. But 
                                                          
79 This does not mean, however, that the attitudes of the group follow from an aggregation of the 
individual attitudes. 
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the Negotiated Order approach allows us to say even more about the functional realisers 
for group agency. 
 
The Negotiated Order Approach and the Functional Realisers of Mental 
States 
Since functionalism remains typically neutral concerning what realises mental states, it 
offers itself as a theory of group agency. A functionalist approach can allow that silicon 
chips in a robot to realise the same mental states as the neural network in a human head. 
As long as the functional profile of the mental state is realised, we have a mental state of 
the same type. 
Endorsing functionalism, defenders of group agency only have to define what realises the 
functional role of mental states in the group. Neural networks in our heads presumably 
have the functional profile needed for having mental states; the proponents of group 
agency have to find an analogue realiser in groups. At this point we only know that, at 
least in some cases, how individuals conceive of the group behaviour makes a difference 
for the realisation of mental states, because otherwise we run into problems with 
coinciding group agents. That leaves multiple proposals on the table. 
One salient option is to identify the functional realisers of mental states with bureaucratic 
rules and official decisions within the groups. The Weberian account of organisation 
provides the basis for such an identification. Although they endorse interpretivism, List 
and Pettit’s work on group agency also suggests such an identification of the functional 
realisers of mental states with bureaucratic elements of organisations. 
Tollefsen reads List and Pettit as suggesting “that the formation of group judgements […] 
somehow realizes group beliefs” (Tollefsen 2015: 81). And while List and Pettit clearly 
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endorse intentional stance theory, their influential book Group Agency focusses on 
various voting procedures for judgement aggregation. In the following, I ignore List and 
Pettit’s endorsement of intentional stance theory and reinterpret them as endorsing a 
broader functionalism. In this interpretation, they could accept that the facts about how 
the individuals interpret the bureaucratic elements belong to the realising mental states. 
We would find a broad functionalism combined with a focus on bureaucratic elements. I 
present their approach to reveal the tension between such a bureaucracy-focussed 
picture of group agents and the one suggested by the Negotiated Order approach. 
List and Pettit’s work on the internal functioning of groups revolves around the 
aggregation of individual propositional attitudes to that of a group agent. They discuss at 
great length which aggregation functions might allow group agency. An appropriate 
aggregation function takes the attitudes of the group members as input and returns the 
attitudes of the group as output in such a manner that the group functions as an agent. 
Most of their discussion concerns one desideratum for the output: the resulting 
propositional attitudes must be consistent enough to guide action. 
This desideratum follows from functionalism and the identification of the aggregation 
result with the attitudes of the groups. Unless the result shows sufficient consistency to 
guide agents, it cannot realise mental states. The functional realisers of mental states 
must meet the consistency requirements that come with the functional profile of the 
mental states they are realising. Only because the aggregation result is supposed to 
realise the mental state and determine its content, does the consistency requirement 
make sense. It proves a challenging requirement. 
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Assume that a group of three people has to take an epistemic attitude towards three 
propositions.80 The third proposition is the conjunction of the first two propositions. All 
three members vote on the truth of the propositions. The first group member votes for 
the first two propositions and the conjunction as a belief. The second and the third 
member each endorse a different one of the first two propositions and accordingly reject 
the conjunction. Using majoritarian aggregation to establish which propositions the 
group believes, the group might end up with a result where it endorses the first two 
propositions as beliefs but rejects the conjunction. The result can be represented in a 
table much employed by List and Pettit: 
Members Proposition 1: p? Proposition 2: q? Proposition 3: (p&q)? 
Member 1 p q (p&q) 
Member 2 p not-q not-(p&q) 
Member 3 not-p q not-(p&q) 
Majority p q not-(p&q) 
 
The resulting beliefs hold the following propositions true: p, q, and not-(p&q). As we can 
see, the group ends up with inconsistent beliefs while all the group members have 
consistent sets of propositional attitudes. 
This situation is an instance of what List and Pettit call “the discursive dilemma”. It shows 
that majoritarian aggregation does not meet the first desideratum since the propositional 
attitudes resulting from the majoritarian aggregation function are inconsistent and 
therefore fail to guide action. Even worse, the discursive dilemma not only arises for a 
                                                          
80 The same dilemma arises for group intention. I only focus on the epistemic case to keep the 
discussion simple. 
 168 
 
majoritarian aggregation, but for a wide range of aggregation functions (cf. List & Pettit 
2011: 47-50). List and Pettit prove that no aggregation function can have the following 
four features (see List & Pettit 2011: 49):  
• Universal domain. The aggregation function admits any possible profile of 
individual attitudes towards the propositions on the agenda as input, as long as 
the individual attitudes are consistent and complete. 
• Collective rationality. The aggregation function produces consistent and 
complete group attitudes towards the propositions on the agenda. 
• Anonymity. All individuals’ attitudes have equal weight in determining the group 
attitudes. Formally, the aggregation function is invariant under permutations of 
any given profile of individual attitudes. 
• Systematicity. The group attitude to each proposition depends only on the 
attitudes the individuals have towards it, not on their attitudes towards other 
propositions, and the pattern of dependence between individual and collective 
attitudes is the same for all propositions. 
For an aggregation function to meet the desideratum, at least one of these four demands 
must be relaxed. List and Pettit go through them in turn (see List & Pettit 2011: 51-58). 
For my purpose of illustrating the bureaucracy bent of List and Pettit’s work, it suffices to 
look at the main solution they tend towards. 
List and Pettit’s preferred solution is to relax systematicity and includes giving up the 
requirement that the pattern of dependence between individual and collective attitudes 
has to be the same for all propositions. An example of such an aggregation function is the 
premise-driven procedure, which “generates a group attitude towards each premise by 
taking a majority vote on that premise and then derives its attitudes on the conclusions 
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from its majority attitudes on the premises” (List & Pettit 2011: 56). To use the table from 
before, the results change as follows: 
 
Members Proposition 1: p? Proposition 2: q? Proposition 3: (p&q)? 
Member 1 p q (p&q) 
Member 2 p not-q not-(p&q) 
Member 3 not-p q not-(p&q) 
Result P (majority vote) q (majority vote) p&q (derived) 
 
As shown in the table, this procedure ensures a consistent output. The premise-driven 
procedure illustrates a set of aggregation functions that meet the first desideratum by 
giving up systematicity. It serves as a proof of concept that aggregation functions can 
meet the desideratum for group agency. They take the attitudes of the group members 
as input and return the attitudes that are consistent enough to guide action. Such 
aggregation functions are not essential for structuring group agents, however. 
Considering how much effort List and Pettit spend on specifying which aggregation 
functions can establish group agency, their admission that group agents do not have to 
be structured around such functions might come as a surprise. List and Pettit distinguish 
between aggregation functions and the organisational structure of a group agent, where 
organisational structures are “the rules and procedures the group uses to implement, and 
subsequently to enact, such a[n aggregation] function” (List & Pettit 2011: 60). 
Organisational structures can be based directly on an aggregation function but they do 
not have to be. List and Pettit draw a distinction between such functionally explicit 
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organisational structures and inexplicit ones. An organisational structure is functionally 
explicit, “if the group explicitly uses a given aggregation function […], applies it 
mechanically to the attitudes of its members, and then enacts the resulting group 
attitudes in an equally mechanical way” (List & Pettit 2011: 60). By contrast, functionally 
inexplicit structures do not commit to one aggregation function, but rather involve “a 
heuristic for determining, from proposition to proposition, the way for the group to go 
on” (List & Pettit 2011: 61). 
List and Pettit repeatedly use a straw-voting procedure as an example for inexplicit 
organisational structures. In a straw vote, the group roughly follows these steps (for a 
more extensive version, see List and Pettit 2011: 62):  
• Consider the relevant propositions one by one. 
• Take a majority vote on each proposition. 
o If the attitude formed is consistent with attitudes already formed, it 
becomes the group attitude. 
o If the attitude formed is inconsistent with the attitudes already formed, 
have a vote on possible revisions until a consistent outcome is reached. 
• Assign suitable members to enact the resulting group attitudes. 
This straw-voting procedure ensures that the group agent ends up with consistent 
propositional attitudes for all relevant propositions if it forms a profile at all. List and 
Pettit do not demand that group agents explicitly structure themselves around an 
aggregation function, but their functionally inexplicit organisational structures must fulfil 
the same demands of consistency. 
The reasons for this limitation follow from List and Pettit’s identification of the states 
resulting from these organisational structures with the mental states of the group. 
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Realisers for functional states have to meet consistency requirements because otherwise 
they would fail to have the appropriate functional profile for states, such as beliefs and 
intentions. But if the outcome of the vote did not fix the content of the mental state, then 
there would be no justification for a consistency requirement on the voting procedure. 
List and Pettit identify mental states with the states resulting from organisational 
structures, which they illustrate with examples of bureaucratic procedures. In their 
examples, they identify the content of these mental states with the results of 
bureaucratic voting procedures. These identifications are compatible with the 
endorsement of a functionalism which resolves the problem of coinciding groups. List and 
Pettit’s discussion suggests a focus on the bureaucratic structure even on the assumption 
that my previous argument for broad functionalism succeeds. 
Having familiarised ourselves with List and Pettit’s position, a stark contrast to the 
Negotiated Order picture becomes apparent. While the Negotiated Order approach 
allows bureaucratic rules a limited role, List and Pettit base their whole account on strict 
aggregation functions and voting procedures. Even their favourite example for a 
functionally inexplicit structure has a formal character. The Negotiated Order approach 
instead emphasises the need for informal negotiations and on-the-spot working 
agreements, which the group members revise often and without much reference to 
official rules or votes. 
The difference between the two accounts matters for applying functionalist accounts of 
mind to groups. List and Pettit’s discussion suggests that the functional realiser is a formal 
aggregation or voting procedure that results in an explicit endorsement of a belief. By 
contrast, the Negotiated Order approach only accepts such a realisation of group beliefs 
for marginal cases. Strauss and his team argued that the rules governing the behaviour 
of the professionals in the hospital “are far from extensive, or clearly stated, or clearly 
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binding” (Strauss et al. 1963: 151). Facts about these rules do not function as the action 
guiding states that mental states should. 
While List and Pettit might perhaps grant that procedures of establishing group beliefs are 
more informal, the problem cuts deeper. The whole picture of official results guiding the 
whole behaviour of the group is flawed. Rules and official results can play a role, but as 
Strauss and his team found, “the area of action covered directly by clearly enunciated 
rules is really very small” (Strauss et al. 1963: 153). For the regular functioning, local 
negotiations and agreements matter more. 
The Negotiated Order account suggests that we will not find the functional realisers of 
propositional attitudes in bureaucratic rules, formal voting procedures, and official 
declarations. The functional realisers are rather aggregate states, which can include 
states concerning such rules, procedures, and declarations, but more importantly on-the-
spot negotiations, local agreements, and unspoken understandings. Reading the 
propositional attitudes from the official voting results proves impossible in this picture. 
The official record, voted upon in a straw-vote procedure, might say one thing, while 
what guides the group are on-the-spot negotiations with another result. 
Accordingly, we do not have to expect that the group’s official declarations and voting 
results meet the kind of consistency that List and Pettit expect. Whatever rationality 
restriction we impose on the content of mental states, they are not therefore restrictions 
on the formal procedures, but rather constrain the more complex realisers, which include 
negotiations, local agreements, and unspoken understandings. Determining the exact 
realisers remains a task for the social sciences. 
Having looked inside group agents, we now turn our attention to their interactions. 
Negotiated Order sociologists suggest that group agents, too, encounter Problematic 
Situations, open up to intrinsic preference change, signal in their exploratory phase, and 
 173 
 
negotiate with one another. The Negotiated Order approach’s theory of action applies to 
group agents and the next chapter explores the consequences for the special case of 
climate negotiations.  
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Chapter Six: The Example of Climate Change Negotiations 
Having combined the theories of Negotiated Order and group agency, I have put forward 
a theory of negotiating group agents. At the beginning of my thesis, I motivated 
developing such a theory by pointing to the large-scale problems humanity faces and 
which it might hope group agents will address through negotiations. In this chapter, I 
apply the theory of negotiating group agents to a particular large-scale problem: climate 
change. 
My promise was that the Negotiated Order approach to climate negotiations has a 
contribution that goes beyond what standard rational choice models offer. If we take the 
perspective of Negotiated Orders, we find different opportunities for influencing climate 
change negotiations so as to achieve a positive agreement. 
The first half of this chapter discusses standard rational choice models of climate change. 
Since the literature provides an abundance of such models, I limit myself to a plausible 
and relevant subset drawing on the work by Stephen Gardiner. After looking at these 
models, I turn to the difference that the Negotiated Order approach makes. I introduce 
the mechanism of preference change and signalling that I discussed in chapters two and 
three and apply them to the case of climate negotiations between states. Based on these 
discussions I provide some general proposals for how to achieve an ambitious climate 
agreement.  
The result shows that although the Negotiated Order approach has some shortcomings 
of its own, such as requiring further formalisation and empirical input, it also has 
contributions to make beyond what rational choice models can offer. 
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Standard Rational Choice Models of Climate Change 
A great variety of standard rational choice models try to represent responses to climate 
change. They come with different assumptions, different degrees of complexity, and take 
different entities as their basic agents. I limit my discussion to models which assume that 
states are group agents negotiating with one another in climate negotiations. All models 
describing reactions to climate change on the level of individuals remain outside the 
scope of my work. 
Despite this limitation, we still face an impractically high number of models. With eyes 
on climate negotiations, DeCanio and Fremstad (2013) showed that just focussing on 
plausible 2x2 games in which we have two agents which can either pollute or abate, we 
end up with 25 possible games. The authors group these games into six groups, but that 
hardly solves the problem of complexity since the assumption that we only have two 
agents and two possible actions is dubious. Climate change negotiations concern a large 
number of agents even if we only take states into consideration. There are also more than 
two actions the states can take since emissions come in degrees. Without these 
assumptions, however, the number of models increases beyond what we can handle 
comprehensively. 
Since I cannot deal with all these models, I instead pick especially conspicuous ones for 
illustration and informally note various complications. Taking these complications into 
account one can produce a myriad of available models.81 My discussion closely follows 
Stephen Gardiner’s influential work on climate change negotiations. In his book, A Perfect 
Moral Storm, Gardiner presents two scenarios for climate change negotiations, one 
                                                          
81  One kind of model, which has received only little attention in philosophical debates, are 
bargaining games trying to model the learning dynamics in climate change negotiations (see 
Smead et al. 2014). In effect, these models introduce a further problem: even if there are satisfying 
equilibria available, the players are not guaranteed to achieve them. However, these models are 
also based upon the assumption of fixed preferences. 
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optimistic, one pessimistic. The two scenarios resemble two well-known 2x2 games: the 
battle of the sexes and the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Following Gardiner, I look first at the optimistic case and the reasons why we should 
assume the pessimistic scenario. Afterwards I informally add the complications to the 
pessimistic scenario. But Gardiner only provides a descriptive model of climate 
negotiations that leaves out important advice that rational choice theory offers for 
structuring such negotiations. To fill this gap, I look at a model proposed by Boadway et 
al. that suggests a way to achieve better negotiation results. 
 
Optimistic Model: The Battle of the Sexes 
Gardiner bases his optimistic scenario on the battle of the sexes. The standard examples 
for battles of the sexes describe two agents who prefer different activities but most of all 
prefer to do something together. Bob and Jess want to start a reading group together. 
Bob prefers reading Hegel over reading Kant and Jess prefers Kant over Hegel. But most 
of all, the two want to read a text together. We can represent the scenario in the 
following matrix:82 
Battle of the Sexes 
Jess 
Hegel Kant 
Bob 
Hegel 3 (Bob), 2 (Jess) 1, 1 
Kant 0, 0 2, 3 
 
                                                          
82 The model is not symmetric because both Bob and Jess derive some utility from reading their 
favourite author, even if they do not do it together. 
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Bob and Jess have a mild conflict of interest, insofar as they do not agree trivially on what 
to read, but it is in both their interests to settle on one author. The outlook for an 
agreement is promising. The solutions come easily since, as Gardiner notes, “the 
collective action problem may be resolved without the need for any change in payoffs or 
motivation on the part of the players” (Gardiner 2011: 88). Jess and Bob both have an 
incentive to acquiesce if the other remains stubborn. 
To apply this game to climate change negotiations we must extend it to multiple players, 
since multiple states negotiate their emission targets. For this purpose, Gardiner presents 
the example of a group of people who want to organise a game of rugby (see Gardiner 
2011: 89). They must form two teams for the game. All participants prefer to watch rather 
than to play, but most of all they want the rugby game to take place. We now have 
multiple players, but also a structure that resembles the original battle of the sexes. 
Importantly, we can remain optimists about cooperation. Since what all participants want 
most of all is for the rugby game to take place, we can expect them to form two teams in 
the end. 
We can also easily extend my reading group example. We can imagine that multiple 
members of the philosophy department want to form a reading group. Assume also that 
most but not all of them are needed for reaching the group size necessary to book a room. 
They all disagree on the reading material. But if joining a reading group with a sub-optimal 
book choice is preferable for enough of them compared with not establishing the reading 
group at all, then we can remain optimistic about the group’s future. 
According to Gardiner, three features characterise such extended battles of the sexes: 
First, partial cooperation suffices to make the rugby game or the reading group happen. 
If there are a few non-co-operators who do not join a team or settle on one of the 
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readings they liked less, it does not undermine the overall cooperation. Gardiner 
summarises this feature: 
“(Partial Cooperation) There is a number M (such that M < N) which is the minimum 
number of players whose cooperation is necessary if some situation, which is 
dispreferred by all, is to be avoided.” (Gardiner 2011: 89) 
We only need so many cooperators for the rugby game or the reading group. If others 
spend time differently, that does not prevent the success of the rugby game or the 
reading group. 
Second, in marginal cases where the participants are just short of enough people for the 
game/reading group, each prefers to cooperate over rugby or the reading group not 
taking place at all. In Gardiner’s formulation: 
“(Marginal Cooperation) If the number of others who are willing to cooperate is just short 
of M, then a given party prefers to cooperate, since each prefers to enjoy the benefits of 
cooperation and pay a share of the costs than to forego the benefits altogether.” 
(Gardiner 2011: 89-90) 
For example, if the reading group threatens to fail because only Bob and Jess are willing 
to compromise on the reading, other participants would become more likely 83  to 
compromise on the reading so that it can take place after all. 
Third, none of the cooperators has any interest in disrupting the cooperation. No one 
wants to stop the rugby game or the reading group. As Gardiner summarises:  
“(Passive Cooperation) Once the cooperating group is formed, the noncooperators prefer 
that it remain so, and succeed in its task. Hence, although they will not take on the costs 
                                                          
83  The “more likely” does not mean to hint at a change of intrinsic preferences. These are 
presumed stable for modelling the situation as a battle of the sexes. 
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of cooperation, they will also refrain from disrupting the efforts of the cooperating group.” 
(Gardiner 2011: 90) 
Even if I refrain from exerting my energy in a rugby team, I stand back and let them play 
their game. 
These three features sustain our optimism about multi-player battles of the sexes. We 
might hope that climate change negotiations also approximate these three features so 
that an agreement becomes likely. If only a limited coalition of states can solve the 
problem, if every state has an interest to join a coalition just short of the needed 
membership, and if the non-cooperating states do not interfere with the effort, we could 
become optimists about climate change negotiations. 
While at first glance one might hope that the international situation has these features, 
Gardiner argues forcefully that it lacks them. Take partial cooperation: Not looking at the 
data, one might assume that the US, if it focussed on just this one goal, could stop climate 
change on its own without interfering in other countries. Then we could hope that a small 
coalition will take it upon themselves to avert catastrophic climate change. On this 
optimistic scenario, no country would stop all its emissions but a small number could 
make a considerable sacrifice which would suffice to save the climate. 
But a small coalition does not suffice, since as Gardiner notes, “if either the Chinese or 
the Indians […] emitted like Americans, they would easily break the ceiling [of emissions 
before reaching potentially dangerous effects] all by themselves, even if the rest of the 
world cut its emissions down to nothing” (Gardiner 2011: 96). Gardiner (2011: 95-98) 
provides many more such data points, for example that if Bangladesh and Pakistan 
increased their per capita emission to the level of the US, then this would suffice to break 
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the ceiling.84 The result is that the minimal cooperation coalition must include most states, 
at least insofar as they must not increase their emission levels too far over the current 
rate. The Vatican state can defect without problems, but nearly all major players must 
come together. 
The next feature on the list is marginal cooperation, according to which participants 
prefer to join the coalition if it is just short of enough cooperators otherwise. We can 
combine the discussion of this feature with the discussion of the next: passive 
cooperation. Passive cooperation states that no one has an interest in undermining the 
cooperation. In the rugby and reading group examples these two features appeared 
reasonable enough. The participants want the game/reading group to happen and they 
have no incentive to undermine it. 
Prima facie, one might also think that all states have an interest in the coalition being 
large enough to avert climate change since they might suffer the consequences of failure. 
But all states face incentives for defecting from a coalition of emission reduction and for 
effectively undermining the effort to avert climate change. While every state might profit 
from a successful coalition, all of them also derive an economic benefit from breaking the 
emission limits which grows with the size of the climate coalition. The more states join a 
climate coalition and stop using fossil fuels, the more the price of these energy sources 
decreases, so that others have a greater incentive to exploit them. If China and the EU 
cut their use of coal and oil, the prices fall and it becomes an even cheaper source of 
energy for the USA. The closer we get to a workable coalition, the greater the incentive 
to defect and improve one’s own economy. Neither in the rugby nor the reading group 
example does the incentive to defect grow with the size of the cooperating coalition. 
                                                          
84 The data on which Gardiner draws for the purpose of these calculations is currently being 
migrated to a new infrastructure, which can be found at: https://ess-dive.lbl.gov/ [27. 3. 2018]. 
 181 
 
The resulting increased emissions by defectors undermine the work of the coalition.85 
The USA could increase their oil and coal consumption because the prices decrease, and 
thereby counteract efforts by a small coalition trying to avert severe climate change. It is 
as if the more people joined the reading group, the more books from a limited number 
of philosophy books would go to those defecting from the reading group. The incentives 
increase for the defectors and, if they follow them, they undermine the cooperators. 
The features which might make us hopeful regarding an extended battled of the sexes 
are missing in the case of climate negotiations. We should look for a less optimistic, but 
more plausible description. 
 
Pessimistic Model: Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Pessimism, and in particular the assumptions that states face a prisoner’s dilemma, 
dominates the current literature on climate change negotiations. As discussed in chapter 
two, in a prisoner’s dilemma the agents prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection, 
but also prefer personal defection to mutual cooperation. We can represent the game in 
the familiar matrix for two players: 
PD Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 2, 2 0, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
 
If we focus only on one player, we can represent the dilemma as follows: 
                                                          
85 For a longer discussion see Gardiner 2011: 98-101. 
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PD Other 
Cooperates 
Other Defects 
Cooperate R(eward) S(ucker) 
Defect T(emptation) P(unishment) 
 
Assuming T>R>P>S,86 there is a reward for mutual cooperation, but everyone fears being 
the sucker and faces temptation. If both fail to cooperate, they receive punishment 
relative to the outcome of mutual cooperation. 
Given this structure, we might say with Gardiner that it is collectively rational to 
cooperate and individually rational to defect. The participants prefer the outcome of 
mutual cooperation over mutual defection, but regarding their own decision they always 
prefer to defect (cf. Gardiner 2011: 104). This divergence of collective and individual 
rationality makes the situation a dilemma. The outcome is sub-optimal for all agents, 
even though individually they act rationally. 
Many have been tempted to model climate change negotiations as such a prisoner’s 
dilemma.87  A state, say the USA, prefers mutual cooperation to mutual defection in 
curbing greenhouse gas emission. However, it also prefers for the others to cooperate 
and itself to defect so that climate change would be averted without the USA having to 
pay the cost. In such an interpretation, the USA find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma 
with other states. Although to cooperate would be collectively rational for the 
participants, individually, defection remains rational for the USA. 
                                                          
86 I take this representation from the influential Axelrod & Hamilton 1981. 
87 See Gardiner 2004: 594-595. See also Brennan 2009. 
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The structure fits with the pessimistic conclusion we drew from the discussion of the 
battle of the sexes. We need cooperation from almost all participants, and defectors 
undermine the aims of cooperation. The agents have no incentive to join the cooperators 
if the climate coalition falls just short of the needed number, instead everyone has an 
incentive to defect. Gardiner’s data and arguments speak in favour of the prisoner’s 
dilemma over the battle of the sexes as a basis for modelling climate change negotiations, 
but important complications are missing from this well-known game. 
 
Complications 
Some authors have a stubborn attachment to thinking of climate change as a prisoner’s 
dilemma (for example Brennan 2009), but a little reflection reveals that such a model 
remains too simplistic. Any rational choice theorist worth her salt can spot questionable 
assumptions needed for modelling climate change negotiations as a prisoner’s dilemma. 
Consider the following complications:  
 
Multiple Agents 
More than two players are involved in the negotiations. There are over a hundred of them 
if we simplify and only count the states involved in climate negotiations. Counting all 
relevant agents influencing the negotiations, for example NGOs and corporations, the 
number increases further. The states must form a large coalition to deflect the negative 
consequences of climate change. Cooperation becomes more difficult once this 
complication is introduced. 
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Multiple Rounds 
Climate negotiations are not a one-shot game, but rather take place repeatedly (cf. 
Madani 2013: 70-71). Before the Paris Summit, delegations met in Copenhagen and 
diplomats also stayed in contact between these meetings. In principle, repeated 
prisoner’s dilemmas are more likely to result in cooperation (as I mentioned in chapter 
three, see also Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). Other players can punish defectors by 
themselves defecting in consequent rounds. 
 
Multiple Decisions 
Not only are the negotiations repeated, but during each round “[e]ach agent must make 
multiple decisions” (Gardiner 2011: 107). Each state decides on how it regulates pollution 
on a variety of dimensions. The multiplicity of decisions renders every meaningful 
agreement more complex and therefore more difficult to achieve. 
 
Sanctions and Side Payments 
Players can engage in sanctions and side payments. Many expect the richer countries to 
support the less wealthy countries financially or with technological transfer. States who 
do not support efforts to combat climate change can be punished in the context of other 
international affairs, for example in trade negotiations or even war. These options help 
mitigate the incentives to defect (cf. DeCanio & Fremstad 2013: 180-181). 
 
Degrees of Cooperation 
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Cooperation and defection come in degrees rather than in disjunctive categories. States 
can reduce their emission of pollution in degrees and climate change comes in degrees 
(for a short discussion, see Wood 2011: 156). We do not find only cooperators and 
defectors, but a spectrum of partial cooperators. 
 
Degrees of Significance 
Cooperation and defection matter to varying degrees depending on the state doing so. 
That the USA defected from the Kyoto protocol reduced its effectiveness more than if 
Austria had defected. The model should take the relative importance of the players into 
account. 
 
Solution Concepts 
Typically, papers on climate change negotiations assume the Nash equilibrium as a 
solution concept, where a solution concept is the rule for determining the how the game 
will be played. In the case of a strict prisoner’s dilemma, this doesn’t matter since the 
Nash equilibrium state of mutual defection is also dominant. However, if we introduce 
the previous complexities, it is possible that no dominant option remains, which makes 
the choice of a solution concept an important factor. DeCanio and Fremstad (2013: 179) 
suggest that players might be risk-averse and therefore follow more of a maximin 
solution concept in which they maximise the minimal pay-off. Madani (2013) criticises 
DeCanio and Fremstad for not taking even more solution concepts into account. 
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This list of complications remains incomplete 88  and the decision as to which of the 
complicating factors we must include to achieve a predictive model is a controversial one. 
The changes have highly complex and interrelated consequences for the prospect of a 
climate change agreement. While the repeated and gradual nature of climate 
negotiations might increase our hope for an agreement, conversely, the large number of 
agents needed for success reduces it. One way or another, we have to change the model 
and leave the charming simplicity of the prisoner’s dilemma behind to move toward a 
plausible representation of actual climate negotiations. 
Gardiner takes some complications into account and argues that the climate situation 
resembles Hardin’s classic discussion of the tragedy of the commons more than a 
standard prisoner’s dilemma (cf. Gardiner 2011: 108-114). In Hardin’s example, the 
herdsmen of a village share a common piece of land on which their livestock can graze. 
All of them have an incentive to add further livestock to their herd until the common 
grazing grounds become exhausted (cf. Hardin 2009). Herdsmen who hold back and do 
not enlarge their herd also end up with an exhausted common piece of land without 
having reaped the benefits of more livestock. 
While the tragedy of the commons is often understood in terms of a prisoner’s dilemma, 
it diverges in multiple points. The herdsmen might not add all the livestock at once but 
instead do so gradually and incrementally. Likewise, countries do not emit pollution all at 
once but instead emit a given quantity over time. In contrast to a prisoner’s dilemma, no 
single decision to defect is decisive. In each round, a decision to defect “erodes the 
collective good—making the full collectively rational outcome unattainable—but does 
not make further cooperative efforts pointless” (Gardiner 2011: 110). Even if the USA 
                                                          
88 One often mentioned complication I leave aside is the intergenerational nature of climate 
change (see Gardiner 2003, 2011). Partially this gap results from looking at group agents: although 
their members change, the group agents remains the same. A further theory of how generational 
change affects group agents would be needed. 
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defects during some rounds of negotiations, such as the Kyoto protocol, the game does 
not end. Other countries can still reduce emissions and if the USA re-joined later the new 
cooperation would still mitigate the consequences of climate change. 
The classic tragedy of the commons example also includes the other aforementioned 
complications: We could argue that the decision in Hardin’s example and in climate 
change negotiations comes in degrees. Just as the herdsmen can add none or varying 
numbers of livestock, states can cut all or varying fractions of their emissions. In sum, the 
prisoner’s dilemma serves as a superior model of climate change than the battle of the 
sexes, and the tragedy of the commons adds important complications on top of the 
prisoner’s dilemma. 
That the world might face a situation resembling a tragedy of the commons is a worrying 
prospect indeed. Hardin called it a tragedy for a reason. As in the case of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, collective and individual rationality diverge (cf. Gardiner 2011: 108-109): Each 
herdsman prefers that the common is sustained by mutual cooperation over it being 
destroyed by mutual overgrazing, but in each round, everyone individually prefers to 
defect rather than to cooperate. The same might apply to climate change negotiations. 
Adding multiple rounds and degrees of cooperation and defection alone does not end 
the tragic structure, although it might alleviate the problem somewhat. 
In recent decades, Elinor Ostrom and others following her pioneering research have 
shown that human groups can overcome such tragedies (cf. Ostrom 2015). From Swiss 
and Japanese peasants sharing meadows and forests, to Turkish inshore fisheries, to 
Spanish and Philippine farmers managing complex irrigation systems, human groups have 
successfully shared commons for long periods without tragic results. 
However, these positive cases rely on clearly defined boundaries of the commons, strong 
social cohesion, and the possibility of excluding exploitative defectors. Gardiner provides 
 188 
 
reasons to believe that the conditions for overcoming the tragedy do not exist in the case 
of climate change: 
“From an international perspective, social capital is weak, not everyone supports 
regulation, excluding noncooperators from emitting carbon is very difficult (if not 
impossible), emissions are difficult to monitor, and the rate of change in emissions in at 
least some economies is considerable (e.g., China is building new power plants every 
month).” (Gardiner 2011: 116) 
The case of climate change lacks the features Ostrom and her followers rely upon that 
would provide more hope about the tragedy of the commons. The outlook for climate 
change negotiations offered by the rational choice models remains dismal. Even taking 
significant complications into account, we stay closer to the pessimism of the prisoner’s 
dilemma than the optimism of a battle of the sexes. But the resources of standard rational 
choice theory are not yet exhausted. 
 
Turning the Models on Their Heads: Implementation Theory 
Following Gardiner, we assumed that states are confronted by some type of game in 
climate change negotiations, and we then attempted to find out how best to model such 
negotiations. But we can turn rational choice theory on its head and ask: How should we 
organise climate change negotiations to avoid a situation in which collective and 
individual rationality as described by Gardiner diverge? 
Implementation theory is a field that asks how non-cooperative games can be designed 
“so that their solution […] corresponds to a social optimal outcome” (Wood 2011: 164). 
Implementation theory typically assumes that the preferences of the agents determine 
the social optimum, which is roughly what Gardiner considers the collectively rational 
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outcome. Such social optimality can fall short of a philosopher’s loftier requirements of 
justice, but it improves the situation compared with a prisoner’s dilemma ending in 
mutual defection where each participant could increase its pay-off if they only mutually 
cooperated. If states face a prisoner’s dilemma in climate negotiations and defect, then 
all of them could suffer less from climate change without anyone being worse off. 
Boadway et al. (2011) offer one exemplary mechanism designed to achieve socially 
optimal climate change negotiations (also discussed in Wood 2011: 166-167). In this case, 
the optimality concept is Pareto-optimality. In an example with two countries, this means 
that we hold the benefits of one country at least constant while maximising those of the 
other (cf. Boadway et al. 354). 
I introduce Boadway et al.’s model informally and present the consequences without 
going into the mathematical details. The main purpose is to explore to what extent 
standard rational choice models that assume stable intrinsic preferences can help to 
improve the outcomes of climate change negotiations. 
The Boadway et al. model assumes that states can conditionally commit themselves to 
abatement levels of pollution. We do not necessarily need a central enforcing authority, 
but in one way or another the USA and all other states must be able to credibly commit 
themselves to a reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions. 
Given this assumption, Boadway et al.’s model has the following consecutive steps: 
1. Each state simultaneously commits to matching rates for all other countries’ 
direct abatement levels. 
2. Each state simultaneously commits to its direct abatement levels. 
First the participants, that is the USA, China, the European Union, and so on, commit to 
certain matching rates. For example, the EU might commit to cut one and a half tons of 
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CO2 for every ton India cuts. In the second step, each member declares its own direct 
abatement levels which the others must now match. India specifies the number of tons 
it will cut and the EU has to match them in addition to its direct abatement. With these 
two steps, each state commits the sum of its direct abatement level plus the direct 
abatement levels of other states multiplied with the matching rate for this other state. 
The outcome of this negotiation procedure is socially optimal and the effective 
abatement costs faced by the states are analogous to the Lindahl price, that is, the price 
of abatement varies according to the satisfaction of the preferences derived (cf. Boadway 
et al. 2010: 357-358). The optimality implies that individual and collective rationality no 
longer diverge as Gardiner sketched, since no one can be better off without another 
player being worse off. 
As an extension, Boadway et al. add a third step to the model: 
3. States engage in trading of their emissions quotas. 
This additional step helps to equalise the marginal benefits of emissions across all states. 
The benefits for an extra unit of emission become the same for all participants. Boadway 
et al. also provide further refinements (Boadway et al. 2010: 360-364), but for our 
purpose this mechanism will do. 
The outcome of this negotiation model is superior to what we expected after Gardiner’s 
discussions: No longer do the agents end with mutual defection although they could 
profit more from mutual cooperation. The mechanism illustrates how standard rational 
choice theory can provide action guidance for climate change negotiations. The Boadway 
et al. model suggests a way to set up negotiations that improves upon the mutual 
defection of a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma. The action guidance, however, also has 
its limits. 
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One limit lies in the notion of social optimality. As already suggested above, a Pareto-
optimal outcome might fall short of the requirements of moral and political philosophers. 
Even a strict utilitarian remains unsatisfied, because the Boadway et al. model only 
considers the preferences of the participating players, that is, the states. Gardiner (2011) 
argues that one shortcoming of current attempts to address climate change is a neglect 
of future generations. Current group agents too strongly discount future generations, 
insofar as neither the USA nor any other states appropriately represent the interests of 
its population in a hundred years. But if the states discount their own future generation 
too much then the outcome of the Boadway et al. mechanism fails to efficiently take the 
preferences of future generations into account. 
But this point still grants that the model’s assumptions hold and that we can implement 
it, which we have good reasons to doubt. The model assumes that states have the 
capacity to credibly commit themselves to matching rates and direct abatement levels. 
One might suggest that sovereign states are always able to back out on their 
commitments and find it hard to commit themselves credibly. 
The case of the USA illustrates the difficulty: For a credible long-term commitment, the 
President needs the support of Congress, which proved difficult to get during the Kyoto 
negotiations. The Paris summit negotiators tried to avoid any formal commitments, 
which would have required an official decision by Congress, because it had proven 
exceedingly difficult to gain such support.89 That, of course made, it easy for a President 
Trump to walk away from commitments Obama had tried to put in place for the USA. The 
group agents in this scenario find it difficult to commit in the ways needed for Boadway 
et al.’s model to work. 
                                                          
89  See: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/11/30/trick-or-treaty-the-
legal-question-hanging-over-the-paris-climate-change-conference/ [29. 7. 2017] 
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The instability of commitment might reduce the efficiency of the outcome. For example, 
the Obama administration might have tried to have the USA commit to smaller emissions 
than would have been strictly efficient, because they hoped that such a commitment had 
a better chance of withstanding following administrations. The limits on commitment 
undermine the positive results of the Boadway et al. model. 
In addition, all implementation theory models raise the worry of second-order games. 
How can we establish a general mode of negotiations? It is not Boadway and his team 
who decide how climate change negotiations proceed but the states themselves. Since 
the Boadway et al. mechanism promises to overcome a divergence between individual 
and collective rationality, we can hope that the states are enlightened enough to follow 
their own interests and endorse the two-step negotiations. Assuming the mechanism 
works, all agents should be better off following the procedure and no one worse off.  
However, establishing such a negotiation mechanism has side effects which might keep 
states from accepting it. States might worry that putting such an international framework 
in place might threaten their interests in other respects. They might believe that there is 
more to gain in the international arena through conflict and keeping negotiations minimal. 
Then states face incentives to avoid Boadway et al.’s mechanism of negotiations. In other 
words, the action guidance of implementation theory depends on our capacity to impose 
a structure on climate negotiations, which might prove limited. 
Furthermore, and most importantly for my purposes, standard rational choice models 
assume fixed intrinsic preferences. But agents change their preferences after the 
negotiations or during them − this can undermine the efficiency of the outcome. Consider 
the following scenario: India commits to certain matching rates and a direct emission 
abatement level in two steps together with all other states. However, afterwards India 
becomes more environmentally aware. Now the efficient outcome would include a 
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higher abatement level. Of course, India might reduce its abatement even more than it is 
committed to, but since the negotiations are over, the other agents might not match this 
additional abatement.  
To summarise, Boadway et al.’s model provides guidance on how to conduct climate 
change negotiations in a way that increases the chances of an efficient agreement. But 
the approach has shortcomings.  
First, it is dubious whether a Pareto-efficient outcome according to prior intrinsic 
preferences meets our normative requirements. It might diverge from a just result. What 
if the preferences of the states make a major climate change the efficient outcome 
because they discount future generations too much? 
Second, the assumptions of the models remain debatable. The extent to which states can 
commit themselves to levels of abatement is called into question, the threat of second-
order games looms, and the change of preferences undermines the efficiency of the 
result.  
Implementation theory is a valuable tool for avoiding catastrophic climate change. As 
such, we should include it in our toolbox, but we should not limit ourselves to such 
models. Particularly if states overly discount future generations, we should look for 
solutions that include preference change. So, we turn to the Negotiated Order approach. 
 
The Negotiated Order Approach to Climate Negotiations 
The Negotiated Order approach as I have reconstructed introduces an account of intrinsic 
preference change and will thereby allow us to see more options for climate change 
negotiations.90 However, the approach also has a shortcoming: In contrast to standard 
                                                          
90 The work within the literature on international relations that bears the greatest resemblance to 
my proposal is probably Alexander Wendt’s (1994) “Collective Identity Formation and the 
 194 
 
rational choice theory, it does not provide sophisticated mathematical models. Blumer 
and Strauss certainly did not quantify their theories and, so far, I have hardly improved 
upon that. As a result, I cannot offer as specific a picture as standard rational choice 
theory. I cannot provide quantitative predictions of the consequences of certain 
mechanisms, nor proofs that outcomes would be Pareto-optimal. 
However, we can hope to develop mathematical models based on the Negotiated Order 
perspective. After all, Cohen and Axelrod managed to formalise their model of adaptive 
utilities. The appendix on Dewey’s decision theory takes the first steps towards a 
formalisation of Dewey’s claims. While the limitation of the Negotiated Order is 
contingent and temporary, for now it remains a deficiency. 
The shortcoming results from giving up the assumption of stable intrinsic preferences. 
This assumption helped us to construct a mathematical model, but it also obfuscates 
available options. The Negotiated Order approach lacks mathematical models so far, but 
it does uncover these options. I pointed out that the Boadway et al. model runs into 
problems when agents change their preferences. In addition, we hope for preference 
change on the assumption, argued for by Gardiner (2011), that current climate 
negotiators inordinately discount future generations. To discuss how we might face these 
issues, we need to include preference change in our theory. 
For the reopening of possibilities to be a productive venture we need some guidelines for 
preference change. A model that includes arbitrary, unlimited preference change has 
little predictive power and no plausibility. Anything could happen. In chapters two and 
three I discussed the limits the Negotiated Order approach puts on intrinsic preference 
                                                          
International state”. He too draws on the tradition of symbolic interactionism and its affinity to 
preference change. However, he focuses on a different mechanism of preference change bound 
up with identity instead of using the Negotiated Order approach. As a result, our proposals diverge 
considerably. 
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change in a general and largely informal way. Agents do not change their intrinsic 
preferences arbitrarily, but in response to Problematic Situations. 
The features of the Problematic Situation and the events during the exploratory phase 
influence the direction of preference change. As discussed in chapter three, the agents 
engage in signalling during the exploratory phase and this affects what motivational 
profile finally settles in. The agents can align during parallel processes of preference 
change. To see the effects this preference has on modelling climate negotiations, 
consider the following informal example, which provides only the first taste of what is to 
come, and makes assumptions that I will later question. 
For a start, assume a tragedy of the commons depiction of climate change negotiations. 
We can think of it as a more complicated version of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma in 
which an overwhelming number of participants must cooperate for a successful climate 
agreement and the more who cooperate, the higher the incentives for the defectors. 
In an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma between two players, we would have reason 
to hope that they settle on cooperation after a while. But various features of the situation 
undermine our optimism: a large proportion of agents needs to cooperate. The more 
agents cooperate, the more the prices for fossil fuels decrease for the defectors, 
incentivising their use. Internal controls remain weak and cooperators cannot exclude 
defectors from the commons, that is, the world climate. 
We can expect that, round for round, important agents defect because they do not want 
to be the suckers in this round. For example, the USA prefers for others to cooperate 
during each round of climate change negotiations, but for themselves to defect, and 
mutual defection over being a sucker, while preferring mutual cooperation by a larger 
coalition over general defection. 
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We can illustrate the situation in a single round with a typical 2x2 matrix: 
 Others 
Cooperate 
Others Defect 
Cooperate R S 
Defect T P 
 
Assuming again T(emptation) > R(eward) > P(unishment) > S(ucker). 
To clarify that we do not actually have two agents here as we would have in a standard 
prisoner’s dilemma, I labelled the columns “Others Cooperate/Defect” rather than just 
“Cooperate” and “Defect”. The USA can choose between two actions, the pay-offs of 
which depend on the choices made by multiple others. 
It is common knowledge that a large coalition is necessary to avoid severe climate change. 
This knowledge informs each player’s choice between the possible acts, reducing the 
likelihood of cooperation. We do not have to change anything about the outlined pay-off 
matrix, because the pay-offs remain the same. But we should keep in mind that each 
player has information reducing the probability of the “Others Cooperate” option and 
therefore the expected pay-off of cooperating oneself. 
Up to now, we stuck to standard rational choice theory, but the failure in finding an 
agreement that limits the increase in global temperature is likely to lead to Problematic 
Situations. The consequences of dramatic climate change cause disruptions and agents 
will identify problems. Droughts, floods, rising sea levels, and similar events disrupt 
economic activity and plans. Having identified problems, the agents show an increased 
likelihood of intrinsic preference change. The Negotiated Order approach predicts that 
they will open up to preference change. 
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The USA might open up to becoming a more cooperative player.91 It tries out a new 
tentative preference for preventing climate change. To give a toy example, this 
preference might result in the following transformation of the prisoner’s dilemma for the 
USA: 
 Others 
Cooperate 
Others Defect 
Cooperate R+i S+i 
Defect T P 
 
In this illustrative example, an i-term is introduced which changes the dynamics of the 
game. If i ≥ (T-R) then the game is no longer a prisoner’s dilemma because now 
temptation is eliminated. If i > (T-R) and i > (P-S), cooperation becomes the dominant 
strategy for the USA. To put it informally, cooperation becomes dominant if the new 
preference for cooperation outweighs the prior pay-off difference between cooperating 
and defecting. 
One might fear that the USA would only end up in a worse position if it underwent such 
a preference change. The USA has to pay the price of cooperation, for example, a 
reduction in economic growth resulting from emission regulation. Their cooperation does 
not suffice to achieve a significant climate agreement if all the other participants stick 
with their strategies. The agent with the preference for cooperation could turn into a 
continual sucker. Because the USA would experience the new cooperation as positive, it 
would not see itself that way, but from the outside it would look as if the USA were simply 
                                                          
91 An intrinsic preference for a climate agreement is not the only option. If the states developed a 
stronger intrinsic preference for preserving nature, this would have a similar effect. 
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making sacrifices without receiving any reward. Such preference change might appear 
unlikely and unwelcome. 
The Negotiated Order approach, however, tells a more complex story. At first the USA 
only explore this new preference for cooperation without yet settling on it. They hold it 
in a qualified tentative mode. They can signal this potential change, but if they do not 
experience others joining in, they might not change their preferences permanently. The 
exploratory phase proves once more an important contribution of the Negotiated Order 
approach. 
The signalling of a potential preference change in favour of cooperation can take various 
forms. For example, after opening up to preference change, the USA might cooperate in 
the next round of climate negotiation rather than defect. Even knowing that in this round 
no one will join in the cooperation effort, for this round the agent foregoes the benefits 
accruing to defectors. This action signals to other agents a tendency of the USA to become 
more cooperative. Given the common knowledge of the situation and the previous 
behaviour of the USA, the cooperation act increases the probability of the USA to develop 
a more cooperative motivational profile. Furthermore, the signal is relatively trustworthy, 
because the USA pays for it with concessions in this round of negotiations. It is a case of 
costly signalling. 
If the USA defected again and again during repeated climate change negotiations, and 
then started to unilaterally cooperate, other participants would interpret the move as 
“taking leadership” and “standing up for the value of international cooperation”. This 
signal might affect the preference changes of other states, which also encountered 
Problematic Situations and entered exploratory phases. The participants might undergo 
preference change in a coordinated manner, thereby avoiding turning into perpetual 
suckers. 
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If enough agents undergo such a coordinated change of motivation, they can form a 
coalition despite the dismal starting situation. Intrinsic preference change and signalling 
during the exploratory phase allow us to break out of the tragedy of the commons. They 
do not guarantee it, but they do increase the chance and provide at least a glimmer of 
hope. 
This kind of more optimistic scenario becomes visible from the Negotiated Order 
perspective, while it is not a potential outcome for standard rational choice models. With 
a different theory of motivation, a different way to cooperate opens up. But the real story 
is more complicated than the example. 
 
Complications 
The example I gave described a simplified scenario. As for standard rational choice 
models, we might consider various complications to make the description more accurate. 
I list the complications for a standard one-shot prisoner’s dilemma again because they 
have different consequences assuming the Negotiated Order approach. Some of these 
complications were already included in the example, some are added to it: 
 
Multiple Agents 
I included the assumption that the negotiations involve multiple players in my example, 
but one can make various assumptions about how many agents negotiated and how 
many are needed to form a coalition that will lead to success. The higher the number of 
agents needed for success, the unlikelier the success. This holds for standard rational 
choice models and for my example. The more agents are involved, the smaller the 
likelihood that enough of them converge in their preference change. We might end up 
with a coalition too small to fend off catastrophic climate change. 
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Multiple Rounds 
Rather than being a one-shot game, climate change negotiations are a recurring event. I 
assume repeated games already in my illustrative example. The repetition provides the 
room for exploratory phases and signalling among the states. The repetition also allows 
punishment of those who give wrong signals, and therefore supports truthfulness. This 
complication increases the chance of cooperation for standard rational choice models 
and it increases the chances for aligning in preference change for Negotiated Order 
models. 
 
Multiple Decisions 
During each round, agents make multiple decisions rather than just one. Each state 
decides how to regulate pollution in a variety of dimensions. The consequences of this 
complication are difficult to predict. On the one hand, the multiplicity of decisions makes 
it more difficult to align on all relevant preferences and find an agreement. On the other 
hand, the variety of decisions allows for fine-tuned signalling, potentially increasing the 
chance of cooperation. Without a detailed model, few conclusions can be drawn. 
 
Sanctions and Side Payments 
If players can engage in sanctions and side payments, the chance of cooperation under 
the assumption of stable preferences increases. Those who defect can be punished and 
those who cooperate rewarded. With preference change entering the picture, sanctions 
and side payments potentially play the further role of influencing the direction of 
preference change. 
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Agents who try out new preferences can be rewarded or punished for their direction of 
preference change. Given that agents respond to such contextual cues, as the Negotiated 
Order approach assumes they will, the feature increases the chance of cooperation even 
further than in the standard model. 
 
Degrees of Cooperation 
Cooperation and defection come in degrees rather than as disjunctive categories, as do 
emissions and climate change. By virtue of this feature of climate negotiations, 
preference change does not have to be dramatic to make a difference. A slight preference 
change in favour of cooperation might already make a difference to the outcome. The 
USA might become willing to accept slightly lower emissions. If enough states undergo 
such slight preference change, it might have an important overall effect. Even if our hope 
for avoiding climate change altogether should fail, the Negotiated Order approach might 
still reveal a way to avoid the most destructive scenarios. 
 
Degrees of Significance 
Although only a large coalition can avoid climate change altogether, agents still matter to 
different degrees. For example, the cooperation and defection of the USA has more 
impact than Austria’s cooperation and defection. Because cooperation and defection of 
different states matter to varying degrees, the preference change of these states matters 
to varying degrees. A preference change on the part of the USA has greater significance 
than would a preference revision undergone by Austria. Accordingly, even if not all states 
fulfilled the Negotiated Order account of motivational change, it could still matter as long 
as it applied to relevant agents in the negotiations. 
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Multiple Solution Concepts 
Multiple solution concepts other than the Nash equilibrium are also worth considering. 
Depending on which solution concept agents follow, different changes of intrinsic 
preference can lead to a success in agreements. Again, to become more specific we would 
need a detailed quantitative model. 
 
As we can see, the complexities we can include in standard rational choice models also 
affect the picture offered by the Negotiated Order approach. In addition, new 
complications arise that did not come into view for standard rational choice theory: 
 
The Agents’ Propensities to Change 
Participants, in this case states, differ in their inner structure, making it more or less likely 
that they undergo preference change in response to Problematic Situations and align with 
other agents. For example, Germany might be more likely to change its intrinsic 
preferences than a country in which the ruling elite is more heavily invested in the 
extraction of fossil fuels. Assuming agents are bogged down in a situation resembling a 
prisoner’s dilemma or a tragedy of the commons, we want them to be more likely to 
undergo preference change so as to overcome the dilemma. 
 
Contextual Support 
A context can offer more or less room for exploring potential new preference and 
signalling. In this regard, it might affect whether agents align during preference change. 
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In the case of climate negotiations, the international system provides the context. It 
determines a number of significant variables, for example how easy it is to have another 
round of negotiations, or the costs of signalling. 
Speaking generally and without a detailed model to prop the claim up, if the context 
leaves ample room for signalling, this might improve the chances of cooperation. 
Consider the following example: The USA might be willing to try out a new preference 
but it would need support from other states to settle on it. If the participants do not have 
enough room for signalling and the USA are unsure whether others might change their 
preferences too, cooperation becomes less likely.92 
 
These complexities call for further investigations, consisting partially in mathematical 
model building, partially in empirical research. In effect, I offer a whole research 
programme for the Negotiated Order approach. Using my suggestions about how to 
reconstruct the Negotiated Order approach and applying it to group agents, new inquiries 
into climate negotiations become available. This kind of research programme goes 
beyond the boundaries of this thesis and requires further social scientific expertise. 
Instead I want to explore how we can use the Negotiated Order perspective for action 
guidance, just as implementation theory employs standard rational choice model for 
action guidance. 
Assuming certain ends, for example a climate deal limiting emissions further than what 
has been achieved so far, we can draw suggestions from my reconstructed Negotiated 
Order approach. To give a general example, if we could make an increased preference for 
                                                          
92 There is also the worry that states might manipulate how problematic a situation appears for 
other each other. My model raises awareness of such options. I thank Yonatan Shemmer for raising 
this issue. 
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cooperation salient for a state in response to a Problematic Situation, this would increase 
the likelihood of a successful agreement. We can draw various similar proposals from the 
Negotiated Order approach. However, before I turn to the details of such a proposal, I 
face a fundamental objection: Is the relevant preference change even plausible? 
 
Objection: The Plausibility of Relevant Preference Change 
Even accepting that agents, including group agents, can undergo preference change in 
response to Problematic Situations, one might consider such change limited. A country 
might undergo change to some of its motivational states, but will the change ever reduce 
its interest in power and economic wealth over international cooperation? Some 
preferences might be practically unchangeable. The potential suggestions offered by the 
Negotiated Order perspective could turn out to be uninteresting if these limits are too 
strict. 
In the context of climate change, we find various positions that endorse strict limitations 
on the preferences of states. The school of Realism in International Relations (cf. Grundig 
et al. 2001) claims that states always look for relative power gains. Assuming this were 
true, states might still undergo some preference change, but the resulting preferences 
would only become relevant if the choice had no effect on the relative power. For 
example, if a state could win the same relative power either by going to war or by 
entering a peace treaty, then a preference for peace might decide. Such scenarios are 
rare and we should not expect them in the case of climate change. The results of climate 
negotiations will likely have consequences for the relative power of states. Accordingly, 
this sort of Realism imposes limits on preference change that would render the 
Negotiated Order perspective uninteresting. 
 205 
 
For another example, consider Geoffrey Brennan’s (2009) charmingly dismal paper 
“Climate Change: A Rational Choice Politics View”, which is predicated upon the 
assumption that one can model climate change as a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma. 
While global cooperation might increase overall utility, we should have little hope for 
achieving it according to Brennan. The preferences of states do not allow it and any hope 
that this might change seems naïve. He claims that defecting from any climate 
cooperation is in the national interest of any nation, for example Australia. In response 
to anyone who disputes this position, he writes “in my view, the claim itself [that it is not 
in Australia’s national interest to reduce carbon emissions] is uncontestable. And people 
who dispute it simply do not understand the nature of the problem!” (Brennan 2009: 
313) 
Brennan probably wants to claim that Australia’s unwillingness to sacrifice its economic 
well-being for a preference to reduce climate change is beyond reasonable doubt. That 
Australia would change its preferences in a way that puts cooperation over its economic 
well-being is just implausible, or so Brennan believes. 
In Brennan’s picture, we face a limit to preference change that appears to threaten the 
usefulness of suggestions from the Negotiated Order perspective. If preference change 
always fails to establish a preference of cooperation over economic well-being, the states 
remain in a game resembling a prisoner’s dilemma. At least that is what Brennan suggests. 
But simply asserting that some preferences remain unchanged and are therefore 
exogenous to the negotiations is not so much an objection against my account as begging 
the question. While a state’s preference for power is more deeply engrained than other 
preferences, more needs to be said to establish that the preferences relevant for climate 
change negotiations are practically stable. In the end, nothing but difficult and empirically 
informed research settles the question as to which preferences lie beyond change. 
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I cannot undertake such a far-reaching investigation here. However, one principled 
consideration speaks against endorsing too dismal a picture of preference change in the 
case of climate negotiations. Relative power, economic wealth, climate change, and 
emission reduction all come in degrees. Consider a case in which the USA could pass a 
regulation that avoids flooding caused by rising sea level and leads to an overall decrease 
of real GDP growth by just one single dollar. Is it plausible that the USA would not accept 
losing this quantity of relative power (or economic wealth) to avoid the flooding? I 
venture that such a proposal is implausible. 
Relative power and economic wealth do not always trump avoiding the consequences of 
climate change, because the consequences of climate change can be huge and the costs 
in terms of power and wealth negligible. Granting this, one can change my example 
incrementally. Would the USA accept losing a real GDP growth of a $100 to avoid damage 
by flooding? What if the damage occurred in a partner country rather than in the USA 
itself? I hope the USA would bear this cost. Admittedly, at some point the preferences for 
the climate over power and wealth break down. We would have to determine the exact 
point empirically. But I see no reason why it should be unchangeable. 
Usually authors simply make the variables categorical rather than a matter of degree: 
Brennan considers cooperation versus defection. With the assumption of categorical 
variables, it becomes more plausible that power and wealth always trump cooperation 
and concern for the environment. But the assumption of categoricity simplifies the 
situation. 
I made a similar simplification above when I discussed climate change negotiations as 
resembling a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. I offered a toy model in which the dilemma is 
transformed to the following game: 
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 Others 
Cooperate 
Others 
Defect 
Cooperate R+i S+i 
Defect T P 
 
We should not confuse the simplified model with the actual negotiations. Our 
contribution to climate change, our willingness to cooperate in battling it, and climate 
change itself, all come in degrees. Shifting the degrees can already have a significant 
impact, depending on the number of states undergoing such a change. 
Even if preference change does not lead states to become whole-hearted cooperators 
sacrificing power and wealth for the common good, changes at the margin can help. The 
complication of degrees of cooperation unmasks Brennan’s perspective as too dismal. 
Preference change can have an effect at the margin of cooperation. Therefore, we should 
look at proposals of how we can contribute to positive preference change. 
 
Proposals 
I assume that we aim at increasing the probability of an agreement on a significant 
emission reduction. Given this aim, the Negotiated Order approach provides proposals 
for action, which I turn to now. For the sake of illustration, I assume that the agents face 
a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma as sketched in my original example. We can again use 
the following matrix for illustration purposes: 
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 Others 
Cooperate 
Others Defect 
Cooperate R S 
Defect T P 
 
As mentioned, this modelling simplifies the issue since decisions in climate change 
negotiations come in degrees. But most of the proposal remains transferable to more 
complex models. A move that increases the change for more cooperative preferences 
applies whether cooperation comes in degrees or as a disjunctive category. 
My proposals remain informal. I also leave open whom the proposal addresses. Boadway 
et al. do not explain who should establish their negotiation mechanism, and I do not 
explain who should implement the changes I propose. Instead of addressing any 
particular group, I use a general ‘we’, that is, we should do such-and-such to avoid severe 
climate change. My discussion focusses solely on the wheels we − whomever that may 
refer to − can turn to achieve cooperation in reducing climate change. I aim to show that 
the Negotiated Order approach to negotiating group agents makes a significant 
difference. For that purpose, I allow myself to stay at a rather general level and to make 
implicit assumptions about causal relations. 
We can distinguish two types of proposals resulting from the Negotiated Order approach 
to climate change negotiations: proposals as to how to change group agents and 
proposals as to how to change their context. In effect, the two new complications 
mentioned above serve as the starting point for my discussion. I go through both types 
of proposals and discuss how we could increase the probability of reducing emissions. 
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Proposals for Reshaping Group Agents 
Here is an optimistic scenario: Unexpected events disrupt the activity of agents, they 
identify a problem, and open up for preference change. They enter an exploratory phase 
during which they can signal with other agents to align in their preference change. In 
response, the agents align on new, more cooperative preferences so that they can form 
an effective coalition. We can reshape the agents in regard to every of these points of the 
process. 
In our illustrative toy example, the motivational changes of the group agents are 
supposed to transform the original matrix given above to the matrix including the 
additional variable i:93 
 Others 
Cooperate 
Others Defect 
Cooperate R+i S+i 
Defect T P 
 
So that i > (T-R) and i > (P-S), as many agents as possible should undergo such a change. 
We want every agent to be such that it is more likely to 
1. undergo a transformation of its pay-offs, in particular, 
2. introduce an i such that i > (T-R) and i > (P-S) during the exploratory phase, and 
3. signal the potential preference change and settle on it if other agents signal a 
similar tendency. 
                                                          
93 Again, the idea of a simple preference change, which leads to the introduction of the i-term, 
only serves the purpose of illustrating the consequences of endorsing the Negotiated Order 
approach. A more appropriate model of actual climate change negotiations would be more 
complicated and the proposals would have to be adapted. 
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For example, we want the USA to be more likely to undergo a transformation of 
preferences: in particular, a pro-cooperative change that outweighs the prior incentive 
to defect. Furthermore, the USA should signal this potential preference change to the 
other states and settle on it if they truthfully signal back a tendency for a similar change. 
If enough agents undergo such change, then they overcome the situation resembling a 
prisoner’s dilemma. We want to increase the probability of a coordinated preference 
change in favour of far reaching climate cooperation. How can we achieve this? 
According to the Negotiated Order approach, an agent is more likely to undergo a 
motivational change that transforms the game if it identifies a problem in response to a 
disruption of activity. Whatever we can do to increase the likelihood of this kind of 
problem identification contributes to the success of the scenario. For example, we might 
assume that a state with a sustained public discourse is more likely to identify a problem 
in response to a disruption and an indeterminate situation. Then we should support such 
a public discourse. Incentives for ignoring disruptions decrease the chance of a game 
transformation. We should work on removing such incentives. Again, the exact actions 
we should take depend on the circumstance. Without empirical research, we can only 
guess what the causal connections could be. However, the Negotiated Order approach 
tells us what to look for and what to do when we have found it.  
Not only should the agent identify a problem, but its structure should also be flexible 
enough to allow for preference change in the first place. Otherwise the group sticks to its 
preferences even after identifying a problem. Political systems can make it easy or 
difficult to introduce a change of policies. For example, if the foreign policy is completely 
governed by a multi-chamber parliamentarian process, then a policy change will prove to 
be difficult. 
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This point suggests that we want change to be easy to achieve. On the other hand, only 
if the state achieves some consistency in its policies will it function as an agent at all.94 
The states need to be agents capable of credibly committing themselves to certain 
emission abatement levels. If a commitment can only be revoked by a multi-chamber 
parliamentarian process, then it would be more credible. We should be aware of trade-
offs. The considerations of the Negotiated Order approach put weight on one side of the 
scale, the side of flexibility, but there is also another side to it. Again, the final advice 
depends on empirical circumstances which we should include in our models. 
Being more likely to change one’s preference is not everything. The preference change 
also should point in the right direction. If the i variable is negative, then the chances of a 
cooperative result decrease rather than increase with preference change. States should 
be such that they are likely to try being more cooperative in response to Problematic 
Situations. Which changes within a state lead to a propensity for becoming cooperative 
depends, once more, on the concrete case. In the USA, but elsewhere as well, 
strengthening the influence the scientific community has on policies might be advisable. 
To give perhaps the least innovative piece of advice resulting from my approach, voting 
for appropriate parties increases the propensity of the right preference change. 
Not just one state should undergo a pro-cooperative preference change. We hope for a 
coalition of states that align on more cooperative intrinsic preferences during an 
exploratory phase. Signalling helps us to achieve this goal, as I discussed in chapter three. 
The states need the capacity to engage in signalling in order to align their preference 
change and reach a strong agreement. 
For example, enhancing the state’s diplomatic capacities so that it can send trustworthy 
signals eases the alignment of preference change processes. Strengthening these 
                                                          
94 According to the functionalism discussed in chapter five. 
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capacities forms an important contribution to approaching the positive scenario I 
sketched. Of course, diplomacy has been praised before. The Negotiated Order approach 
contributes the insight that signalling also affects the preference change and therefore 
matters for achieving further-reaching cooperation. It offers a further consideration in 
favour of strengthening the signalling capacities of states. 
In addition to having the capacity for signalling, the state also should react to signals by 
other agents. If the USA signals a tendency to adopt a pro-cooperative preference and 
receives signals back that other states are also undergoing a similar preference change, 
the USA should then be more likely to settle on the cooperative preferences they tried 
out. The considerations of the Negotiated Order approach encourage changes which 
support such responsiveness. Again, the exact steps to take depend on the concrete 
situation. 
The Negotiated Order approach points to changes that can encourage a positive result. 
We find ways to support a cooperative solution between states that did not become 
apparent from the perspective of standard rational choice theory: 
• Render the identification of a problem more likely. 
• Ensure that the group agent’s structure is flexible enough to allow for preference 
change. 
• Ensure preference change has the right direction. 
• Enable the group agent to signal about preference change. 
• Ensure the group agent reacts appropriately to such signals. 
So far, we considered how changes to the agents help. Changing the context in which 
agents negotiate can also contribute to achieving a meaningful climate agreement. 
 
Proposals for Changing the Context 
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This time we want the context to make it more likely that each agent 
1. undergoes a transformation of its pay-offs, in particular, 
2. introduces an i such that i > (T-R) and i > (P-S) during the exploratory phase, and 
3. signals the potential preference change and settles on it if other agents signal a 
similar tendency. 
The requirements remain the same as before, but this time we look at how the context 
can contribute towards meeting them. The international system and the negotiations 
serve here as the context in question. How can we change the context to increase the 
probability that the negotiating states will undergo a preference change in favour of 
climate saving cooperation? 
First, the context should allow and incentivise a transformation of the game by the agent. 
In the case of climate change negotiations, we can push for an international system that 
enables states to change their course of action in a face-saving way, especially if the 
change is in favour of reducing climate change. The agreements between states should 
allow for amendments if a party becomes more cooperative regarding the climate 
negotiations. 
I pointed out above that we face a trade-off between flexibility and credible 
commitments. Agents should be flexible enough to change their preferences, but also 
able to credibly commit themselves. We face an analogous trade-off on the level of the 
negotiation context. It must allow agents to change their preferences and act accordingly, 
and at the same time provide a background for stable agreements. The Negotiated Order 
approach, as developed thus far, does not show us how to balance such a trade-off 
successfully, but it draws our attention to the importance of such features for a positive 
scenario. 
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The context can also encourage the agent to develop an i such that i > (T-R) and i > (P-S) 
in a variety of ways depending on the exact mechanism of preference change. On my 
reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach, agents enter an exploratory phase 
during which they try out tentative preferences. The feedback they receive influences 
which motivational profile they settle on and thereby can increase the chance of a 
sufficiently large i. Signalling comes in at this point, so that requirements (1) and (2) are 
closely related.  
One salient option to increase the likelihood that other agents develop a preference for 
cooperation is to signal approval of a motivational profile that includes such a preference. 
Assume that India signals an exploration of becoming more cooperative. The EU might 
signal back that it approves of this potential change of preferences and might be willing 
to take steps to support India.95 This option assumes that a signal of approval affects the 
chance of a motivational profile settling in positively. Whether this holds true must be 
judged in the concrete case. If Pakistan signalled approval, this might have a smaller or 
even the reverse effect. 
The context must allow room for signalling, so that agents align in their intrinsic 
preferences. Accordingly, we should allow negotiations to take longer. By contrast, 
consider the Boadway et al. mechanism. In their model, group agents commit first to 
matching rates and second to direct abatement levels. Then the negotiations end. 
Afterwards, the agents might still engage in emission quota trading, but overall 
abatement commitments remain fixed. Signalling has little place in this mechanism, since 
it is almost completely limited to declaring the matching rate. If one state picks high 
                                                          
95 The EU’s willingness in this scenario might be the result of prior preferences or of intrinsic 
preference change. We are concerned here with what advice we could give the agents, for 
example the EU, if they ask us how to increase the likelihood of forming a successful coalition of 
co-operators. 
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matching rates, this increases the subjective probability that it will also pick high direct 
abatement levels. But there is hardly any place for coordinating preference change. 
The Negotiated Order model provides a reason to have multiple rounds of negotiations 
rather than to come to a quick Pareto-efficient agreement. We want the states to be able 
to undergo aligned pro-cooperative preference change to increase the climate 
friendliness of the resulting agreement. Again, we face difficult trade-offs. The climate is 
changing now. Adding another round of negotiations, while giving opportunity for 
signalling, costs valuable time. But the Negotiated Order approach at least gives us a 
reason not to endorse a quick and supposedly efficient mechanism such as the one 
proposed by Boadway et al. In sum, we find the following broad suggestions: 
• The context should allow and incentivise appropriate transformations of the 
game. 
• The context should leave room for signalling about preference change. 
The Negotiated Order approach offers a suggestion on how to work towards successful 
climate negotiations, but how does it compare with the suggestion of standard rational 
choice theory? 
 
Comparing the Negotiated Order Proposals with Boadway et al. 
Before I turned to the Negotiated Order approach, I showed that standard rational choice 
theory offers guidance for how to structure negotiations to avoid unfavourable outcomes. 
The implementation theory model proposed by Boadway et al. suggests a mechanism for 
climate negotiations improving upon a prisoner’s dilemma type scenario. 
This implementation theory model has important advantages over the proposals I made 
from the perspective of the Negotiated Order approach: it proves, under certain 
assumption, that its outcomes are Pareto-efficient and therefore preferable to the prior 
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situation of mutual defection. It provides clear prescriptions: follow these two steps and 
the result has the following features (under certain assumptions). 
In contrast, the proposals I just listed remained general and often came with a proviso 
such as that one must consider certain trade-offs or gather further empirical data. I 
offered no proofs but only plausible considerations in favour of certain changes. Given 
these shortcomings of my reconstructed Negotiated Order approach over standard 
rational choice theory, one might be tempted to stick to the latter. But that conclusion 
neglects the shortcomings of the model by Boadway et al. and similar models. 
As I discussed earlier, the Boadway et al. two-stage negotiation mechanism only ensures 
a limited notion of optimality − Pareto-optimality. By introducing emission quota trading 
we can also equalise the marginal benefits of emissions over all states, but all these 
achievements fall short of moral requirements. Particularly if the states fail to take future 
generations into account, the Boadway et al. mechanism cannot deliver a positive result. 
Efficiency relative to the current preferences of negotiating states does not suffice. 
We do not only want agents to follow their preferences Pareto-efficiently so that 
individual and collective rationality (in Gardiner’s sense) coincide; in addition, we want 
states to have appropriate preferences. Boadway et al.’s model assumes fixed 
preferences and then shows how to achieve efficiency. The Negotiated Order proposals, 
on the other hand, provide a way of meeting more ambitious goals. The suggestions I 
offered remained general and in need of further empirical input, but they serve as a start 
towards achieving deeper cooperation through preference change. 
Furthermore, the occurrence of preference change undermines the original success of 
the Boadway et al. model. A formerly efficient agreement on abatement levels is no 
longer efficient if the agents change their preferences afterwards. Even what the 
mechanism achieves becomes dubious if we look at the assumption of the model.  
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Both approaches, as they stand, have their shortcomings. The Negotiated Order 
proposals remain general and in need of further research, including empirical 
investigations and mathematical models. The implementation theory as represented by 
Boadway et al. provides a specific model, but one that rests on debatable assumptions 
and falls well short of our higher goals. Both offer valuable suggestions for ambitious 
climate agreements. 
Future research can hope for a convergence of the approaches, for the Negotiated Order 
approach to spawn a quantitative formalisation, and for implementation theory to take 
intrinsic preference change into account. After incorporating future empirical research 
and improved models we might end up with specific recommendations that take 
preference change into account and allow us to achieve our ambitious goals regarding 
climate change. For example, the Boadway model was plagued by second-order worries, 
that is, by worries as to whether the states would even enter such a formal negotiation 
procedure. Perhaps the Negotiated Order approach and its accounts of preference 
change can help to overcome such difficulties which then allow us to apply models like 
that of Boadway.96 
 
The Contribution 
In this chapter, I applied the reconstructed Negotiated Order approach to group agents. I 
presented the differences the approach makes to the way we describe climate 
negotiations and the proposals we can derive from it. Although we found limitations in 
the approach in its current stage of development, it also made contributions going beyond 
                                                          
96 I thank Yonatan Shemmer for this suggestion. 
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the standard rational choice model. The Negotiated Order approach serves as an original 
theory of negotiating group agents offering a unique perspective. 
Climate change negotiations are a particularly important example. Humanity faces a 
threat in climate change and the Negotiated Order approach reveals different ways of 
tackling it. But the significance of the approach reaches beyond this one example. 
Negotiations between states and other group agents abound, and the Negotiated Order 
approach points to possibilities for negotiation that we do not see using standard rational 
choice models. 
Beyond the illustrative example of climate negotiations, the Negotiated Order approach 
offers us a general theory of negotiating group agents. The journey has not reached its 
end, however, since research remains to be done. After the conceptual success of this 
thesis, there remains the work of formalising the models of the Negotiated Order 
approach and combining them with further empirical data. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of the present thesis is to provide an account of group agents as negotiators who 
are potentially capable of solving the large-scale problems humanity faces, 
paradigmatically climate change. For this purpose, I have drawn on pragmatist social 
science and in particular the Negotiated Order approach. In chapters two to six we found 
a unified picture of motivational change in the interaction between agents including 
group agents. 
The second to fourth chapter of this thesis aimed to provide a philosophically palatable 
reconstruction of the sociological Negotiated Order approach. The reconstruction 
included the development of a theory of preference change based on the account of 
motivational change found in the pragmatist literature. At the core of this theory was the 
idea of the Problematic Situation which opens agents up to a change of preferences. The 
notion of a Problematic Situation can already be found in John Dewey’s work and served 
as the central theme of the second chapter of this thesis. Finding themselves disrupted 
in their course of action, agents can enter an exploratory phase during which they are 
more likely to undergo motivational change. Problematic Situations are supposed to have 
the force to open the agent up to a change of all types of preferences, including the 
intrinsic preferences over fundamental alternatives. 
Chapter three combined the pragmatist account of Problematic Situations with the 
theory of signalling, which has become a hot topic in game theory over recent decades. 
Such an encounter of different approaches became salient because of the emphasis 
pragmatist sociology put on the symbolic aspects of human interaction. The resulting 
combination of exploratory preference change in response to Problematic Situations and 
signalling opened the door for new kinds of cooperation. Agents can signal to each other 
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what kind of preference change they might undergo. Having these elements in place, I 
offered a reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach in the fourth chapter. While 
this reconstruction was selective, it allowed us to see how the Negotiated Order approach 
sketches dynamics which escape the view of standard rational choice theory. 
Since the main interest of this thesis is in group agents as negotiators and problem solvers, 
my reconstruction of the Negotiated Order approach needed to be combined with a 
theory of group agency. The fifth chapter presents the two main accounts of group 
agency in the literature: functionalism and interpretivism. The chapter argues that 
interpretivism is seriously flawed and that our approach to negotiating group agents 
should endorse a version of functionalism. In addition, the fifth chapter provides 
constraints on what we should expect the realisers of functional states to be in group 
agents, given the Negotiated Order approach. 
Chapter six serves as a proof-of-concept of the Negotiated Order approach applied to 
negotiating group agents addressing a real-world problem. It discusses current game 
theoretic models of climate change negotiation used in philosophy at length to then show 
the difference made by the introduction of preference change in response to Problematic 
Situations. The Negotiated Order approach allows us to see potential means of egress 
from dismal scenarios resembling a prisoner’s dilemma or a tragedy of the commons.  
In sum, the present thesis introduces a school of social science into philosophical 
discussions; in the course of doing so it puts forward a theory of preference change, and 
combines these ideas with a theory of group agency to allow a new perspective on how 
humanity might face large-scale problems. The final chapter shows that this proposal 
promises advantages over current standard game theoretical approaches. While the 
modelling of climate change negotiation certainly must go beyond what could be 
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sketched in this illustrative chapter, it indicates the benefits we can expect from following 
this path further. 
Without doubt great challenges lie ahead of the proposed account of negotiating group 
agents. The present thesis does not offer a full formalisation of the theory of preference 
change (but see the appendix, which takes steps in this direction). Future research in how 
to combine the new picture of agency and motivational change with formal accounts in 
decision and game theory remains open.  Nonetheless, through a large variety of topics 
the present thesis has managed to develop a unified theory of group agents as 
negotiators, which makes it possible to see how they could come to successfully address 
the large-scale problems facing humanity.
 222 
 
Appendix: Dewey’s Decision Theory 
The main part of this thesis has discussed the Negotiated Order approach and has drawn 
on Dewey’s theory of the Problematic Situation for this purpose. But while this aspect of 
Dewey’s work has exerted a clear influence on pragmatist sociology, it does not 
constitute the entirety of his thought on motivational change. Since it is not clear that 
these further elements have had as great an impact on the Negotiated Order approach, I 
have left them out of my reconstruction. Nonetheless, they provide an important 
background to pragmatist sociology and raise the question as to how to integrate the 
pragmatist tradition with decision theory. The purpose of this appendix is to provide a 
general take on Dewey’s theory of practical reasoning and to underline the importance 
of preference change for the theory.  
Apart from certain circles of committed admirers, Dewey’s theory of practical reasoning97 
suffers from a lack of interest as a result of two widespread assumptions: First, Dewey’s 
approach is incompatible with decision theory. Second, his proposed replacement and in 
particular his claims about ends and means make little sense, if any. 
To overthrow both assumptions, I show that we can render Dewey’s approach formal 
with a revised decision theory, and that the result allows us to make sense of Dewey’s 
philosophy of action. His claims about ends and means become interesting and even 
plausible, once reformulated as contributions to decision theory. 
Undoubtedly, Dewey discouraged attempts to quantify human decision processes. 98 
According to him, we should resist the temptation to understand significant human 
                                                          
97 In the present appendix I am especially drawing on Dewey’s middle and late work, in particular 
his books Human Nature and Conduct and Theory of Valuation. Although there are differences in 
detail between Dewey’s various formulations, I will assume an underlying unified theory. 
98 Other pragmatists have shown greater affinity to decision theory. Frank P. Ramsey (1926) was 
greatly influenced by pragmatism and his contributions to decision theory were revolutionary. For 
recent work on Ramsey’s pragmatism, see Misak (2016) and Gruber (2017). 
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decisions by means of analogy with a stock investor trying to make the best deal (cf. MW 
14: 151).99 Despite Dewey’s reservations, I will present three of his claims about ends and 
means and reconstruct them as contributions to decision theory: 
First, new ends can arise out of impeded habits. If the environment blocks the realisation 
of habits, agents might change their ends in response. They start to explore different 
courses of conduct. 
Second, ends are relative to situations. Dewey prefers to talk of ends-in-view, because 
for him ends only persist if they fulfil a certain function. 
Third, means affect ends. Dewey claims that means and ends form a continuum rather 
than remain separate from each other. In a nutshell, information about how an agent can 
realise its ends alters these ends. 
After introducing these three claims, I will show how we can reconstruct them as 
contributions to decision theory given a technical innovation: commitment values. These 
values range over intrinsic preferences and specify the probability that the preference 
will change by the next act. Dewey’s claims give us rules for the dynamics of commitment 
values, that is, rules for how preferences change. I conclude after addressing concerns 
about the descriptive value of the proposed theory of preference change. 
Before getting into the matter, a further complication deserves attention: Dewey 
disdained the separation of descriptive and normative inquiries. Accordingly, he would 
have rejected the distinction between descriptive and normative decision theory. While 
the discussion in the main text of this thesis remained descriptive and tried to provide an 
adequate account of how agents in fact undergo motivational change, this appendix 
                                                          
99 In the quoted passage, he seems to have transformative decisions in mind, such as discussed by 
L. A. Paul (2016). See also Fesmire (2003: 76) for a discussion of this criticism. 
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follows Dewey insofar as it should have plausibility on a normative as well as a descriptive 
construal. 
 
Dewey’s Central Claims 
Dewey criticises a strict application of means-ends schemes to human action and revises 
the notion of ends. All ends should be open to change, and they should resemble means 
more than traditional theories of practical reasoning assume. 
While I do not reconstruct Dewey’s claims as contributions to decision theory until later, 
I take the first steps in this direction here by translating the terminology from “means” 
and “ends” to “preferences” and “consequences”. Although there is no trivial reduction 
of the folk-psychological to the decision theoretic vocabulary, I suggest that ends can be 
specified in terms of the preferences over consequences: to have an end is, other things 
being equal, to prefer consequences that realise it over other consequences. If my end is 
to read a book, I prefer consequences that realise this end over other consequences, 
other things being equal. 
 
Ends Arising from Impeded Habits 
As has been recognised in the secondary literature, Dewey’s theory gives prominence to 
an idiosyncratic notion of habit. For Dewey, habits are dispositions that give action 
structure (cf. MW 14: 31, Anderson 2014). Without habits we would be driven by a bundle 
of raw impulses. 
While Dewey’s habits merit their own discussion, for the issue of motivational change the 
most important aspect of habits is their disruption. Sometimes habits become impeded 
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when the environment is contrary to the agent’s expectations.100 In response to such 
situations, agents exhibit exploratory behaviour and open up to motivational change. In 
effect, Dewey describes a special case of Problematic Situations brought about by the 
impediment of habits. Consider the following example of a Problematic Situation: 
Matilda visits an alpine village every summer. She has a favourite path which she walks 
each year. On her current visit, she chooses to hike on this path, as is her habit.101 Walking 
the path, however, she finds herself confronted with an unexpected obstacle. A tree has 
fallen across the path. Its size does not allow Matilda to climb over it. Thick thorn bushes 
on both sides of the path render even a small deviation from it difficult. The tree blocks 
the path and Matilda’s activity. 
Contrary to Matilda’s expectations, her habit cannot give her activity structure. She 
responds with a phase of exploration with respect to the situation (cf. MW 14: 139-141). 
The exploratory process can take place in the agent’s mind. Matilda goes through various 
options using her imagination. But she can also try out an end by acting as if she fully 
endorsed it. Finding her habitual route blocked, Matilda takes a few steps in this or that 
direction, looking down various paths before endorsing a final decision. She is opened up 
by the situation and explores the opportunities it offers. All of this should be familiar from 
the introduction of Problematic Situations in chapter two above, except that Dewey puts 
greater emphasis on habits.102 In line with this previous discussion, such events of habit 
impediment and exploration alter the motivational life of agents: 
                                                          
100 In the following, I will not always note that the impediment is unexpected but this is a silent 
assumption. 
101 Dewey’s idiosyncratic notion of habit might also allow for one-time habits (cf. MW 14: 32). But 
this feature of his account doesn’t make a difference for my purposes. 
102 My presentation here also does not mention the identification of problems, which I introduced 
as a necessary condition for Problematic Situations in chapter two. I assume silently that such an 
identification occurs so that these situations of habit impediment meet the necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for Problematic Situations. 
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“Some habit impeded by circumstances is the source of the projection of the end.” 
(MW 14: 29) 
To project an end is to consciously endorse it. To project a new end entails being 
motivated by it. To project an old end is to reaffirm it. The situation of impeded habits 
opens agents up to such an endorsement of ends. Accordingly, to be opened up by a 
situation entails a propensity for motivational change. 
But impeded habits do not guarantee that ends change. Matilda might double down on 
wanting to walk this path and project the old end. She might go get a chainsaw, call the 
fire brigade to remove the tree, or simply postpone her walk without giving up her end. 
Dewey endorses a strictly probabilistic theory of changing ends, according to which 
impeded habits render the change of motivations, such as Matilda picking a new favourite 
path, more likely. 
Dewey does not restrict this change of ends to instrumental aims. All ends can be opened 
up when circumstances impede habits. If a change of non-instrumental ends occurs and 
Matilda develops the end of walking another path, we expect her to take this other path 
in the following year, even though she has no reason to assume that her formerly habitual 
path is still impassable, since non-instrumental ends do not depend on information. 
Accordingly, a decision theory for reconstructing Dewey’s claims must include a 
mechanism for the change of intrinsic preferences, that is, preferences independent of 
information.103 
My reconstruction must also account for the exploratory element in Dewey’s theory, 
which I have pointed to throughout my thesis. Agents do not immediately endorse new 
ends in response to impeded habits, but rather explore how to move on after such a 
                                                          
103 During the discussion of formal decision theory, I elaborate the notion of intrinsic preferences. 
See also Binmore 2009: 5-6. 
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situation. This exploratory phase poses a major difficulty for any decision theoretic 
reconstruction of Dewey: The agents apparently act without fully endorsing their 
preferences. According to traditional decision theory, one either has a preference or not, 
but one does not hold it in a qualified, exploratory manner for a certain period. 
That new ends can arise out of impeded habits and that agents explore ends in response 
to such situations are not Dewey’s only challenging claims about ends, as we will see. 
 
The Horizon of Ends 
To distinguish his theory of practical reasoning from traditional approaches, Dewey 
prefers the term “end-in-view” rather than “end”. Dewey rails against understanding 
ends as fixed finalities that agents aim for in all situations (cf. MW 14: 159). He attacks 
the concept of the highest good, according to which we have a goal overruling all other 
goals at all times. Instead ends-in-view “arise out of natural effects or consequences 
which in the beginning are hit upon, stumbled upon so far as any purpose is concerned” 
(MW 14: 155). Ends have their origin in situations of action and must prove themselves 
to persist in such situations. As we have seen, impeded habits offer an occasion to 
abandon old ends-in-view by bringing about Problematic Situations. But even without 
such impediments, ends are not guaranteed an infinite lifespan.104 Ends have to fulfil a 
function or they disappear: 
“Ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of activity and which 
are employed to give activity added meaning and to direct its further course.” 
(MW 14: 155) 
                                                          
104 One might think of the time preference approach used in economics. But while there might be 
interesting connections between these approaches, time preferences should not be confused with 
Dewey’s proposal. 
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Ends serve the function of giving our activities meaning.105 It would be wrong, however, 
to make this function another end of the agent. Then we would have a highest good all 
over again: the good of meaningful activity. Instead we should understand the function 
as governing the lifespan of ends. Unless ends fulfil their function, the agent loses them 
over time. Ends come with a sell-by date, which is pushed back if they do well. The 
function is not a highest good, but a constraint on the persistence of ends. 
Assume Matilda goes for a walk and endorses the end of getting to know the wild flowers 
along the path. She looks at the blossoms and the leaves. Using her smartphone, she 
learns their names. Matilda’s end of getting to know the flowers adds meaning to the 
activity of walking. But this end might not persist forever. Maybe on the next walk the 
end does not give her activity more meaning. The longer it fails to give meaning, the 
likelier Matilda is to lose it. We can think of the end as decaying, unless it receives a 
renewal by fulfilling its function. 
In the following I assume that this horizon applies only to particular ends in the 
foreground of our motivations: ends that typically come to mind when someone asks us 
what we are trying to achieve (cf. Stevenson 1962: 93). Background ends, such as avoiding 
tripping over our feet, do not have to repeatedly prove themselves. In most situations, it 
would be odd to call health an end-in-view. It is an end, but it remains in the background 
rather than in view. My discussion will focus on the foreground ends. 
For decision theory, Dewey’s horizon translates into the claim that preferences that 
sustain foreground ends will fall out of use over time, unless they renew themselves by 
                                                          
105 See also: “A hypothetical possible solution, as an end-in-view, is used as a methodological 
means to direct further observations and experiments.” (LW 13: 232, see also Pappas 2008: 263) 
Dewey also suggests that ends-in-view are “means of unification and liberation of present 
conflicting, confused habits and impulses” (MW 14: 158). One should not overemphasise the role 
of habits and impulses for the function of ends, however. This quote belongs to Dewey’s Human 
Nature and Conduct, which stresses habits and impulses more than other texts. 
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fulfilling their function. Extrinsic preferences are uncontroversially relative to situations, 
because they depend on information that differs between situations: if Matilda prefers 
to take the left over the right path because it leads her to the top of the hill faster, this 
preference remains relative to the situation. In another situation, where the right path 
leads to the top more quickly, she would take this path. These extrinsic preferences 
depend on the information about the paths. For intrinsic preferences, however, a 
dependence on the situation is controversial. 
Standard decision theory assumes stable intrinsic preferences that hold in all situations. 
As commonly conceived, intrinsic preferences don’t come with an expiration date. If 
Matilda intrinsically prefers knowing the wild flowers, then one would expect her to have 
this preference in other situations as well.106 Not so with Dewey, as according to him, we 
are more likely to change our ends with new situations (cf. MW 14: 160-161). My 
reconstruction of Dewey’s decision theory must make sense of the idea that foreground 
preferences change unless they add meaning to our activity. 
For Dewey, ends have a horizon − are ends-in-view − because they do not differ that 
much from means. Just as means have the function to help fulfil ends, ends-in-view have 
their function as well. But Dewey goes even further in connecting ends and means. 
 
Means Affect Ends 
Perhaps the best-known element of Dewey’s theory of action is the continuum of ends-
means (cf. LW 13: 226), that is: Dewey’s denial of the complete separation of ends and 
means. We can distinguish a strong and a weak version of the ends-means continuum. 
                                                          
106 This still allows for the possibility of the agent to refrain from acting on these preferences when 
other considerations override it. For example, Matilda might be in a hurry to get to her philosophy 
seminar and lack the time to study the flowers. 
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The strong version does away with the distinction almost entirely. In this interpretation, 
to call a state of affairs an “end” is only done to add emphasis to it for present 
consideration, not to give it a categorically different status in practical reasoning. The 
following quote suggests the strong version: 
“The ‘end’ is merely a series of acts viewed at a remote stage; and a means is 
merely the series viewed at an earlier one.” (MW 14: 27) 
According to this passage, the difference between ends and means results from how 
much time one takes into consideration. Reaching the top of the hill is the end of the walk, 
because it remains remote, while taking the next turn is a means, because we face it soon. 
This strong reading of Dewey’s continuum of ends-means eliminates the distinction 
almost completely. 
By contrast, the weak reading of the continuum allows a categorical difference between 
ends and means but asserts that they stand in a stronger connection than usually 
presumed. While ends and means play different roles in reasoning, these roles involve 
each other closely. In this weak version, agents might change their ends in light of the 
means needed to achieve them (cf. Stevenson 1962: 95). I endorse this reading because 
it fits Dewey’s motivation for denying the separation between ends and means. 
The absurd results of clinging to an end regardless of the needed means motivate Dewey 
to introduce his continuum (cf. LW 13: 226-229). To take an example from Dewey, it is 
absurd to roast pork by burning down the whole sty of pigs.107 If we cared exclusively 
about the end of roast pork, then we should see no problem in roasting pork by burning 
down pig-sties. Dewey believes there is a problem and therefore proposes his continuum. 
                                                          
107 The example goes back to a humorous essay by Charles Lamb (see LW 13: 226-227). For a free 
online version visit https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/43566 [18. 8. 2017]. 
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Within limits, Dewey’s claim raises no controversy. Assume that Matilda has the end of 
going for a walk. She chooses reaching the top of the hill as an intermediate aim for her 
walk. However, after choosing the hilltop as an intermediate aim, she learns that the 
roads leading to it are badly maintained and dangerous. Upon learning this, she decides 
to walk to the lake instead. In this case, information about a means, the state of the path, 
overturned the intermediate aim of reaching the top of the hill. There is a continuum, at 
least of the weak version, between the means and the intermediate aim. This case is 
unproblematic, because the final goal was to go for a walk. 
Dewey, however, extends his continuum to all ends, not just such intermediate aims. 
Returning to his original example, we find that such a general claim leads to difficulties. 
According to Dewey, if I learn that I cannot get roast pork without burning down sties, I 
should not only refrain from choosing roast pork for breakfast; in addition, I should be 
likelier to lose my end of eating roast pork altogether. Just as Matilda abandoned her 
intermediate aim of reaching the top of the hill, I might lose the end of having roast pork. 
 But why should means affects the end rather than the particular choice? I might choose 
to forego roast pork this morning, but that does not imply that I lose my general end of 
having roast pork. If someone told me that I can roast pork in an oven, I would do it. 
For decision theory, Dewey’s postulate translates to the claim that information about 
how intrinsic preferences can be realised affects these preferences. The information that 
I have to burn down sties to get roast pork is supposed to affect my preference for pork 
over a vegetarian meal. While it raises no controversy that such information can influence 
whether I act on a preference, it remains unclear how the information could lead to a 
change of my intrinsic preferences. Traditional decision theory lacks the means to 
formalise Dewey’s claim because it assumes stable intrinsic preferences. Therefore, my 
reconstruction must go beyond traditional decision theory to capture Dewey’s claims. 
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In sum, three desiderata guide my reconstruction of Dewey’s decision theory: First, the 
reconstruction must specify how impeded habits lead to exploration and preference 
change. Second, the reconstruction must include the horizon of ends and the horizon-
deferring effect of an end fulfilling its function. Third, the reconstruction must make 
plausible that information about how intrinsic preferences can be realised might alter 
these preferences. I now turn to decision theory and the technical innovation of 
commitment values to meet these desiderata. 
 
The Formal Apparatus 
To reconstruct Dewey’s claims as contributions to decision theory I need a formal 
apparatus. This apparatus can be split into standard decision theory and the mechanism 
of preference change governed by commitment and described by commitment values. 
 
Introducing Decision Theory 
I start with a simple Savage-type decision theory. We have a set X of consequences.108 
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that these consequences are mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive. For example, Matilda might either walk in the sun or walk in the rain 
or walk in the shade under trees, but not all or none of these options. 
Preference relations hold over such consequences. For my purposes, strong preference 
and indifference are going to be the only preference relations.109 The “≻” sign indicates 
a strong preference. Matilda has a strong preference for the consequence of a walk in 
                                                          
108  Hansson’s (1995) formalisation of preference change also allows preference change by 
introducing or removing alternatives. 
109 In the literature, the “≽” indicates a weak preference, which is the disjunction between a strong 
preference and indifference relation. However, for expositional reasons that will become clear 
later, I avoid the weak preference relation. 
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the sun over a walk in the rain: walk in the sun ≻ walk in the rain. The “∼” indicates 
indifference. Matilda is indifferent towards a choice between a walk under trees if the 
sun is shining and a walk under trees if it is raining, because neither the sun’s rays nor 
rain can reach her there: walk under trees during sunshine ∼ walk under trees during rain. 
Assuming that the preference relations over consequences are transitive and complete, 
we can construct a utility function.110 The transitivity assumption states that if the agent 
prefers (or is indifferent between) consequences A to B and B to C, she also prefers (or is 
indifferent between) A to C. The completeness assumption states that for each two 
consequences in X, the agent either strongly prefers one over the other or the agent is 
indifferent. For all consequence pairs we find one preference relation. 
Given these assumptions, we can assign utility values to consequences. For example, 
Matilda might derive a utility 10 from the consequence of a walk in the sun, a utility 0 
from a walk in the rain, and a utility 5 from a walk under trees that block rain and sun: 
u(walk in the sun) = 10, u(walk in the rain) = 0 and u(walk under the trees) = 5. 
Agents have a set of available acts A, such as taking a path in the open or a path under 
trees. To model choice under risk, we assume that consequences are combinations of a 
state of the world, which has a certain subjective probability, and an action. For example, 
the consequence of a walk in the rain is a combination of the act of walking in the open 
and the state of it raining. 
Each act comes with an expected utility value, calculated by adding the utilities of the 
potential consequences multiplied by the subjective probability of the state of the world. 
Consider Matilda’s act of taking a path under the open sky, allowing rain and sun to reach 
her. Matilda’s subjective probability for rain is high: p(rain) = .8 and the probability of 
                                                          
110 However, Mandler (2001) has argued that we should expect preferences only to fulfil one or 
the other but not both assumptions. 
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sunshine is low: 1−p(rain) = .2. The expected utility of this act is: eu(taking open path) = 
0 ∗ .8 + 10 ∗ .2 = 2. Matilda is better off walking under the trees: eu(walking under trees) 
= 5 ∗ .8 + 5 ∗ .2 = 5. 
The subjective probabilities make no difference to the preference ordering over 
consequences. Matilda prefers a walk in the sun over a walk in the rain independently of 
how likely she considers sunny weather to be. But we can construct a second preference 
ordering over acts using expected utilities. According to our calculations, Matilda prefers 
the act of walking under trees over the act of walking in the open. In contrast to the 
preferences over consequences, this preference ordering over acts depends on 
subjective probabilities. If Matilda had given p(rain) = 0, then she would have preferred 
the act of walking in the open. 
I call the preferences over consequences “intrinsic preferences” and the preferences over 
acts “extrinsic preferences”, because the first are independent of subjective probabilities 
while the latter depend on them (cf. Binmore 2009: 5-6). Matilda intrinsically prefers a 
walk in the sun over a walk under trees. However, she extrinsically prefers the act of 
walking under trees over walking in the open, as our calculation has indicated. 
Those are the outlines of the standard decision theory I assume. The theory alone cannot 
make sense of Dewey’s claims, because it does not include any change of intrinsic 
preferences. The preference relations over the consequences are static in the picture we 
have inherited from Savage. For a successful reconstruction, we need more. 
 
Introducing Commitment Values 
For reconstructing Dewey’s tenets as contributions to decision theory, the traditional 
approach lacks a way to model the change of intrinsic preferences. Such preference 
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change occurs if and only if a strong preference relation over consequences replaces an 
indifference relation or vice versa, or the relata of the strong preference relation switch 
places.111 To model preference change, I introduce commitments and commitment values. 
According to my account, preferences are mental states governing choice behaviour, 
while commitments are properties governing the probability that these preferences 
change (see Strohmaier & Messerli typescript). 112  For example, if Matilda is highly 
committed to her preference for the green over the red party, but less committed to her 
preference for chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream. In other words, Matilda is 
likelier to undergo preference change with regard to ice cream than parties. 
Commitment values represent the degree of commitments, that is, how likely preference 
change is. Commitment values are a further type of value in addition to utility values and 
subjective probabilities, and cannot be directly derived from these other values. Formally, 
commitment values range over the set of intrinsic preferences P, which contains all 
preference relations over consequences. For each intrinsic preference we have one 
commitment value. The commitment value of a preference specifies the probability that 
the preference changes before the next act begins, given that the agent’s mind functions 
normally.113 The normality clause rules out preference change by way of a brain seizure 
or a surgical intervention. 
                                                          
111 As mentioned above, I ignore the weak preference relation. The reasons have now become 
clear: if we replace a strong preference relation with a weak preference relation, this could signify 
a preference change but it does not have to, because the weak preference relation is the 
disjunction between strong preference and indifference. Losing a preference relation without 
replacing it and establishing one in place of a previous gap would become additional types of 
preference change. 
112 I generally follow Dietrich & List’s (2016) argument for mentalism about preferences. Those 
unhappy with postulating a preference as a mental state and commitment as a property of such 
states can accept commitment values but have to give them a different interpretation. 
113 The take of probability raises the question of whether we are concerned with objective or 
subjective probability. Both options are viable given appropriate background assumptions. If 
human minds are non-deterministic, the probability could be objective. If human minds are 
deterministic, I propose to interpret the probability as the subjective expectation of a preference 
change assigned by an idealised well-informed bystander. 
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In my proposal, the commitment value for an intrinsic preference is a real number 
between 0 and 1. That is, for all preferences p in P: 1 ≥ com(p) ≥ 0. For example, Matilda 
has a high commitment to her preference walk in the sun (WS) ≻ walk in the rain (WR), 
so that com(WS≻WR) = .999. Accordingly, there is only a .1 per cent chance that this 
preference will change by the next act. The chance that she either starts to prefer a walk 
in the rain or becomes indifferent in that time is small. If she had a commitment value 
of .5, then she would be as likely to change her preference as not. 
I allow for a commitment value of 0 as a limiting case. A commitment value of 0 ensures 
that the agent will have changed preferences by the next act. Consider a quitting smoker 
who sincerely and with sufficient willpower acts one last time on her preference for a 
cigarette. We can describe her as having a preference at this point of time but with zero 
commitment to it. By the next act, she has lost the preference for a cigarette over no 
cigarette. 
Commitment values range over all intrinsic preferences, but not over utilities or 
subjective probabilities. As it turns out, we can reconstruct all of Dewey’s claims with 
such a limited set of commitment values. Nonetheless, the proposed decision theory 
shouldn’t disconnect preferences from utilities. If Matilda loses her preference WS≻WR, 
a change in the utility values of WS and/or WR should reflect the preference change. The 
construction of utility function out of preferences standardly assumes transitivity and 
completeness. However, besides connecting utility values and preferences, the 
transitivity assumption entails restrictions for commitment values.114 
Assume that Matilda has a preference for a walk in the sun over a walk in the rain 
(WS≻WR) and a preference for a walk in the rain over a walk during snowfall (WR≻WN). 
                                                          
114 Giving up the completeness demand, preference relations could also change by disappearing 
altogether rather than being replaced. In the following I assume this to be ruled out. 
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According to the transitivity assumption, Matilda also prefers a walk in the sun over a 
walk during snowfall (WS≻WN). It follows that if Matilda underwent change regarding 
her preference WS≻WN, she must lose either her preference WS≻WR or WR≻WN. The 
probability of one preference change depends on the probability of the other preference 
changes.115 
I proposed to interpret the commitment value of a preference as the probability of the 
preference to change by the time of the next act. From the interdependence of 
probabilities for preference change follows the interdependence of commitment values. 
They can only take values such that we are not forced to predict intransitive preferences. 
We can formalise this constraint on commitment values. For illustration, I stipulate that 
an agent faces a set of three consequences such that X = {c1, c2, c3} and has strong 
preferences over these consequences such that c1 ≻ c2, c2 ≻ c3, and c1 ≻ c3. The transitivity 
requirement mandates that given the first two, the last of these three preference 
relations must hold. Accordingly, the commitment values for the first two preference 
relations provide a floor for the commitment value of the third relation. The probability 
of a change of the last preference (1- com(c1 ≻ c3)) cannot be larger than the combined 
probability of a change in the first two preferences: 
1 - com(c1 ≻ c3) ≤ 1 – com (c1 ≻ c2) +1 – com(c2 ≻ c3) 
With the introduction of this transitivity restriction we have the tools at hand for 
reconsidering Dewey’s claims. In my reconstruction, Dewey’s theory of practical 
reasoning concerns the question of what makes a commitment value increase or 
decrease. As I will show in the following, Dewey describes and prescribes the dynamics 
of preference change. 
                                                          
115 The same holds for indifference relations. 
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Reconstructing Dewey’s Claims 
Having introduced these commitments, I can reconstruct Dewey’s claims as contributions 
to decision theory. Commitment values serve as a tool to describe Dewey’s kinematics of 
ends. 
 
Impeded Habits Decrease Commitment 
Dewey proposes that the impediment of habits makes motivational change likelier. If 
habits cannot guide activity in virtue of unexpected obstacles, the commitment to 
associated preferences sinks. Finding her path blocked, Matilda’s commitment to her 
action-guiding preferences decreases and, accordingly, the probability of preference 
change increases. 
Before running into the tree, Matilda might have preferred the consequence that she 
walks path A over path B with a commitment value of .99. In light of the impeded habit, 
Matilda’s com (A ≻ B) sinks to .4. There is a 60 per cent chance that she will have 
abandoned the original preference by the next act. 
In a nutshell, the impediment of habits leads to an experience which reduces 
commitment and thereby affects the change of preferences. Giving experience such a 
prominent role fits well with Dewey’s philosophy of action (cf. MW 14: 47, 133, see also 
Godfrey-Smith 2014). The more the agent experiences the impediment of her habits as 
problematic, the more the commitment value decreases. In the example, the more 
Matilda experiences it as problematic that the tree blocks her path, the lower her 
commitment to the preference for following this path. 
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I introduce a variable for describing the effects of such an experience: ex.116 For reasons 
that will become clear later, the experience variable can also take a positive value so that 
it ranges between -1 and 1: 1 ≥ ex ≥ −1, but for the special case of impeded habits the 
variable takes a negative value: 0 > ex ≥−1. We calculate the new commitment value by 
adding the experience value for the prior situation to the prior commitment value: 
𝑐𝑜𝑚 (𝐴 ≻  𝐵) 𝑡+1  = 𝑐𝑜𝑚 (𝐴 ≻  𝐵) 𝑡 + 𝑒𝑥𝑡 
Of course, the general floor of 0 and ceiling of 1 for commitment values must remain 
intact, a limitation I silently assume in the following. 
This formula presupposes that the experience values have ratio-scale commensurable 
with commitment values. Otherwise it would make no sense that a negative experience 
value leads to a reduction of commitment. While these are substantive assumptions, they 
offer the best interpretation of Dewey’s decision theory.117 
Which commitments are affected by an impediment? Presumably Matilda’s commitment 
to her preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream does not decrease because the 
environment impedes her habit to walk a certain path. This particular impediment should 
affect the particular commitments associated with the walk. 
One might suggest limiting the commitment reduction to the preference which underlies 
the impeded habit, in Matilda’s case the preference for path A over path B.118 However, 
                                                          
116  Dewey has a rich notion of experience. The experience variable introduced here is only 
supposed to capture one aspect of it, namely the extent to which the situation is experienced as 
problematic. 
117 For support of this reading see also Elizabeth Anderson’s discussion of how experiences of 
trying out new valuations affect future valuations. “As the individual engages this new valuation, 
she experiences the consequences of acting on it. Reflection upon these consequences is then 
incorporated into more intelligent valuations, by way of further appraisals” (Anderson 2014). 
Anderson also reads Dewey as assuming a commensurability between experiences and practical 
attitudes. 
118 One might question whether each habit has an underlying preference. Maybe agents also have 
mere habits without underlying preferences. I bracket this question for the purpose of this 
reconstruction and assume there is always such a preference. 
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we should expect a broader effect, because the transitivity assumption renders 
commitment values interdependent, as I argued. Trying to keep the preference change 
minimal, we can take the commitment to preference for path A over B as the starting 
point of change, since it is directly associated with the impeded habit, and then calculate 
other changes using the equation for the transitivity restriction given above. 
I have sketched how an impeded habit can lead to the projection of different ends: It 
decreases commitments and thereby affects the change of preferences as described by 
Dewey. So far, however, I haven’t captured the exploratory phase. The change of ends in 
response to an impeded habit does not settle in immediately, instead the agent explores 
different courses of action. We have to formalise that during a stretch of time following 
the unexpected impediment of habits, agents relate in a special way to their preferences. 
Traditional decision theory lacks the tools to qualify the preferences for a period. 
Introducing commitments allows us to overcome that difficulty. After having her habits 
impeded, Matilda tries out various preferences with a low commitment until new 
preferences stick. 
I propose the following approach to formalise the exploratory phase: We specify an 
interval from t+1 until t+n, the exploratory phase, during which the commitment to new 
preferences does not reach prior levels. This ceiling on commitment values for the 
relevant preferences characterises the interval. To be exact, during this phase no 
commitment value for a preference having A and B as relata can exceed the value of 
𝑐𝑜𝑚 (𝐴 ≻  𝐵) 𝑡+1  = 𝑐𝑜𝑚 (𝐴 ≻  𝐵) 𝑡 + 𝑒𝑥𝑡 where 0 > ex ≥−1.  
At the end of the exploratory phase the ceiling disappears. This implies neither that the 
commitment value after the exploratory phase is larger than during the phase, nor that 
the preferences at the end differ from those at the beginning. The phase’s end only means 
that the commitment can take larger values again. 
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Specifying the length of this interval poses a major problem. It might depend on such 
factors as the nature of the original impediment and the experiences which follow during 
the exploratory phase. Dewey’s empiricist tendencies limit how much we can abstract 
from the concrete situation. A pragmatist interested in decision theory has to confront 
the question of whether to follow Dewey here or simplify the rules for commitment 
values. Despite these concerns about how to further develop pragmatist decision theory, 
my reconstruction succeeds in formalising Dewey’s claims and rendering them plausible. 
What seemed opposed to decision theory becomes a contribution to it, once 
commitment values have been introduced.  
 
A Horizon for Preferences 
Dewey prefers the term “end-in-view” over “end” because it indicates that ends come 
with a horizon. Ends-in-view only persist if they fulfil their function. My reconstruction 
captures this proposal by letting commitment values for a preference decrease over time. 
Matilda’s commitment to her preference concerning wild flowers decreases, unless 
fulfilling its function re-enforces it. 
We can conceive of the commitment value’s reduction in analogy to a decay in nuclear 
physics. The decay function of carbon-14 describes that for any sample, only half the 
particles remain after a few years. Likewise, commitment values decay over time. The 
longer the time, the smaller the commitment value, the larger the probability of a 
preference change. 
However helpful, the analogy remains imperfect. First, it is not clear that we should 
attribute an exponential decay as is typical for nuclear physics to commitment values. The 
decay-function might take a different form. Second, decay is not the only factor that 
affects commitment. The decay-function gives a baseline for the commitment to the 
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preference in the future, but other factors might change the commitment. We already 
encountered one of them: impeded habits lead to an additional decrease in commitment 
values. 
How well the ends-in-view function is a further factor that affects the decrease of 
commitment. Dewey suggests that when ends-in-view function well, this might produce 
re-enforcing experiences reversing preference decay. If Matilda’s end to inquire into the 
wild flowers functions well, then the experience re-enforces the commitment. 
Introducing such a re-enforcement allows reconstructing ends to have a function without 
postulating a highest end. 
While Dewey does not spell out the details, the claim that positive experiences re-enforce 
the commitment suits his emphasis on experience. We can use the experience variable 
‘ex’ introduced above. In effect, the equation for calculating the change of an intrinsic 
preference from t to t+1 should look as follows 
𝑐𝑜𝑚 (𝐴 ≻  𝐵) 𝑡+1  = 𝐷𝐹(𝑐𝑜𝑚 (𝐴 ≻  𝐵) 𝑡) + 𝑒𝑥𝑡 
where DF is the decay function taking a commitment value at a time t and returning it 
reduced for t+1. 
Specifying a non-arbitrary decay function poses a major problem. Should it be an 
exponential function as in nuclear physics? Then the function would take the form 
𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚 (𝐴 ≻  𝐵) 
𝑑 𝑡
= −𝜆 𝑐𝑜𝑚 (𝐴 ≻  𝐵)  
where λ is the exponential decay constant (ignoring the effects of experience). Even 
granting that the decay should be exponential, the question remains as to whether we 
have the same decay function for all kinds of preferences or whether the decay constant 
varies. Matilda’s commitment to preferences concerning types of ice cream might decay 
faster than her commitment to voting preferences. 
 243 
 
As I suggested in the beginning, we might want to distinguish foreground and background 
ends, where the latter do not exhibit a horizon. Some ends, such as the end to be healthy 
rather than to suffer from a sickness do not tend to disappear. Accordingly, some 
commitment values do not seem to decay at all.119 The question as to which commitment 
values decay and why is left open by Dewey’s texts and I too will leave it for future 
research.120 
The questions about decay functions become even more difficult if we accept Dewey’s 
theory of practical reasoning as a normative prescription. How should we adjudicate the 
rationality of various decay functions? Again, Dewey’s text leaves the final answer open, 
but his general pragmatism suggests adaptation to the environment as a criterion for 
evaluating functions. The decay should not occur so quickly as to disrupt adaptation 
between the agent and the situation, but fast enough for re-adaptation. The challenge 
lies in cashing out the notion of adaptation so as to adjudicate between decay functions. 
A further problem results from describing the decay as a function of commitment values 
over time, such that it takes a commitment value at a time and returns a diminished 
commitment value. This description cannot be completely correct, because if the decay 
function ranged over all moments of time, then commitment values would fail to 
correctly specify the probability of preference change by the next act. 
As a solution, I let the decay function range over a quantised time. The decay happens 
from act to act rather than from moment to moment. Since the decay never occurs 
between acts, one can interpret commitment values as the probability of preference 
                                                          
119 We could also capture this intuition by assuming countervailing factors reversing the decay, but 
it is hardly plausible that I have frequently positive experiences resulting from my preferences for 
health over sickness. 
120 Perhaps the best way to go here is to employ Dewey’s notion of growth. The decay of some 
commitment values might contribute to growth while that of others might not. But Dewey’s notion 
of growth is notoriously difficult to cash out. 
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change by the next act. One might even suggest a more coarse-grained time which only 
includes significant acts. Commitment to preference might only decay from one 
relevantly different situation of action to another. Consider a telephone operator 
engaging in repetitive acts, such as taking and forwarding calls. It could be that the decay 
progresses only when the operator switches from these tasks to other activities.121 While 
I leave open which decay functions we should endorse, I succeeded in reconstructing 
Dewey’s horizon for ends in a formal way by introducing commitment values. 
 
Means Affect Commitment Values 
Dewey’s claim that means affect ends poses a challenge for every reconstruction. It is 
uncontroversial that ends can outweigh each other in case of a particular choice. 
According to Dewey, however, means affect the general ends and not just the occasional 
choices. I understand such general ends as specified by intrinsic preferences.122 It seems 
implausible that any information could affect these preferences. Information is typically 
considered to influence subjective probabilities, not the preferences which are 
independent of such probabilities. 
Consider the following example: Matilda has the end to walk to the top of the hill rather 
than to the lake. However, the only path leading there is badly maintained. At one point, 
Matilda would have to jump over a dangerous crevice. Taking such a path conflicts with 
her end of staying safe. Uncontroversially, Matilda’s end of safety can outweigh her end 
of reaching the top of the hill.  
                                                          
121 I thank Yonatan Shemmer for this suggestion and example. 
122 We can also take extrinsic preferences over acts to provide ends. However, only the first type 
of ends, which are given by intrinsic preferences, create a problem for Dewey’s decision theory. 
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Dewey, however, makes the unusual proposal that learning about the cost of the means 
can lead to a change of the end itself. According to Dewey, Matilda might lose her end to 
get to the top altogether, so that she would not even go to the top of the hill if she learned 
of a different, safe path. Remember, if I learn about the need to burn down pig-sties for 
roast pork I should be likelier to lose my preference for roast pork. Even learning that I 
could use an oven instead, I would no longer do so. 
Cast in these terms, we might wonder why Dewey lets the means affect the ends. Why 
should the mere information about how intrinsic preferences can be realised affect these 
preferences? Dewey’s position appears in conflict with the most sensible interpretation 
of how information about means influences decisions. By introducing commitment values, 
however, we can render Dewey’s position plausible. Instead of letting information about 
means change preferences directly, it affects the commitments governing the probability 
of preference change. 
Upon receiving the information that realising the intrinsic preference comes with high 
costs, the commitment value should decrease. Matilda has an intrinsic preference for 
reaching the top of the hill and risking her safety over going to the lake. Accordingly, 
Matilda prefers to take the path and jump over the dangerous crevice. But she should be 
less committed to this preference for getting to the top, because it leads her to increase 
the probability of states she values negatively, such as incurring injuries. In light of the 
conflict with other ends, Matilda should consider whether the preference is worth it. 
Dewey suggests that to unwaveringly stick with one’s preferences if they overrule other 
ends repeatedly is irrational. An agent might be willing to risk her life for her cause. 
However, when it becomes clear that she can only further the cause by risking her life, it 
is rational for her to wonder whether she should keep the preference. 
 246 
 
While an agent receiving the information that an intrinsic preference is likely to result in 
negative states should reduce her commitment, this does not rule out that some 
preferences have enough support to maintain a high commitment even though realising 
them precludes other positive states. Consider a resistance fighter living under a fascist 
regime who endures great pains for her struggle. She risks her life repeatedly for the just 
cause. We do not want to be forced by our decision theory to label her irrational and my 
reconstruction does not imply such an irrationality attribution. While the information 
about the means needed to fight the fascist regime should reduce the commitment value, 
conversely, other factors might raise the commitment value. The commitment reduction 
is ceteris paribus. 
Using the technical innovation of commitment values, Dewey’s assertion that we should 
not consider the ends separate from the means becomes plausible. We can also express 
it formally if we specify a measure of the costs for realising a preference. Such a measure 
would be easier to construct if we did not assume the exclusivity of consequences. Then 
we could calculate the cost of a consequence in terms of how many positive 
consequences it ruled out. But even assuming exclusivity, multiple ways to measure costs 
remain. 
For example, when an agent receives information about the means needed to realise a 
preference, we can ask: How much would the agent have paid in US dollars before 
receiving the information in order for it not to be true? How much would Matilda have 
paid for the road not to include a dangerous crevice? We then calculate the new 
commitment value for the preference for the path to the hilltop over the other path (p) 
by deducting the amount of money (m) multiplied by a weighing factor (d):123 
                                                          
123 I ignore the decay function and experience here. 
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𝑐𝑜𝑚(𝑝)𝑡+1 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚(𝑝)𝑡  −  𝑚 ∗  𝑑 
There are problems with such a measure for costs. Arguably, the value of money 
diminishes the more an agent has of it. The sum of dollars might therefore fail to measure 
costs appropriately. We could try other approaches, for example we could ask how much 
pain the agent would have been willing to endure for the information to be false. The 
final measure does not matter much, as long as we can determine the cost of preferences 
and use it to reduce the commitment accordingly. 
The general procedure has three steps: First, look at which currently chosen acts would 
no longer be chosen if not for this preference. Second, measure the costs of the action. 
Third, new information about these costs leads to a change in commitment. 
As can be seen, commitment values allow us to capture Dewey’s intuition that 
information about means affects ends in a variety of ways. The story about pig-sties and 
ovens appeared implausible, but the proposal that learning about the costs associated 
with a preference influences commitment to this preference is worth taking seriously. 
What seemed hard to accept becomes an interesting suggestion for decision theory in my 
reconstruction. 
 
Problems 
I have reconstructed Dewey’s central tenets using an extended decision theory, which 
includes commitment values. Two problems, however, threaten the usefulness of the 
resulting decision theory. 
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Commitment Values Remain Underspecified 
While Dewey’s central tenets concern the dynamic of commitments, it remains 
underspecified. At multiple points in my reconstruction I was forced to say that only 
vaguely described factors influence commitment values. Experience played an important 
role, but I offered no way of measuring it. Neither did I settle on a specific decay function, 
nor on a way to calculate the costs which lead to a change of commitment values. 
Furthermore, I have offered no suggestions for how to determine the initial commitment 
value after a preference change. 
The under-determination of commitment values results from the limited scope of the 
present text: I focus on reconstructing Dewey’s theory of practical reasoning. What 
seemed completely contrary to decision theory has become a contribution to it by 
introducing commitment values. The remaining work needed for developing a more 
encompassing pragmatist decision theory does not lessen this achievement. 
Many of the gaps could be closed by broadening the inquiry. Pragmatists do not have to 
stick to Dewey’s word and could instead make original contributions. Formally specifying 
the full dynamic of commitments should stand on top of the priority list for developing a 
pragmatist decision theory. The gaps in the current theory follow from the limitations of 
Dewey’s texts. 
 
Too Much Preference Change 
One might worry that introducing commitment values results in too much preference 
change. Assume that Matilda has a preference p for chocolate over vanilla ice cream such 
that com(p) = .99 remains constant over a long period of time. We should then expect 
that over 100 acts, Matilda’s preference will change. In the course of a long day Matilda 
acts a 100 times, so that we should assume the occurrence of a preference change, even 
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though Matilda never encounters a situation where she had to choose between chocolate 
and vanilla ice cream. A possible response is to simply assume that the commitment 
values approach 1, but by adding Dewey’s commitment decay to the picture it becomes 
clear that they won’t stay there. 
Frequent preference changes might seem implausible. Should we endorse a decision 
theory on which our preferences change many times a day? On a closer look, however, it 
becomes acceptable. That Matilda’s preference concerning ice cream changes over the 
course of 100 acts does not imply that she sticks with her new preference. Matilda might 
simply be indifferent between chocolate and vanilla ice cream at one point during the day 
and switch back after a few acts. After all, there is no reason for the commitment value 
for the new indifference to be high. And if it is .5 at its origin, there is a 50 per cent chance 
that it is already gone again by the time of the next act. While preference change might 
be frequent, it can also go unnoticed without making a behavioural difference. 
For some preferences, such as preferring health over sickness, we might propose that the 
commitment value typically approaches 1 and no decay occurs. But for many preferences 
frequent changes are plausible, especially if they tend to revert quickly and can go 
unnoticed. In fact, this account of preference change allows us to account for ‘trembling 
hand’ phenomena, where agents choose options which they otherwise disprefer. The 
trembling fits well with a commitment value close to but below 1, where the preference 
jumps quickly back after changes. The concern about too much preference change proves 
rather toothless, since a change of preferences is not that threatening if it has few or no 
consequences. 
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Conclusion 
While Dewey avoided quantitative approaches, I have managed to reconstruct Dewey’s 
claims about means and ends as contributions to decision theory. Impeded habits can 
lead to a change in ends, ends can be situational relative ends-in-view, and means can 
have a horizon. All these postulates suggest rules for an extended decision theory. 
Dewey’s theory specifies the kinematics of commitments. It provides a model for 
preference change, and gives prominence to experience, the situational horizon of 
commitment, and information about how preferences can be realised. 
My proposal shows that we do not have to insist on opposing Dewey’s theory of practical 
reasoning to decision theory. Instead we can move forward towards a unified and 
sophisticated theory of human choice. Furthermore, it succeeds in recasting Dewey’s 
apparently outrageous statements about ends and means as intriguing hypotheses about 
the dynamics of preferences. While we might not accept all of Dewey’s suggestions, my 
reconstruction provides the basis for a pragmatist decision theory. 
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